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Abstract
The unifying theme in my PhD thesis is the effect that credit market imperfec­
tions have on aggregate outcomes. My main interest is in the collateral amplification 
mechanism and on the welfare effects that economic shocks and policies have on dif­
ferent groups in society.
In my first chapter (which is joint with Nobu Kiyotaki and Alex Michaelides), 
we develop a life-cycle model of a production economy in which land and capital are 
used to build residential and commercial real estate. We find that, in an economy 
where the share of land in the value of real estates is large, housing prices react 
more to an exogenous change in expected productivity or the world interest rate, 
causing a large redistribution between net buyers and net sellers of houses. Changing 
financing constraints, however, has limited effects on housing prices.
My second and third chapters examine environments with credit constrained 
entrepreneurs similarly to the original Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) paper. My second 
chapter asks the question of whether tightening capital requirements may be welfare 
improving when firms face credit constraints. I find that the answer is ‘no’. Although 
tightening the collateral constraint dampens business cycle fluctuations, the first 
order cost in terms of reduced access to credit is too great.
My third chapter examines the extent to which a borrower’s reputation for re­
payment can serve as intangible collateral, thus explaining the movement of down­
payment requirements over the business cycle. The main finding is that, under stan­
dard technology shocks, down-payments move in a pro-cyclical fashion. Introducing 
a pro-cyclical productivity gap between firms as well as counter-cyclical degree of 
idiosyncratic production risk helps to generate counter-cyclical down-payment re­
quirements.
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O verview
The financial crisis of the last few years has given a fresh impetus to the develop­
ment of macro-economic models with credit frictions. In an economy with complete 
markets, full information and full commitment, only the most productive firms will 
be in operation, consumers will enjoy smooth consumption profiles across states of 
nature and housing tenure will be irrelevant for consumer welfare. Once we allow for 
limited commitment, outcomes in the market economy depart from those predicted 
in the standard RBC model. This thesis examines three aspects of these departures 
from first best.
Chapter 1 (joint with Nobu Kiyotaki and Alex Michaelides) studies the effect of 
collateral constraints on housing tenure choices over the life cycle, before examining 
what effect housing price changes have on the welfare of different groups in society. 
We argue that limited commitment in the housing rental market and in the credit 
market are key to explaining the fact that almost a third of the US population 
rent. In the model we build, landlords guard against moral hazard in the housing 
rental market by restricting the freedom of tenants in modifying rented dwellings 
to their own taste. This implies that tenants get less utility from a rented house 
compared to the utility they would get from owning the same house. Without credit 
constraints, everyone would then borrow heavily and purchase a house in order to 
enjoy housing services to the full. However, credit constraints prevent young and 
poor households from buying and forces them to rent instead. Only gradually, 
consumers accumulate savings and purchase houses. At first they do so subject to 
binding borrowing constraints but increasingly over time, they accumulate their own 
equity as they start to save for retirement.
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Chapter 1 also examines the aggregate and welfare implications of the model. 
We consider whether our economy is capable of delivering quantitatively realistic 
predictions for housing prices when hit with shocks such as a fall in the world real 
interest rate or an increase in the labour productivity growth rate. The chapter 
shows that the presence of land (which is fixed in aggregate supply) in the production 
of real estate services is key in delivering large movements in housing prices, following 
changes in fundamentals. In contrast the tightness of the collateral constraint plays 
almost no role because it only affects relatively poor people who account for a 
small fraction of the housing stock. Finally, we show that housing price movements 
redistribute wealth from buyers to sellers of housing.
In Chapters 2 and 3 I we focus on the collateral amplification mechanism, using 
a more traditional Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) environment in which entrepreneurs 
rather than consumers are subject to borrowing constraints. Chapter 2 studies the 
incentives of a benevolent government to regulate the private sector’s leverage in 
an economy in which debt is secured by collateral. The presence of asset prices in 
individual agents’ collateral constraints introduces a ’fire sale’ externality, which can 
potentially make the private equilibrium constrained inefficient. Individual entrepre­
neurs decide how much to borrow and lend, only taking private gains and losses into 
account. What atomistic agents ignore is the fact that in some states of the world, 
they will realise gains, purchase more assets and push prices up while in other states 
they will realise losses, ’fire sale’ assets helping to push prices down further. Usually, 
such pecuniary externalities are not a reason for policy to correct private outcomes. 
But in an environment with collateralised borrowing and lending, asset prices can 
affect the tightness of borrowing constraints and policy can help to stabilise access 
to credit and therefore economic activity. As a result, consumption variability is 
reduced and this has a beneficial effect on welfare. We find that regulating leverage 
has a substantial cost too because it denies highly productive entrepreneurs access 
to funds. Quantitatively, we find that the cost is too great and the government does 
not find it optimal to regulate leverage in our environment.
In most models of the collateral amplification mechanism, the fraction of firm
12
tangible assets that can be used as collateral is assumed to be constant and exoge­
nous. In contrast, during the crisis we saw big changes in the access and terms 
for leveraged finance. Downpayment requirements for house purchase increased and 
private equity firms no longer could acquire their targets with a minimal amount 
of own equity. It is widely believed that such fluctuations in downpayment require­
ments significantly amplified the credit cycle over the past few years. In Chapter 3 
we extend a Kiyotaki-Moore (1997) type model in order to incorporate such fluctua­
tions in downpayment requirements for capital goods. We do this by assuming that 
a lender can lend anonymously but a borrower must borrow publicly. In addition, 
we assume that lenders can commit to punish defaulting borrowers by permanently 
excluding them from future credit.
We show that, when credit constraints are binding, such permanent exclusion 
is costly for borrowers because they earn a higher return on their own production 
than the rate of return on risk free debt. Access to credit helps entrepreneurs 
leverage up in order to take maximum advantage of this excess return. Having to 
self finance or lend to others therefore leads to a substantial loss of utility. In the 
paper we compute how a borrower’s reputation for repayment can act as intangible 
collateral. We find that intangible collateral can be very substantial in steady state, 
backing the liabilities of the private sector in addition to the more traditional tangible 
collateral usually considered in the literature. We introduce aggregate technology 
shocks and find that the value of intangible collateral is high (and downpayment 
requirements are low) in recessions because borrowing constraints bind more tightly 
and the excess return enjoyed by high productivity entrepreneurs is higher. We show 
that introducing a high degree of idiosyncratic production risk in recessions can 
help correct this implication of the model, generating counter-cyclical downpayment 
requirements on capital goods.
Chapter 1
W inners and Losers in H ousing  
M arkets
1.1 Introduction
Over the last few decades, we have observed considerable fluctuations in real estate 
values and aggregate economic activities in many economies. In Japan, both the 
real capital gains on real estate during the prosperous decade of the 1980s and the 
losses during the depressed decades of the 1990s and the early 2000s are in the order 
of multiple years worth of GDP. Recent fluctuations in housing prices in many coun­
tries raise concerns. To what extent are these housing price fluctuations consistent 
with fundamental conditions? How do the fluctuations affect the wealth and welfare 
of different groups of households? In this paper, we develop a life-cycle model to 
investigate how housing prices, aggregate production and the wealth distribution 
react to changes in technology and financial conditions. After confirming that the 
model is broadly empirically consistent with life-cycle choices of home ownership 
and consumption, we use the model to assess which groups of households gain and 
which groups lose from changes in fundamentals.
To develop a theoretical framework, we take into account the limitation on the 
supply of land and the limitation on the enforcement of contracts in real estate and 
credit markets. Land (or location) is an important input for supplying residential
1
2and commercial real estates. Because the supply of land is largely inelastic and 
because the real estate price includes the value of land, the real estate price is 
sensitive to a change in the expected productivity growth rate and the real interest 
rate in equilibrium. We also consider incomplete contract enforcement to be an 
essential feature of an economy with real estate. Often, because landlords are afraid 
that the tenant may modify the property against their interests, landlords restrict 
tenants’ discretion over the use and modification of the house, and tenants enjoy 
lower utility from renting the house compared to owning and controlling the same 
house. If there were no other frictions, then the household would buy the house 
straight away. The household, however, may face a financing constraint, because 
the creditor fears that the borrowing household may default. The creditor demands 
the borrower to put his house as collateral for a loan and asks him to provide 
a downpayment. We develop an overlapping generations model of a production 
economy in which land and capital axe used to produce residential and commercial 
tangible assets, taking the importance of land for production of tangible assets, 
the loss of utility from rented housing and the tightness of collateral constraints as 
exogenous parameters. 1
The interaction between the collateral constraint and the loss of utility from 
renting a house turns out to generate a typical pattern of consumption and housing 
over a life-cycle. When the household is born without any inheritance, it cannot 
afford a sufficiently high downpayment for buying a house; the household rents and 
consumes modestly to save for a downpayment. When the household accumulates 
some net worth, the household buys a house subject to the collateral constraint, 
which is smaller than a house that would be bought without the collateral constraint. 
As net worth further rises, the household upgrades along the housing ladder. At 
some stage, the household finds it better to start repaying the debt rather than 
moving up the housing ladder. When the time comes for retirement possibly with 
idiosyncratic risk attached, the household moves to a smaller house anticipating a
1 Here, the importance of land for the production of the tangible asset is defined as the elasticity 
of tangible asset supply with respect to land for a fixed level of the other input. See equation (1.2) 
later on.
3lower income in the future.
In equilibrium, due to the limitation of land supply, the supply of tangible assets 
tends to grow more slowly than final output causing an upward trend in the real 
rental price and the purchase price of the tangible asset. The more important is land 
for producing tangible assets compared to capital (as in Japan or a metropolitan 
area), the higher is the expected growth rate of the rental price and therefore the 
higher is the housing price-rental ratio. In such an economy, the household needs a 
larger downpayment relative to wage income in order to buy a house and tends to 
buy a house later in life, resulting in a lower home-ownership rate.
Moreover, in an economy where land is more important for producing tangible 
assets, we find the housing price to be more sensitive to exogenous changes in funda­
mentals such as the expected growth rate of labor productivity or the world interest 
rate, along the perfect foresight path from one steady state to another. Consistent 
with these theoretical predictions, Davis and Heathcote (2007) note that housing 
prices are more sensitive in large U.S. metropolitan areas. Del Negro and Otrok 
(2007) use a dynamic factor decomposition to find that local factors are more im­
portant for the house price change in states where the share of land in the real estate 
value is larger in the United States.2
In contrast to the change in productivity growth and the world interest rate, we 
find that financial innovation which permanently relaxes the collateral constraint has 
a surprisingly small effect on housing prices, despite increasing the home-ownership 
rate substantially both in the transition and in the steady state. In our economy, 
tenants or credit-constrained home owners are relatively poor and own a small share 
of aggregate wealth as a group. As a result, the effect of relaxing the collateral
2Davis and Palumbo (2008) find that the share of land in the value of houses has risen in U.S. 
metropolitan areas and they argue that this contributes to faster housing price appreciation and, 
possibly, larger swings in housing prices. Glaeser et. al. (2005) find that land use restrictions are 
needed to explain recent high housing prices in Manhattan, van Nieuwerburgh and Weill (2006) 
also argue that the increase in the dispersion of housing prices across regions can be quantitatively 
generated from an increase in the dispersion of earnings in the presence of planning restrictions. 
We ignore the restrictions on land use and planning, even though they further increase the natural 
limitation of land in supplying tangible assets. Other factors that might be empirically relevant for 
house price determination (such as owner-occupied housing as a hedge against rent risk, the effects 
of inflation and money illusion) are not considered in our framework; see Sinai and Souleles (2005) 
and Brunnermeier and Julliard (2008).
4constraint on housing prices is largely absorbed by a modest conversion from rented 
to owned units.
In addition to the effect on the housing price and aggregate output, the exogenous 
changes in the productivity growth rate and the interest rate affect the wealth and 
welfare of various households differently, causing winners and losers in housing mar­
kets. As a general rule of thumb, net house buyers (such as young worker-tenants) 
lose and net house sellers (such as retiree-home owners) gain from the house price 
hike, while the wealth effect of the house price change on aggregate consumption is 
negligible aside from the liquidity effect.3 Since housing wealth forms the largest 
component of nonhuman wealth for most households, the distribution effect is sub­
stantial. The overall welfare effect depends on the underlying shocks causing house 
price changes. A general equilibrium framework with heterogeneous agents enables 
us to analyze how the shocks to fundamentals affect the distribution of wealth and 
welfare of different households.
Our work broadly follows two strands of the literature. One is the literature on 
consumption and saving of a household facing idiosyncratic and uninsurable earn­
ings shock and a borrowing constraint, which includes Bewley (1977, 1983), Deaton 
(1991), Carroll (1997), Attanasio et. al. (1999) and Gourinchas and Parker (2002). 
Huggett (1993), Aiyagari (1994), and Krusell and Smith (1998) have examined the 
general equilibrium implications of such models. The second strand is the literature 
on the investment behavior of firms under liquidity constraints. In particular, Kiy­
otaki and Moore (1997) is closely related since they study the dynamic interaction 
between asset prices, credit limits and aggregate economic activity for an economy 
with credit constrained entrepreneurs. When many households borrow substantially 
against their housing collateral and move up and down the housing ladder, these 
households are more like small entrepreneurs rather than simple consumers.
3 The household is a net house buyer if the expected present value of housing services consumption 
over the lifetime exceeds the value of the house currently owned. Although the present population 
as a whole is a net seller of the existing houses to the future population, the aggregate effect is 
quantitatively very small because the discounted value of selling the existing houses to the future 
population is negligible. Thus, unlike some popular arguments, the wealth effect of housing prices 
on aggregate consumption is negligible, because the positive wealth effect of the net house sellers is 
largely offset by the negative wealth effect of the net house buyers of present population.
5Our attention to housing collateral is in line with substantial micro evidence 
in the UK (Campbell and Cocco (2007)) and the US (Hurst and Stafford (2004)) 
which suggests that dwellings are an important source of collateral for households. 
Given the empirical findings that connect housing prices, home equity and aggre­
gate consumption, there has been substantial research on building models that 
capture these relationships, either with a representative agent (Aoki, Proudman 
and Vlieghe (2004), Davis and Heathcote (2005), Kahn (2007), Piazessi et. al. 
(2007)), or with heterogeneous agents (Chambers, Garriga and Schlagenhauf (forth­
coming), Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2007), Iacoviello (2005), Iacoviello and 
Neri (2007), Lustig and van Nieuwerburgh (2005), Nakajima (2005), Ortalo-Magne 
and Rady (2006), Rios-Rull and Sanchez (2005) and Silos (2007)). Distinguishing 
features of our analysis include an explicit account of land as a limiting factor in a 
production economy, an investigation of the interaction between household life-cycle 
choices and the aggregate economy and evaluating welfare changes across heteroge­
neous households stemming from shocks to fundamentals.
Section 1 . 2  lays out the model, Section 1.3 examines the steady state, and Sec­
tion 1.4 investigates the transitions, including the impact on wealth and welfare of 
different households.
1.2 T he M odel
1.2 .1  Fram ew ork
We consider an economy with homogeneous product, tangible assets, labor, repro­
ducible capital stock, and non-reproducible land. There is a continuum of hetero­
geneous households of population size Nt  in period t, a representative foreigner, and 
a representative firm.
The representative firm has a constant returns to scale technology to produce 
output (Yt) from labor (Nt) and productive tangible assets (Zyt)  as;
Yt =  F(AtN t , ZYt) =  0  < r, <  1 , (1.1)
6where At is aggregate labor productivity which grows at a constant rate, At+i/At  =  
Ga • Tangible assets (Zt) are produced according to a constant returns to scale 
production function using aggregate capital (K t ) and land (L):
Zt =  £1-7-K7, o < 7 < 1. (1.2)
The tangible assets are fully equipped or furnished and can be used as productive 
tangible assets (such as offices and factories) or houses interchangeably:
fNt
Zt =  Zyt  +  /  ht (i ) di ,
Jo
where ht(i) is housing used by household i in period t. With this technological 
specification of tangible assets, the firm can continuously adjust the way in which 
the entire stock of land and capital are combined and can convert between productive 
tangible assets and housing without any friction.4 The parameter (1 — 7 ) measures 
the importance of land for the production of tangible assets compared to capital, 
which would be equal to the share of land in property income if there were separate 
competitive rental markets for land and capital. Thus, we often call (1 — 7 ) as "the 
share of land in the production of tangible assets" hereafter. Typically, the share 
of land in the production of tangible assets is higher in urban than in rural areas, 
because land (or location) is more important for production with the agglomeration 
of economic activities.5 We assume that the aggregate supply of land L is fixed. 
The capital stock depreciates at a constant rate 1 — A e  (0,1) every period, but can
4 Davis and Heathcote (2005) use a production function in which only a fixed flow of new vacant 
land can be used for building new houses. Because, once used, the land is no longer usable for ren­
ovation nor new construction, there would be no vibrant city older than a hundred years. Perhaps, 
in reality, the allocation of land and capital is not as flexible as in our model but not as inflexible as 
in Davis and Heathcote (2005). We also assume there is no productivity growth in the production 
of tangible assets, because Davis and Heathcote (2005) calculate the growth rate of productivity in 
the US construction sector to be close to zero (—0.27 percent per annum). We ignore labor used 
in this sector for simplicity.
5We will not attempt to explain why agglomeration arises. We should not confuse the share 
of land (1 — 7 ) with the scarcity of land (or marginal product of land), because scarcity not only 
depends upon the share of land, but also on labor productivity, the capital-land ratio and the 
capital-labor ratio. We will later discuss how the share of land in the production of structures is 
related to the share of land in the value of tangible assets in Section 3.4.
(1.3)
7be accumulated through investment of goods (It) as:
K t =  \ K t- 1 +  It . (1.4)
Tangible assets built this period can be used immediately.
The representative firm owns and controls land and capital from last period and 
issues equity to finance investment. As the firm increases the size of tangible assets 
with capital accumulation, it will be convenient in subsequent analysis to assume 
that the firm maintains the number of shares to be equal to the stock of tangible 
assets.6 Let qt be the price of equity before investment takes place and let pt be the 
price of equity after investment takes place in this period. Let wt be the real wage 
rate, and rt be the rental price of tangible assets. The firm then faces the following 
flow-of-funds constraint:
Yt -  wtNt -  r tZYt -  It +  PtZt =  qtZt-i  (1.5)
The left hand side (LHS) is the sum of the net cash flow from output production, mi­
nus investment costs and the value of equities after investment. The right hand side
(RHS) equals the value of equity at the beginning of the period (before investment 
has taken place).
The owners of equity pay pt to acquire one unit and immediately receive rt as a 
rental payment (including imputed rents). Next period, the owner earns qt+i before 
investment takes place. Therefore, the rate of return equals
Rt =  ■ (1.6)
pt -  n
There are no aggregate shocks in this economy except for unanticipated, initial 
shocks. As a result, we assume that agents have perfect foresight for all aggregate 
variables, including the rate of return.
6This means the firm follows a particular policy of equity issue and dividend payouts. However, 
alternative policies do not change allocations because the Modigliani-Miller Theorem holds in our 
economy under perfect foresight and would only complicate subsequent expressions.
8From (1.5) and (1.6) under perfect foresight, the value of the firm (V f ) to the 
equity holders from the previous period is equal to the present value of the net cash 
flow from production and the rental income of tangible assets produced:
VtF -  qtZt_i =  Yt -  wtNt -  rtZYt ~  It +  rtZt +  (jpt - r t )Zt (1.7)
=  Yt -  wtNt -  rtZYt ~ h  +  rtZt +  ^ -V ^ i
The firm takes {wt,rt ,  Rt} as given and chooses a production plan {Nt, ZYt, Yt, It, K t}  
to maximize the value of the firm, subject to the constraints of technology (1 .1 ) ,(1 .2 ), 
(1.3) and (1.4).
Since the production function of output is constant returns to scale, there is no 
profit from output production. Therefore, the value of the firm equals the value of 
the tangible asset stock. Given that the number of equities are maintained to equal 
the stock of tangible assets by assumption, the price of equities equals the price of 
tangible assets. Hereafter, we refer to the shares of the firm as the shares of tangible 
assets.
Households are heterogeneous in labor productivity, and can have either low, 
medium, or high productivity, or be retired. Every period, there is a flow of new 
households born with low productivity without any inheritance of the asset. Each 
low productivity household may switch to medium productivity in the next period 
with a constant probability 5l. Each medium productivity household has a constant 
probability Sm to become a high productivity one in the next period. Once a 
household has switched to high productivity it remains at this high productivity until 
retirement. All the households with low, medium and high productivity are called 
workers, and all the workers have a constant probability 1 — uj € (0 , 1 ) of retiring 
next period. Once retired, each household has a constant probability 1 — a  G (0,1) 
of dying before the next period. (In other words, a worker continues to work with 
probability uj, and a retiree survives with probability a  in the next period). The 
flow of new born workers is Gn  — uj fraction of the workforce in the previous period,
9where Gn  >  w >  Sl for i =  l ,m.  All the transitions are i.i.d. across a continuum 
of households and over time, and thus there is no aggregate uncertainty on the 
distribution of individual labor productivity. Let Nj., N™ and Nj1 be populations 
of low, medium and high productivity workers, respectively, and let N[  be the 
population size of retired households in period t. Then, we have:
We choose to formulate the household’s life-cycle in this stylized way, following Diaz- 
Gimenez, Prescott, Fitzgerald and Alvarez (1992) and Gertler (1999), because we 
are mainly interested in the interaction between the life-cycles of households and the 
aggregate economy. The three levels of labor productivity give us enough flexibility 
to mimic a typical life-cycle of wage income for our aggregate analysis.
Each household derives utility from the consumption of output (ct) and housing 
services (ht) of rented or owned housing, and suffers disutility from supplying labor 
(nt). (We suppress the index of household i when we describe a typical household). 
We assume that, when the household rents a house rather than owning and con­
trolling the same house as an owner-occupier, she enjoys smaller utility by a factor 
'ijj G (0,1). This disadvantage of rented housing reflects the tenant’s limited dis­
cretion over the way the house is used and modified according to her tastes. The 
preference of the household is given by the expected discounted utility as:
N ‘ =  ( G N - ^ i N U + N f h  +  N ^  +  i u - ^ N U  
N™ =  ^ iV ^i +  ^ - O A ^ ,
N? =  8rnNF_1 +LjN£l i ,
E0 [u (ct, [1 -  ip I  (rent t )} ht) -  v(nt, v t)\ I , 0 < /3 <  1, (1.8)
where I(rent t) is an indicator function which takes the value of unity when the
household rents the house in period t  and zero when she owns it .7 Disutility of
7We assume that, in order to enjoy full utility of the house, the household must own and control 
the entire house used. If the household rents a fraction of the house used, then she will not enjoy
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labor v(nt, vt) is subject to idiosyncratic shocks to its labor productivity vt, which
consists of the persistent component et and transitory component C,t as
vt =  €tCt (!-9)
The persistent component et is either high (eh), medium (em), low (el), or 0, depend­
ing on whether the household has high, medium or low productivity, or is retired, 
and follows the stationary Markov process described above. The transitory compo­
nent Q is i.i.d. across time and across households and has mean of unity.8 Eo(Xt) 
is the expected value of Xt  conditional on survival at date t and conditional on 
information at date 0. For most of our computation, we choose a particular utility 
function with inelastic labor supply as:
U a j a ^[l-ilfl(rentt)\ht y  
U (ct, ht) =  —----------
1—a \ l ~P
1 -  p
and vt =  0 if nt <  vti and vt becomes arbitrarily large if nt >  vt- The parameter 
p > 0  is the coefficient of relative risk aversion and a  e  (0 , 1 ) reflects the share 
of consumption of goods (rather than housing services) in total expenditure. We 
normalize the labor productivity of the average worker to unity as:
Nle1 +  N ? e m +  N?eh =  N lt +  N tm +  JVt\  (1.10)
We focus on the environment in which there are problems in enforcing contracts 
and there are constraints on trades in markets. There is no insurance market against 
the idiosyncratic shock to labor productivity of each household. The only asset that 
households hold and trade is the equity of tangible assets (and the annuity contract 
upon this equity). An owner-occupier can issue equity on its own house to raise 
funds from the other agents. But the other agents only buy equity up to a fraction 
1 — 6 € [0,1) of the house. Thus, to control the house and enjoy full utility of a
full utility even for the fraction of the house owned.
8 The transitory labor productivity shock helps to generate smooth distribution of net worth of 
households of the same persistent labor productivity.
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house of size ht , the owner-occupier must hold sufficient equity St to satisfy:
st > 0ht . (1 .1 1 )
We can think of this constraint as a collateral constraint for a residential mortgage
— even though in our economy the mortgage is financed by equity rather than debt
— and we take 6 as an exogenous parameter of the collateral constraint. Because 
the tenant household does not have a collateral asset, we assume the tenant cannot 
borrow (or issue equities):
st >  0 . (1 .1 2 )
We restrict tradeable assets to be the homogeneous equity of tangible assets 
in order to abstract from the portfolio choice of heterogeneous households facing 
collateral constraints and uninsurable labor income risk. Because we analyze the 
economy under the assumption of perfect foresight about the aggregate states, this 
restriction on tradeable assets is not substantive (because all the tradeable assets 
would earn the same rate of return), except for the case of an unanticipated aggregate 
shock.9
The flow-of-funds constraint of the worker is given by:
ct +  rtht +Ptst  =  (1 -  r )w tut +  rt st +  qtst- i, (1.13)
where r is a constant tax rate on wage income. The LHS is consumption, the rental 
cost of housing (or opportunity cost of using a house rather than renting it out), 
and purchases of equities. The RHS is gross receipts, which is the sum of after 
tax wage income, the rental income from equities purchased this period, and the
9 Although we do not attempt to derive these restrictions on market transactions explicitly as 
the outcome of an optimal contract, the restrictions are broadly consistent with our environment 
in which agents can default on contracts, misrepresent their wage income, and can trade assets 
anonymously (if they wish). The outside equity holders (creditors) ask the home owners to maintain 
some fraction of the housing equity to prevent default. There is no separate market for equities 
on land and capital upon it, because people prefer to control land and capital together in order to  
avoid the complications. Cole and Kocherlakota (2001) show that, if agents can misrepresent their 
idiosyncratic income and can save privately, the optimal contract is a simple debt contract with a 
credit limit. See Lustig (2004) and Lustig and van Nieuwerburgh (2005b) for analysis of optimal 
contracts with tangible assets as collateral.
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pre-investment value of equity held from the previous period. 10
For the retiree who only survives until the next period with probability <r, there 
is a competitive annuity market in which the owner of a unit annuity will receive the 
gross returns qt+i/cr if and only if the owner survives, and receive nothing if dead. 
The retiree also receives the benefit bt  per person from the government, which is 
financed by the uniform payroll tax as
btN l  =  r w t (N‘ +  N r  +  IV?). (1.14)
We assume that the retirement benefit does not exceed after-tax average wage income 
of the low productivity worker:
bt / w t =  — -  <  (1 -  t ) e1.
1 —  CO
The flow-of-funds constraint for the retiree is
ct  +  n h t + p t s t  =  bt +  r t s t +  — s t - i .  ( 1-15)<T
Each household takes the equity from the previous period (s*_i) and the joint 
process of prices, and idiosyncratic labor productivity shocks {wt, qt, £t} as 
given, and chooses the plan of consumption of goods and housing, and the equity 
holding {c*, ht, St} to maximize the expected discounted utility subject to the con­
straints of flow-of-funds and collateral.
The representative foreigner makes purchases of goods Cf  and equities of tangible 
assets in the home country (both Cf* and S? can be negative), subject to the
10 When the worker is an owner-occupier of a house of size ht and issues equity to the outside 
equity holders (creditors) by outstanding size of (ht — St) in period t, she faces the flow-of-funds 
constraint:
ct +  \ptht -  qtht- 1] -I- n {h t  -  s t ) =  (1 -  r ) w t i>t +  [pt (ht -  s t) -  qt (ht - i  -  s t_ i)].
The LHS is an outflow of funds: consumption, purchases of the owned house over the resale value 
of the house held from last period, and rental income paid to the outside equity holders of this 
period. The RHS is an inflow: after-tax wage income, and the value of new issues of outside equity 
above the value of outside equity from the previous period. By rearranging this, we find that both  
the owner-occupier and tenant face the same flow-of-funds constraint (1 .13), in which only the net 
position of equity matters.
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international flow-of-funds constraint against home agents as:
c ; + p ts ;  =  rts ;  +  qts u . (1.16)
The LHS is gross expenditure of the foreigner on home goods and equities, and 
the RHS is the gross receipts. We will focus on two special cases: one is a closed 
economy in which S* =  0, and another is a small open economy in which Rt =  Rf  
where Rf  is the exogenous foreign interest rate.
Given the above choices of households, the representative firm and the foreigner, 
the competitive equilibrium of our economy is characterized by the prices {Wt, rt ,pt}  
which clear the markets for labor, output, equity and the use of tangible assets as:
nt (i) di =  elNl  +  £mN ^  +  ehN^ =  N lt +  TVfm +  TV;rh t » (1.17)
o
ct (i ) di +  It +  C *, (1.18)
and (1.3) -11 Because of Walras’ Law, only three out of four market clearing condi­
tions are independent.
1.2 .2  B ehavior o f  R ep resen ta tive  F irm
The first order conditions for the value maximization of the representative firm are:
wt =  (1 -  rj)Yt /N t , (1.20)
n  =  riYt/Zyt =  V where Mt =  AtNt and ft  =  ZYt/Z u (1*21)
i-i (1.22)
11 The name of individual household i is such that a fraction of new-born households named after 
the names of the deceased households and the remaining fraction of newborns are given new names 
for i G ( N t - i , N t ].
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The first two equations are the familiar equality of price and marginal products of 
factors of production. The value of M* is the labor in efficiency unit, and ft  is 
a fraction of tangible assets used for production. The last equation says that the
Because there is no profit associated with regular production, the value of the 
firm is:
The first term of the RHS is the capital stock inherited from the previous period,
the return to land which comes from output and housing service production. Thus, 
the equity holders as a whole receive returns from capital and land through their 
holdings of equities of the entire tangible asset.
1.2 .3  H ousehold  B ehavior
The household chooses one among three modes of housing - becoming a tenant, 
a credit constrained owner-occupier, and an unconstrained owner-occupier. The 
flow-of-funds constraint of the worker and retiree can be rewritten as
opportunity cost of holding capital for one period -  the cost of capital -  should be 
equal to the marginal value product of capital. Thus we have
(1.23)
Yt =  ft (1.24)
VtF =  rtZ t - ( K t - \ K t. 1) +  ^ - [ r t+1Zt+1~ ( K t+1- \ K t ) ]  +  ... (1.25)
Mt
\ K t- i  +  77(1 -  7 ) ^
/
and the second term is the value of land, which is proportional to the present value of
ct +  rtht +  (pt -  rt )st =  (1  -  r )w tvt +  qtSt- 1 =  ®t, 
ct +  rtht +  {pt -  rt )st =  bt +  [qt/a\  st- i  =  xu
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where xt is the liquid wealth of the household. Liquid wealth is the wealth of the 
household, excluding illiquid human capital (the expected discounted value of future 
wages and pension income). We call liquid wealth “net worth” hereafter.
The tenant
The tenant chooses consumption of goods and housing services to maximize the 
utility, which leads to:
ct _  a  
rtht 1 -  a
Using the flow-of-funds constraint we can express housing and consumption as func­
tions of current expenditure:
and
ht =
(1 -  a) [xt -  (.Pt -  rt)st]
n
Substituting these into the utility function we get the following indirect utility func­
tion:
T ( \ 1 \ x t - ( p t - r t ) s t '[1~ p
u  { s t , x t \ r t , p t )  =  y —
\ r t / {  1 — -0 )] 1—a
Due to the lower utility from living in a rented house, the tenant effectively faces 
a higher rental price than the owner-occupier for the same utility, i.e., [r**/ ( 1  — ip)] 
rather than rt.
The constrained owner-occupier
The constrained owner-occupier faces a binding collateral constraint as:
st =  0ht.
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Thus he consumes ht — st/9  amount of housing services, and spends the remaining 
on goods as:
The indirect period utility of the constrained home owner is now:
1 [ xt -  (pt -  n  +  st
a
st/8  ]
i - 4 a 1 — a
The unconstrained owner-occupier
The collateral constraint is not binding for the unconstrained owner-occupier. Her 
intra-temporal choice is identical to the tenant’s but she does not suffer from the 
limited discretion associated with renting a house.
Value functions
Let At be the vector of variables and a function that characterizes the aggregate 
state of the economy at the beginning of period t  :
where $*(£*(*), s*_i(i)) is the date t  joint distribution function of present persis­
tent productivity and equity holdings from the previous period across households.
state, even if each faces idiosyncratic risks on her labor productivity. The prices 
(wt,rt ,pt,qt)  would be a function of this aggregate state in equilibrium. We can 
express the value functions of the retiree, high, medium and the low productiv­
ity worker by Vr (xt,At),  V h{xt, At), Vm(xt, At), and V l{xt, A t) as functions of the 
individual net worth and the aggregate state.
The retiree chooses the mode of housing and an annuity contract on equities, St, 
subject to the flow-of-funds constraint. Then, the retiree’s value function satisfies
uu (st ,xf ,r t ,pt) =
1 [xt -  { p t - r t) s t \ l 9 
1 -  p rt1_a
Each household has perfect foresight about the future evolution of this aggregate
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the Bellman equation:
V r (xt , At) =  Max  ( max {uj ( s t , xt \r t ,pt) +  PcrVT (bt+i +  [qt+i/cr] s t , At+1 ) } I ,
j —T,C,U \  st J
where vP (st ,xt]rt ,pt)  is the indirect utility function of present consumption and 
housing services when the mode of housing is tenant (j  =  T), constrained owner- 
occupier (j =  C), or unconstrained owner-occupier (j  =  U).
The worker chooses the mode of housing and saving in equities. The value 
function of a high-productivity worker satisfies the Bellman equation:




uj (su xt \ru pt) +  P{uE(\Vh({\ - T ) £ hCwt+i +  qt+i s t ,At+i)]
+(1  — u ) V r (bt+i +  qt+ist,  Aj+i)}
The high productivity worker continues to work with probability u  and retires with 
probability 1 — u> in the next period.
The value function of a medium productivity worker satisfies:







uj (s t ,xt ;rt lpt) +  P{(u -  <5m)£;c[Fm(( 1 -  r)emO t+ i +  qt+ is t , A t+i)] 
+6mE^[Vh(( 1 — T)eh£wt+i +  qt+ist , At+i)] +  (1 — uj)Vr(bt+ 1  +  <7t+ist, At+i)}
Next period, the medium productivity worker switches to high productivity with 
probability 8m, retires with probability 1 —u;, and remains with medium productivity 
with probability aj — 8m . The value function of a low productivity worker is similar 
to the value function of a medium productivity worker, except for m  being replaced 
by I and h being replaced by m.
Growth in the economy with land presents a unique problem for the solution of 
the individual agent problem because wages grow at different rates from the rental 
price and the equity price even in the steady state. This means that we need to 
transform the non-stationary per capita variables in the model into stationary per 
capita units. In Appendix 4.A.2, we describe how to convert the value functions of 
the household into a stationary representation.
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1 .2 .4  S tead y  S ta te  G row th
Before calibrating, it is useful to examine the steady state growth properties of our 
economy. Let Gx  =  X t+ i / X t be the steady state growth factor of variable X t . 
In the following we simply call the growth factor as the “growth rate”. In steady 
state, the growth rate of aggregate output variables should be equal:
It-i-i 1-1
- W  =  —  =  - k T  =  G y -
The growth rate of tangible assets need not be equal the growth rate of output, but 
it should be equal to the growth rate of productive tangible assets:
Zt+ 1 Zyt+i
- z r - - ^ r ~ G z -
Then, from the production functions, these growth rates depend upon the growth 
rates of aggregate labor productivity and population as G y  =  (Ga Gn )1-7? Gvz , and 
Gz  =  G]r. Thus
Gy  =  (G,iGjv)(1-7?)/(1-777), (1.26)
Gz  =  (G^Giv)7(1~T?)/(1_777) •
Because the supply of land is fixed, to the extent that land is an important input 
for producing tangible assets, the growth rates of output and tangible assets are 
both smaller than the growth rate of labor in efficiency units. Moreover, because 
tangible assets are more directly affected by the limitation of land than output, the 
growth rate of tangible assets is lower than the growth rate of output, when labor 
in efficiency units is growing.
In the steady state of the competitive economy, the growth rate of the real rental 
price and the purchase price of tangible assets is equal to the ratio of the growth 
rate of output and the growth rate of tangible assets:
n  _  rt+ 1 _  Pt+1 _  G y  _  i _ 7
L r r  —  — — — C ry  •
n  Pt Gz
(1.27)
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The rate of increase of the rental price and the purchase price of tangible assets is an 
increasing function of the growth rate of workers in efficiency units in steady state. 
The wage rate grows in the steady state with the same rate as the per capita output 
as
a * ,  r _ / i  _ \ i  1 / ( 1 —yv)
(1.28)r  -  — n  
&N
r i - n r  - ,< i-7)lV<i-r>)
UN
Because the per capita supply of land decreases with population growth, the growth 
rate of the wage rate is a decreasing function of the population growth rate.
Notice that the growth rates of aggregate quantities and prices only depend upon 
the parameters of the production function and the population and labor productivity 
growth rates. Because of overlapping generations and Cobb Douglas production 
functions, there is always a unique steady state growth in our closed or small open 
economy with constant population and labor productivity growth rates, even though 
the consumption and net worth of the individual household have different trends 
from the aggregate output per capita.
1.3 O bservations and S teady S tate  Im plications
1.3.1 O bservations  
Types o f Tangible A ssets
Here, we gather some observations, which give us some guidance for our calibrations. 
Our model has clear implications about the amount of tangible assets and its split 
between a productive and a residential component. We use the U.S. flow of fund 
accounts (see Appendix 4.A.3) to compute the average quarterly tangible assets of 
the non-farm private sector to GDP (this includes the value of land) and this equals
3.3 for the 1952-2005 period, and is fairly stable. The fraction of productive tangible 
assets to total tangible assets (Z y t /Z t ) turns out to be around 0.41 (but this masks 
a downward trend from around 0.39 in 1991 to around 0.31 in 2005). The value of 
the total housing stock to GDP has an average value of around 1.94 but again this 
masks a marked increase from around 2.2 in 1991 to 2.6 in 2005.
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Evolution of U .S. hom e-ow nership rates and housing prices
There exists considerable variation in home ownership rates across countries and 
over time. Focussing on the recent U.S. experience, Figure 1.1 plots the home 
ownership rates (fraction of households who are owner-occupiers) across different 
age groups from 1991 to 2009.
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Figure 1.1: Home-ownership in the US since 1991
The figure shows a general upward trend that starts after 1995 and basically 
reflects the choices of younger cohorts (see Chambers, Garriga and Schlagenhauf 
(forthcoming) for further discussion). Variations over time across different cohorts 
may reflect differences in financing constraints, and utility losses from renting, factors 
that we analyze in the theoretical model. At the same time as homeownership goes 
up, real house prices also increase by a substantial amount. Figure 1.2 plots the real 
(deflated by the urban CPI) house price both for the value-weighted Case-Shiller 
index and for the equally weighted OFHEO index (for purchase-only transactions). 
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Figure 1.2: Housing prices in the US since 1991 
1.3.2 C a lib ra tio n
We consider one period to be one year and the baseline economy as the United 
States.
Labor Incom e Process
Our analysis will critically hinge on capturing the skewed income distribution in the 
data. To deal with this problem we follow Castaneda, Diaz-Gimenez and Rios-Rull 
(2003) and construct a simplified version of their labor income process to capture the 
substantial earnings inequality in U.S. data, with the aim of generating endogenously 
a wealth distribution close to its empirical counterpart. We pick the probabilities 
of switching earnings states (Sl , Sm) and the individual labor income productivity 
levels (£l,Em, eh) to match six moments. The first moment is a hump-shape in labor 
income; we set the ratio of mean income of 41-60 year old to the mean income of 21- 
40 year old to be 1.3, based on PSID evidence. The other five moments are the five 
quintiles of the earnings distribution. All six moments are taken from Castaneda 
et. al. (p.839 and table 7, p. 845) but we have independently confirmed that
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even though these moments change in subsequent waves of the SCF (1995, 1998, 
2001 and 2004), these changes are very small. Given that we normalize the average 
productivity to one, this means we have 4 parameters to match 6  moments. This 
results in setting {Sl =  0.0338, 6m =  0.0247}, while the ratio of the middle to low 
productivity is 4.51 and the ratio of high to low productivity is 15.75. Following 
the buffer stock saving literature (for example, Deaton (1991) or Carroll (1997)) we 
assume that the transitory shock ( ( t) is log-normally distributed with mean —0.5*<7^  
and standard deviation =  0 .1 .
The probability of continuing to work ( u j )  is set so that the expected duration of 
working life is 45.5 years, while the probability of the retiree to survive (cr) implies 
an expected retirement duration of 18.2 years. The replacement ratio (b) is chosen so 
that the replacement rate for the workers with low or medium productivity is 40%, 
consistent with the data from the PSID (very high earnings workers similar to our eh 
types will be top-coded in the PSID). We set the growth rate of labor productivity 
(Ga) to two percent, and the population growth rate (Gn)  to one percent.
Other parameters
Using the Cooley and Prescott (1995) methodology of aligning the data to their 
theoretical counterparts, Appendix 4.A.3 outlines how we calculate the share of 
productive tangible assets in the production of non-housing final output (77) from 
the NIPA data for the period 1952:Q1 to 2005:Q4. This share equals 0.258 which 
is a bit lower than the one used in other studies (between 0.3 and 0.4), because we 
treat the production of housing services separately (and this is a capital intensive 
sector).
A key parameter in our model is the share of land in the production of tangible 
assets ( 1  — 7 ). Thinking of the U.S. economy as our baseline, we set 7  =  0.9 since 
Haughwout and Inman (2001) calculate the share of land in property income between 
1987 and 2005 to be about 10.9%, while Davis and Heathcote (2005) also use 7  =  0.9. 
Davis and Heathcote (2007) note that the share of land in residential housing values 
has risen recently in the U.S., and it is close to 50% in major metropolitan areas like
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Boston and San Francisco. We will run some experiments for the U.K., a country 
where we think land restrictions are more important than in the U.S.. Absent a 
model with regional variation in 7  (an interesting topic for further research), we 
will use a lower 7  to match aggregate features in the U.K. with the aim of better 
understanding the influence of the share of land on the allocations in the steady 
state as well as in the transition.
The depreciation rate of the capital stock (1 — A) is set at 10 percent per annum 
and the coefficient of relative risk aversion at 2. For the baseline, we consider a 
closed economy as the baseline. Recent papers have calibrated a  (the share of non­
durables in total expenditure) at around 0.8 (Diaz and Luengo-Prado (2007) use 0.83 
and Li and Yao (2007) use 0.8 based on the average share of housing expenditure 
found in the 2001 Consumer Expenditure Survey). We use a slightly lower number 
(0.76) since we think of housing as inclusive of other durables, while Morris and 
Ortalo-Magne (2008) provide evidence supporting this choice.
The fraction of a house that needs a downpayment (6) is set at 20%, consistent 
with the evidence in Chambers et. al. (forthcoming) who estimate this to be 21% 
for first-time buyers in the early 1990s. We perform extensive comparative statics 
relative to this parameter since one of our goals is to better understand the role of 
collateral constraints on home-ownership rates, house prices and allocations.
M odel Targets
We choose the discount factor (ft) to generate a reasonable tangible assets to output 
ratio (3.3), and the fraction of utility loss from renting a house (iji) to generate the 
number of renters observed in the data (36% in 1992). This yields =  0.9469 and 
■0 =  0.0608 for the baseline economy.
1.3 .3  G eneral Features o f  H ou seh old  B ehavior
The household chooses present consumption, saving, and mode of housing, taking 
into account its net worth and its expectations of future income. Figure 1.3 illus­
trates the consumption of goods, housing services and the mode of housing of the
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worker with low productivity as a function of net worth. In order to explore the 
stable relationship between the household choice and the state variable, we detrend 
all variables using their own theoretical trend as in Appendix 4.A.2.
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Figure 1.3: Policy functions for a low productivity household
When the worker does not have much net worth, x < xu ,  he does not have enough 
to pay for a downpayment of even a tiny house. He chooses to rent a modest house 
and consume a modest amount. In Figure 1.4, the locus s' = s(s,q,yl)  shows the 
equity-holding at the end of the present period as a function of the equity-holding 
at the end of the last period for the low productivity worker when the transitory 
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Figure 1.4: Evolution of savings for a low productivity household
Everyone enters the labor market with low productivity and no inheritance (so =  
0). Because the s' =  s(s,q,yl)  locus lies below the 45-degree line for small enough 
s, as long as the worker continues to be with low productivity, he does not save - 
aside from small saving stemming from the transitory wage income shock - hoping 
to become more productive in the future. He continues to live in a rented house. 12
Figure 1.5 shows the choice of a worker in the medium productivity state.
12 No saving by a low productivity worker is not always true. If the income gap between low 
productivity and higher productivity workers is small, the transition probability from less to more 
productive states is small, or the pension is very limited, then the low productivity worker saves to 
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Figure 1.5: Policy functions for a medium productivity householdfigure4a
When she does not have much net worth to pay for a downpayment to buy 
a house, x < x im, she chooses to rent a place, a similar behavior with the low 
productivity worker. The main difference is that the medium productivity worker 
saves to accumulate the downpayment to buy a house in the future. In Figure 1.6, 
the s' = s(s, q, y m ) locus of the medium productivity worker lies above the 45-degree 
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Figure 1.6: Evolution of savings for a medium productivity household
When the medium productivity worker accumulates modest net worth, x  G 
[xim,X2m] in Figure 1.5 she buys her own house subject to the binding collateral 
constraint. Here, the size of an owned house is a sharply increasing function of 
net worth, because the worker maximizes the size of the house subject to the down­
payment constraint. 13 When the medium productivity worker has substantial net 
worth x > X2mi she becomes an unconstrained home owner, using her saving partly 
to repay the debt (or increase the housing equity ownership). In Figure 1.6, the 
medium productivity worker continues to accumulate her equity holding until she 
reaches the neighborhood of equity-holding at sm*, the intersection of s ( s ,q ,y m ) 
and the 45-degree line.
The behavior of the high productivity worker is similar to the medium produc­
tivity one, except that she accumulates more equities: s' = s (s ,q ,yh ) lies above
13 The size of the house at net worth x =  x \m is smaller than the house rented at net worth slightly 
below x\m, because she can only afford to pay downpayment on a smaller house. (Nonetheless, 
she is happier than before due to larger utility from an owner-occupied house). The worker moves 
to a bigger house every period in our model because there are no transaction costs. If there were 
transaction costs, the worker would move infrequently, and change housing consumption by discrete 
amounts, rather than continuously. She may even buy first a larger house than the house rented 
before, anticipating the future transaction cost. But the basic features remain the same.
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s' =  s(s, q, y m ) and her converging equity-holding sh* is larger than that of medium 
productive worker sm*. Therefore, the equity holding of all the workers is distributed 
between 0  and the neighborhood of sh*, with a mass of workers in the neighborhood 
of s =  0, s =  sm* and s =  sh*. The retiree decumulates assets very slowly as the 
rate of return is lower than the growth-adjusted rate of time preference.
Putting together these arguments, we can draw a picture of a typical life-cycle 
in Figure 1.7. The horizontal axis counts years from the beginning of work-life, and 
the vertical axis measures housing consumption (h) and equity-holding (s). Starting 
from no inheritance, he chooses to live in a rented house without saving during the 
young and low wage periods until the 6th year. When he becomes a medium 
productivity wage worker at the 7th yeax, he starts saving vigorously. Quickly, he 
buys a house subject to the collateral constraint. Then he moves up fast the housing 
ladder to become a unconstrained home owner. Afterwards, he starts increasing the 
fraction of his own equity of the house (similar to repaying the debt). By the time 
of retirement, he has repaid all the mortgage and has accumulated equities higher 
than the value of his own house. When the worker hits the wall of retirement (with 
the arrival of a retirement shock) at the 50th year, his permanent income drops, 
and he moves to a smaller house. He also sells all the equities to buy an annuity 
contract on the equities, because the annuity earns the gross rate of return which 
is (1 /a)  >  1 times as much as straightforward equity-holding. But his effective 
utility discount factor shrinks by a factor a  too. Thus as the rate of return on the 
annuity is not sufficiently high to induce the retiree to save enough, he decumulates 
slowly the relative equity-holding, downsizing his consumption of goods and housing 
services relative to the working population as he gets older. When he dies, his assets 
drop to zero according to the annuity contract.
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Figure 1.7: An example life time
1.3.4 C o m p ariso n  o f S tea d y  S ta te s
We compare the implications of the model for the steady state economy with the 
data in the 1992 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF, 1992). Table 1 .1  reports the 
five quintiles of earnings and net worth implied by the model and their empirical 
counterparts. The earnings quintiles are matched exactly since the parameters of 
the earnings process were chosen to achieve this objective before the model is solved. 
Given the skewed earnings distribution, the model generates a very skewed net worth 
distribution as well, slightly more skewed to the right than the data. The model 
distribution of net worth for homeowners is even more unequal than in the data, 
reflecting that only very poor households remain tenants. The self-reported house 
value for homeowners is more evenly distributed than net worth both in the data 
and in the model.
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Earnings quintiles (all) 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
Data 0.00 0.03 0.12 0.23 0.62
Model 0.00 0.03 0.12 0.23 0.62
Net worth quintiles (all)
Data 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.13 0.80
Model 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.11 0.88
Net Worth quintiles (Homeown ers)
Data 0.02 0.07 0.11 0.18 0.62
Model 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.16 0.78
House value quintiles (Homeowners)
Data 0.08 0.12 0.16 0.23 0.41
Model 0.03 0.03 0.11 0.21 0.62
Table 1.1: Distribution of earnings, net worth and housing usage - SCF 1992
Table 1.2 compares mean net worth as a ratio to per capita GDP between the 
data and the model for different groups. The total net worth normalized by per 
capita GDP adds up to the calibration target of the model (3.29). Conditional on 
home owning, owners are wealthier than tenants, both in the model and in the data. 
Although the model approximately matches the average net worth of owners (4.76 
in the data versus 5.52 in the model), it completely misses the net worth of tenants 
- tenants own very little net worth in the model while in the data they do own 
something. The reason is that the model abstracts from determinants of renting 
other than poverty. But given the richness of other moments that we match we are 
going to leave a more explicit calibration that captures the wealth accumulation for 
the tenants to future work. The average (self-reported) house value is 1.93 times 
as large as per capita GDP in the SCF data versus 2.34 in the model. The mean 
leverage ratio - the mean ratio of house value to net worth conditional on being an 
owner-occupier (h/ s  in the model) - is 1.39 in the data versus 1.49 in the model.
T en an t Total Owner House H o u s eV a lu e
NW NW NW Value to  NW
Data 0.68 3.29 4.76 1 .93 1.39
Mode 0.01 3.29 5.52 2.34 1.49
Table 1.2: Aggregates - model vs SCF1992 
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Table 1.3: Life cycle profiles of home-ownership - model vs SCF1992
Table 1.4 reports net worth and home value relative to per capita GDP for the 
different groups over the life cycle. Household net worth and house values increase 
over the life cycle in the data, which is consistent with the model.
Net Worth (all) Net Worth (Owners) Home Size (Owners)
Data Mod el D at a Model Data M odel
Up to 34 0.80 0.21 1.62 0.68 1.60 1.00
35-44 2.35 1.23 3.34 2.26 2.02 1.62
45-54 4.72 2.65 5.91 3.88 2.24 2.17
55-64 5.98 4.34 7.27 5.58 2.11 2.69
65 or more 3.76 3.01 4.49 3.48 1.62 1.02
Table 1.4: Life cycle profiles of net worth - model vs SCF1992
We interpret these results as suggesting that the model generates reasonable 
implications relative to the information in the 1992 SCF. Given this interpretation, 
we now would like to understand how the endogenous variables in the model (house 
prices and home-ownership rates) depend upon exogenous fundamentals in steady 
state. We restrict our attention to three main changes in the fundamentals: greater 
financial development, a higher productivity growth and a fall in the world real 
interest rate, since we view these as reasonable exogenous changes to fundamentals 
given the US experience in the 1990s14.
14 Notes to Tables 1.2-1.4: All data are from the 1992 SCF, while model refers to the baseline 
capturing the initial steady state for the U.S.. In Table 1.2 NW stands for net worth, and all 
numbers are the means relative to per capita GDP. Housing refers to the value of the home, while 
the house value to NW ratio is the median size of a house divided by net worth conditional on being 
a home-owner. Table 1.3 reports the average homeownership over the life cycle and the median 
house value to net worth ratio. Table 1.4 reports the average net worth over the life cycle (both for 
everyone and conditional on home-ownership), as well as the average home size over the life cycle 
(for homeowners).
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Table 1.5 reports steady state comparisons for the baseline (U.S.) calibration 
(panel A). In the first column, the fraction of tenants in the population is 36%, which 
is equal to the US tenancy rate in the early 1990s (by our choice of the utility-loss 
from renting). The fraction of constrained home owners is 13.9%. The fraction of 
houses lived in by tenants and constrained home owners is smaller than the fraction 
of their population because they tend to live in smaller houses than the unconstrained 
home owners. The average house size is about 19.5% (= 7.02/35.92) of the economy 
average for tenants, and is about 21% for constrained home owners. The tenants 
and the constrained home owners live in smaller houses than the average mainly 
because they have lower permanent income. The distribution of equity-holding is 
even more unequal across the groups of households in different modes of housing. 
The fraction of total equities held by tenants is negligible (0.1%), the fraction of 
total equities held by constrained home owners is 2.97%, and the remainder is held 
by unconstrained home owners.
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Panel A: US calibration
baseline ?=0.1 ?=1.0 aa=1.03 R*=5.69
% of te mints 35.92 10.08 53.99 49.66 49.66
% of constrained households 13.92 26.32 4.25 2.06 1.14
% of unconstrained homeowners 50.16 63.61 41.77 48.28 49.21
% of housing used by tenants 7.02 1.82 13.20 10.82 10.15
% of housing used by constrained 2.97 5.11 2.92 0.84 0.37
% of shares owned by tenants 0.10 0.01 0.71 0.18 0.13
% of shares owned by constrained 0.26 0.23 1.29 0.17 0.06
Value of total tangible a ssets  to GD P 3.29 3.29 3.29 3.62 3.75
Housing to total tangible assets 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.43 0.43
Value of housing to w ages 2.39 2.40 2.39 2.50 2.61
Housing price to rental rate 8.58 8.58 8.58 9.56 9.87
Real return 6.69 6.69 6.69 6.69 5.69
Panel B: UK calibration
% of tenants 31.87 7.51 54.18 49.66 49.62
% of constrained households 15.63 22.82 5.21 1.51 1.25
% of unconstrained homeowners 52.50 69.67 40.61 48.83 49.13
% of housing used by tenants 5.92 1.26 12.67 10.44 10.27
% of housing used by constrained 3.13 4.17 3.72 0.70 0.64
% of shares owned by tenants 0.09 0.02 0.79 0.19 0.02
% of shares owned by constrained 0.29 0.19 1.70 0.18 0.12
Value of total tangible a ssets to GD P 4.29 4.29 4.29 4.91 5.07
Housing to total tangible assets 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.44 0.44
Value of housing to w ages 3.23 3.23 3.23 3.48 3.64
Housing price to rental rate 10.96 10.96 10.96 12.85 13.22
Real return 6.69 6.69 6.69 6.69 5.69
Table 1.5: Steady state comparative statics for the small open economy
Turning to prices and aggregate variables, the gross rate of return on equity- 
holding is 1.0669 in terms of goods, and is equal to 1.0669 -f- G]ra = 1.0662 in 
terms of the consumption basket. The latter is smaller than the inverse of the 
discount factor, which, adjusted for growth effects, equals (1//3) (Gw/G l~ a) p = 
1.095. This is not because people are impatient, but because people tend to save 
substantially during the working period to cope with idiosyncratic shocks to wage 
income and to mitigate the collateral constraint. Many general equilibrium models 
with uninsurable idiosyncratic risk have such a feature, including Bewley (1983) and 
Aiyagari (1994). The ratio of average housing value to the average wage is 2.4 years, 
while the housing price to rental ratio is 8 . 6  years in the baseline economy. The
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share of housing in total tangible assets is 45% (compared to 41% in the post war 
US economy, see appendix 4.A.3) . 15
Columns 2  and 3 of Table 1.5 report the results for a different level of financial 
development, keeping the interest rate constant at its closed economy counterpart 
in column 1 , by considering a corresponding small open economy. Column 2 is the 
case of a more advanced financial system, where the fraction of house that needs 
downpayment is 0 =  0.1 instead of 6 =  0.2 of the baseline. The main difference 
relative to the baseline economy is that now there are more constrained home owners 
instead of tenants. Intuitively, because borrowing becomes easier, relatively poor 
households buy a house with high leverage (outside equity ownership) instead of 
renting. Column 3, by comparison, is the case of no housing mortgage (6 =  1) so 
that the household must buy the house from its own net worth. In this economy, 
more than a half of households are tenants. Financial development affects sub­
stantially the home-ownership rate. On the other hand, financial development by 
itself has limited effects on prices and aggregate quantities in steady state. This 
result arises because the share of net worth of tenants and constrained households 
(who are directly influenced by the financing constraint) is a small fraction of ag­
gregate net worth, and because the required adjustment is mostly achieved through 
the conversion of houses from rental to owner-occupied units.
In column 4, we consider a small open economy in which the growth rate of 
labor productivity is three percent instead of two percent. A higher growth rate of 
productivity, keeping the world interest rate constant, raises the housing price-rental 
ratio from 8 . 6  to 9.6, because the real rental price is expected to rise faster as in 
(1.27). The value of housing to the average wage rises from 2.4 to 2.5, as does the 
value of tangible assets to GDP. In the new steady state, the percentage of tenants 
is much higher (50% from 36%) as housing prices-rental ratio is substantially higher.
15 From (1.27) we learn that the steady state annual growth rate in rents of the baseline economy 
will be 0.3% when 7  =  0.9. Davis et. al. (2008) compute the annual rent for the U.S. economy 
since 1960 and the mean real growth rate is found to be 1.17% with a standard deviation of 1.5%. 
Another prediction of the model involves the long run growth in house prices which is predicted 
to be equal to the growth rate in rents (therefore 0.3%). Using the OFHEO average annual house 
price data from 1960 to 2007 we calculate a real (deflating using the US CPI) annual growth rate 
of 2.1% with a standard deviation of 3.3%.
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In Column 5, we consider an open economy where the world interest rate is lower 
by one percentage point. A lower world interest rate increases the house price-rental 
ratio from 8 . 6  to 9.9, which leads to a higher tenancy rate, 50% instead of 36% of 
the baseline.
“UK  calibration”
One of the key messages of our work is that the constraint imposed by land as a 
fixed factor of production can have important implications for the behavior of house 
prices and homeownership. In order to illustrate the general equilibrium effect of the 
different importance of land for production of tangible assets (1 — 7 ), we change 3 
parameters from the previous calibration and argue that this can give useful insights 
to a country like the U.K. Specifically, {/3,7 , ip} are chosen so that the interest rate 
remains at 6.69% in the closed economy, the ratio of tangible assets to GDP is 
equal to 4.29 (the UK average between 1987 and 2007, for which the data exist) and 
the homeownership rate is equal to 6 8 % (the UK number in the early 1990s). The 
resulting parameter values are 7  =  0.783 (a larger share of land in the production 
of tangible assets than in the US), /3 =  0.9612 and ip =  0.0598.
The baseline results (column 1) in Panel B of Table 1.5 illustrate that the value of 
housing relative to wages rises from 2.39 in the 7  =  0.9 economy (US calibration) to 
3.23 in the 7  =  0.78 one (UK calibration), and that the housing price to rental ratio 
rises from 8.58 to 10.96. Why is the value of tangible assets to GDP and the price 
to rental ratio much higher in the UK calibration? Since land neither depreciates 
nor accumulates, as land becomes more important for tangible assets relative to the 
capital stock, the effective depreciation of tangible capital falls and the expected 
growth rate of the rental price rises. Thus, the ratio of tangible asset value to GDP 
and the housing price to rental ratio are larger in the UK calibration. 16
16 From columns 2 and 3 of Table 3, we observe that changing the collateral constraint again 
only affects the homeownership rate and does not affect equilibrium prices. A higher productivity 
growth changes in column 4 substantially the house price to rental ratio (from 11.0 to 12.9). A 
reduction in the world interest rate in column 5 also substantially affects equilibrium prices. The 
main difference from the US calibration comes from the higher share of land which makes the price 
to rental ratio rise more in the UK calibration. In this economy the price to rent ratio rises from 
11.0 to 13.2 (a 21% increase), while in the US calibration (7 =  0.9) this ratio rises from 8.6 to 9.9 
(a 15% increase).
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There are two ways to measure the importance of land for tangible assets. One 
is the share of land in the production of tangible assets (1 — 7 ). The other is the 
share of land in the value of tangible assets. In the steady state, we can compute 
the present value of imputed income of land and capital in order to obtain the share 
of land in the value of tangible assets as:
 1=2__
1 - ( G y /R)
l-(A/ii) +  1 - ( G y / R )
Note that physical capital depreciates through A, while the imputed rental income 
of land grows at the rate of aggregate output growth in the steady state because 
the ratio of land value to aggregate GDP is stable in the steady state. Thus, in 
the US baseline economy in which 1 — 7  =  10%, R =  1.0669 and G y  =  1.029, the 
share of land in the value of tangible assets is equal to 33%. (Davis and Heathcote 
(2007) produce estimates of the share of land in U.S. residential tangible assets and 
the annual average between 1930 and 2000 is 24.7% with a standard deviation of 
9.6%.17) For the UK baseline economy in which 7  =  0.78, the share of land in the 
value of tangible assets is 55% for the same real rate of return.
1.4 W inners and Losers in H ousing M arkets
We now examine how the small open economy reacts to a once-for-all change in 
different fundamental conditions of technology and the financial environment. We 
change a parameter once-and-for-all unexpectedly and solve for the path of prices and 
quantities that lead the economy to the new steady state. Here, we assume perfect 
foresight except for the initial surprise. Details of the numerical procedure can be 
found in Appendix A, but the basic procedure is as follows. First guess a set of rental 
rates over the next (say) 50 years, which converges to the new steady state; then solve 
backwards the household problem based on these prices; and finally update this price
17 Thus, our assumption of a Cobb-Douglas production function for structures is generally con­
sistent with the U.S. data. Moreover, for Japan Kiyotaki and West (2006) provide evidence that 




vector until the market for use of tangible assets clears in all periods. To highlight 
the importance of land, we compare the reaction of the economy with a larger share 
of land in the production of tangible assets ( 7  =  0.78, the “UK calibration”) with 
the baseline economy ( 7  =  0.9, the US calibration).
1.4 .1  W elfare E valuations
We are particularly interested in how an unanticipated change in fundamentals af­
fects the wealth and welfare of various groups of households differently. Here, using 
the joint distribution of current productivity and equity holdings from the previ­
ous period 3> S - i  (i)) in the steady state before the shock hits, we define the 
group as the set Ig of individual households of a particular labor productivity (low, 
medium, high, and retired (Z,m, h, r)), and a particular range of equity holdings of 
the previous period which corresponds to a particular home-ownership mode (tenant, 
constrained owner or unconstrained owner) in the old steady state. For example, 
the low-wage worker tenant group is a group of agents with low labor productivity 
who choose to be tenants under the old steady state.
One simple measure of the distribution effect is the average rate of change of net 
worth. Let j  (i ) be present labor productivity of (j (i) =  h,m,  I and r ) of individual 
i. Then the net worth of individual i depends upon the wage rate and equity price 
as:
x(i) =  +  qs-i ( i ) ,
where e7 =  (1  — t )s j for worker of productivity j  and =  (b/w) for j  =  r, retired, 
s_ i (z) =  s_ i (i) if i was a worker and s_ i (i) =  s_ 1 (i ) / a  if i was a retiree in the 
previous period. Then, the average rate of change in net worth (non-human wealth) 
of group Ig is:
( [ w ne?toC +  qnS-i(i)] \  . { onNaverage of  ----- ^ -  1 for all % € Ig (1.30)
where (wQ, q0) are the wage rate and equity price in the old steady state, and (wn, qn) 
are those immediately after the shock.
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To calculate welfare changes we use the value functions. Given that we have 
solved for the prices and value functions for all the periods in the transition, we 
know that the value functions at the period when the change in fundamentals takes 
place is a sufficient statistic for the welfare effect of the shock. Let v j ^ \ x  (i)) be the 
value function at the old steady state and (x (i)) be the value function in the 
period of the shock’s arrival as a function of net worth x{i) and labor productivity.18 
We compute a measure of welfare change for the group Ig e l s :
fig =  average of v j ^ \ [ w nej WC +  gras_ifo)])\  1 P _  1 
Vj^\[w0e^C  + 9oS-i(*)]) /
for all i £ Ig. (1.31)
We call this measure e l s  the certainty expenditure equivalent, because we convert the 
change of the value into the dimension of expenditure before taking the average. 19
18Note that Vn is the value function that has been derived after the full perfect foresight transition 
has been solved for and therefore includes all this information about the transition to the new steady 
state.
19 We also computed the net worth equivalent that would make a household indifferent between 
the period before and after the shock as the value of A (i) such that
C +  <7oS-i(i)]) =  V^W(A (i) +  <?nS-i(i)])
The value of A(i) measures how much the initial net worth must be multiplied immediately after 
the shock in order to maintain the same level of the expected discounted utility as the old steady 
state. We can find the net worth equivalent uniquely, because the value functions are monotonically 
increasing. We can then compute the average of individual A(i) — 1 for a particular group g of agents 
as 'jig. This welfare measure suffers from the drawback that net worth does not include the value 
of human capital. Thus, if two groups have different ratios of net worth (liquid wealth) to human 
capital, a difference in jlg may reflect the difference of the ratio of human to non-human wealth 
rather than the difference in the welfare effect.
39
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Figure 1.8: 1 per cent increase in labor productivity growth
Figure 1.8 shows the responses to a once-for-all increase in the growth rate of labor 
productivity from 2% to 3%. Because the economy is growing, all the following 
figures show the percentage difference from the old steady state growth path of the 
baseline economy. In both economies the housing price increases substantially ini­
tially and continues to increase afterwards. In the economy with a larger share 
of land ( 7  =  0.78), the increase in house prices is larger, and real house price in-
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flation afterwards is higher. The housing price-rental ratio is going to be higher, 
anticipating the increase in the rental price in the future. The home-ownership 
rate gradually declines because young workers take a longer time to accumulate a 
sufficient downpayment to buy a house. Consumption of goods and housing ser­
vices increase initially as well as afterwards, reflecting higher permanent income. 
The share of productive tangible assets (Z y t /Z t ) falls initially, to accommodate a 
larger demand for residential tangible assets by converting productive to residential
tangible assets.
Scarcity of Land Parameter v=0.9 v=0.78 v=0.9 v=0.78 v=0.9 vt0.78
Column 1 2 3 4 5 6
Panel A: Ceitaintv exDendiure emivaleit .03+1% 03+1% F *-1% R*-1% 3// aS
Workers 9.20 10.46 0.00 0.00 11.59 13.62
Tenant Workers 8.74 9.61 1.27 0.88 10.24 10.69
Constrained Homeowner Workers 9.04 9.93 1.27 1.00 11.04 11.76
Unconstrained Homeowner Workers 9.80 11.39 -0.05 0.42 12.74 15.65
Low Income Workers 8.94 9.71 1.28 0.96 10.63 11.20
Middle Income Workers 9.48 10.73 0.10 0.37 12.24 14.49
High Income Workers 10.37 12.58 0.00 0.00 13.72 18.30
Retirees 8.27 10.46 1.64 3.49 14.85 20.79
Tenant Retirees 6.86 7.07 1.24 0.78 8.59 8.75
Constrained Homeowner Retirees 7.10 7.39 1.30 1.11 9.32 9.63
Unconstrained Homeowner Retirees 10.67 11.24 3.15 4.25 16.05 21.93
Panel B: Wealth change
Workers 4.61 7.44 4.88 8.10 15.57 24.01
Tenant Workers 0.50 0.71 0.42 0.90 1.06 2.12
Constrained Homeowner Workers 2.34 4.25 1.97 4.72 6.10 10.93
Unconstrained Homeowner Workers 8.15 12.31 8.30 13.55 25.44 36.87
Low Income Wor kers 1.03 1.77 1.13 2.08 3.42 5.90
Middle Income Workers 7.72 11.78 7.90 12.95 24.42 37.27
High Income Workers 10.14 14.70 10.33 16.11 31.37 46.24
Retirees 6.47 10.45 6.61 11.50 21.65 33.95
Tenant Retirees 0.81 1.74 0.84 1.80 2.16 4.74
Constrained Homeowner Retirees 3.22 4.24 3.32 4.42 6.94 10.40
Unconstrained Homeowner Retirees 10.84 11.52 11.09 12.56 23.26 36.09
Table 1.6: Welfare
Table 1.6 reports the average rate of change of welfare (1.31) in Panel A and the 
average rate of change of current net worth (1.30) in Panel B for each group against 
changes in the fundamentals, for the baseline economy ( 7  =  0.9) and the economy 
with a larger share of land ( 7  =  0.78). The first and second columns report the
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average rate of changes from an increase in the growth rate of labor productivity from 
2% to 3%. Given the higher productivity growth, households are on average better 
off with a higher permanent income. (Remember the retiree’s benefit is proportional 
to the wage rate of present workers). The higher housing price, however, affects the 
welfare of different groups of households differently. Those who buy (or expand) 
houses in the future gain less from the housing price hike, while those who sell 
houses in the future gain more. Specifically, unconstrained homeowners as a group 
gain more than tenants and constrained homeowners. The gap in welfare effects 
between unconstrained homeowners and the other groups is particularly large for 
the retirees. Overall, one main message from this analysis is that the redistribution 
effect is larger in the economy with the larger share of land since the house price 
hike is bigger in this economy.
We can observe the change in current net worth in Panel B. The net worth 
of unconstrained homeowners increases by a much larger amount than tenants’ net 
worth because the former own much more non-human wealth. Thus, those with 
larger holdings of shares experience a bigger increase in net worth with the house 
price rise, and the increase is more pronounced where land is more important.
Figure 1.9 shows how these two economies react to a once-for-all fall in the world 
real interest rate by 1%. In both economies, housing prices and output increase 
with large inflows of capital, and the adjustment of housing prices is fast. In the 
economy with a larger share of land, the swing of net exports and consumption 
is larger, output takes a longer time to increase despite the large increase in the 
capital stock, because a large amount of tangible assets gets allocated to housing 
in the early stages of the transition. The home-ownership rate declines gradually 
because the lower real interest rate discourages saving, delaying the age of switching 
from renting to owning a house over the life cycle.
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Figure 1.9: lper cent decrease in the world real interest rate
The third and fourth columns of Table 1.6 report the reaction of welfare to this 
decrease in the world real interest rate for the two economies with different shares 
of land. Looking at the value of net worth in Panel B, all groups have a larger 
net worth from a higher house price, and the net worth increase is larger group-by- 
group in the economy with a larger share of land ( 7  =  0.78). As we discussed in the 
Introduction (especially in footnote 3), however, the increase in housing price per 
se does not have an aggregate wealth effect on consumption nor welfare, but mainly 
redistributes wealth between net sellers and net buyers of houses. Unconstrained
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homeowner retirees gain most from the house price hike due to a lower interest rate. 
Although workers gain from a higher wage rate due to the capital inflow, workers 
as a whole are savers who suffer from a lower interest rate, particularly high income 
workers. Thus despite the capital gains on housing, the high income workers and 
unconstrained homeowner workers lose from a lower interest rate in our calibration, 
and the loss is larger when the share of land is small ( 7  =  0.9), that is, when the 
capital gains on the house is small.
These two experiments illustrate the idea that the relationship between housing 
price changes and welfare depends upon the underlying cause of the house price 
change. House prices are higher by a similar magnitude after either a higher pro­
ductivity shock or a lower world interest rate, but in our calibrations workers as a 
whole gain from the productivity improvement but lose as a whole from the interest 
rate decrease.20
We have also done the experiment of lowering the downpayment requirement 
from 20% to 10% permanently. This provides extra liquidity for households, espe­
cially for constrained home owners, and encourages consumption initially. At the 
same time, with a less stringent collateral constraint, some low wage workers and 
tenants from the previous period buy houses. Overall, however, relaxing the financ­
ing constraint has a very limited effect on housing price and aggregate production 
in the transition, a result similar to the comparisons of the steady states, because 
the necessary adjustment is mostly achieved by the modest conversion of rented to 
owned units rather than by the housing price. This contrasts Ortalo-Magne and 
Rady (2006), who show that relaxing the collateral constraint increases the housing 
price substantially by increasing the housing demand of credit constrained house­
holds. In their model, the net worth of the home-owners with outstanding mortgage 
is sensitive to the housing price due to the leverage effect, which magnifies the ef­
fect of any shock to fundamentals, while there is no leverage effect in our equity
20Attanasio et. al. (2009) make a similar point empirically. They find that tenants’ consumption 
is positively correlated with house price increases, contradicting the conventional wealth channel. 
They attribute this finding to common factors driving both consumption demand and house prices, 
namely better longer-run income prospects. Thus, the shock causing higher house prices can be key 
in determining the effect on consumption (and, therefore, welfare).
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financing economy. Also the supply of houses and flats is inelastic in their model. 
Thus, relaxing the collateral constraint will generate a large inflow of new owners of 
flats and houses, which is not offset by an increase in the supply, through conversion 
from rented to owned units, conversion from productive to residential tangible assets 
and capital accumulation. A comprehensive analysis of the leverage effect and the 
portfolio decision in the presence of uninsurable earnings and aggregate risk is a 
topic for future research.
1.4.3 A  S cenario  for H ouse P r ic e  C h an g es?
Putting together the simulation results from these experiments, we can conclude 
that, if we were to explain the large increase in housing prices in many developed 
countries in the last decades, we could look for increases in the expected growth 
rate of labor productivity and for decreases in the real interest rate. Moreover, to 
generate a positive correlation between homeownership rates and house price rises 
since the early 1990s, we will also need to simultaneously improve access to credit. 
An empirically plausible calibration will be to simultaneously increase the expected 
growth rate of labor productivity from 2% to 3%, decrease the world interest rate 
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Figure 1.11: Aggregate home ownership rates since 1991: model versus data
The implications for house prices and homeownership rates are given in Figures 
1.10 and 1.11 respectively for the US experience, and Figures 1.12 and 1.13 for the 
UK. For the US calibration Figure 1.10 illustrates that the model can explain a 
substantial component of the recent house price increases. Moreover, the model 
captures well the increase in home-ownership rates, even though this increase is 
much faster in the model than in the data given the perfect foresight/information 
assumptions of the model. Interestingly the model does predict a fall in the home- 
ownership rate after the initial increase as house prices begin to rise. The wealth 
changes and the welfare effects from this simultaneous shock for the US economy 
are given in column 5 of Table 1.6. Households are both richer and better off in 
response to this combination of shocks, with the unconstrained home owner retirees 
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Figure 1.13: UK: Aggregate home ownership rates since 1991: model versus data
The responses of the calibration for the “UK” economy are given in Figures 
1.12 and 1.13. The model captures a lower fraction of the recent runup in housing 
prices in the UK, but it also predicts a slight increase in homeownership rates with 
a decrease predicted in the future as housing prices reach a higher level. The last
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column of Table 1.6 illustrates that both wealth and welfare increase by more in 
this economy rather than in the 7  =  0.9 one and that the effect is biggest for the 
unconstrained retirees.
1.5 C onclusions
This paper develops an aggregate life-cycle model to investigate the interaction be­
tween housing prices, aggregate production, and household behavior over a lifetime. 
We take into account land as a fixed factor for producing residential and commercial 
tangible assets in order to analyze the implications for the aggregate time series and 
the cross section of household choices. Comparing two small open economies with 
different shares of land in the production of tangible assets, the economy with a 
larger share of land has a higher housing price-rental ratio and a lower homeowner- 
ship rate in the steady state. The transitions of the small open economy along the 
perfect foresight path illustrate that, where the share of land is larger, once-for-all 
shocks to the growth rate of labor productivity or the world interest rate generate 
a greater movement in housing prices.
We also find that the permanent increase in the growth rate of labor productivity 
and the decrease in the world real interest rate substantially redistribute wealth from 
the net buyers of houses (relatively poor tenants) to the net sellers (relatively rich 
unconstrained homeowners) with the house price hike. On average, households gain 
from the increase in the growth rate of labor productivity and do not gain from the 
decrease in the world interest rate. Because the gap in welfare effects between 
winners and losers in the housing market is substantial, especially where land is 
more important for production of tangible assets compared to capital, we think 
that a credible welfare evaluation should take into account household heterogeneity 
and contract enforcement limitations in housing and credit markets that generate 
realistic life-cycles of consumption and homeowner ship.
Chapter 2
Is Private Leverage Excessive?
2.1 Introduction
The 2007-09 financial crisis brought the world financial system to the brink of col­
lapse, leading to calls for tighter regulation in order to prevent a repeat of the crisis. 
‘Excessive leverage’ is thought to be one of the main culprits for the fragility of the 
economy in the face of shocks. This has re-opened the debate of whether private 
banks, corporates and households tend to take socially optimal borrowing decisions. 
In this paper we examine the optimality of firms’ leverage decisions using a stan­
dard macroeconomic model with credit frictions. We examine whether a benevolent 
government can improve ex ante welfare by imposing capital requirements which are 
different from those chosen by the market.
A growing academic literature has shown that the prevalence of uncontingent 
debt has the potential of interacting with binding collateral constraints in order to 
magnify the effects of shocks to the economy. The mechanism is based on different 
versions of the the collateral amplification argument popularised by Bernanke and 
Gertler (1989), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist 
(1999). More recently, Lorenzoni (2008), Gromb and Vayanos (2002) and Korinek 
(2009) have shown that, in an environment of binding credit constraints, private 
leverage tends to be excessive from a social point of view due to the presence of 
a market price externality. This externality arises because private borrowers do
48
49
not internalise the effects of their own financial distress on other borrowers. When 
collateral constraints tighten due to an adverse aggregate shock, leveraged debtors’ 
net worth declines and they need to sell assets in order to satisfy the collateral 
constraint. This ‘financial distress’ scenario leads to private losses which are fully 
taken into account by firms when they decide ex ante how much debt to take on.
What private borrowers ignore, however, is the market price externality of fi­
nancial distress. The larger the volume of asset sales following an adverse shock 
to collateral values, the bigger the eventual decline in capital prices and the wider 
the spectre of financial distress. Individual borrowers, however, do not take such 
‘general equilibrium’ effects into account. They take the state contingent evolution 
of market prices as exogenous, treating their own leverage decisions as irrelevant for 
aggregate outcomes. In contrast, the government takes the market price external­
ities in question into account when designing the optimal state contingent capital 
adequacy rules.
This paper focuses on the quantitative question of whether taking the market 
price externality into account leads the government to choose very different capital 
requirements from those already required by the market. We use a business cycle 
model with credit constraints, which is similar to Kiyotaki (1998). In our environ­
ment borrowing and lending is motivated by a heterogeneity in the productivity of 
different firms. But because debt is assumed to be uncontingent and secured against 
collateral, aggregate shocks can damage the net worth of borrowers and reduce their 
access to finance. I assume that borrowing entrepreneurs in the model know that 
aggregate productivity shocks may hit and this gives them an incentive to hedge 
their net worth by borrowing less than the market determined debt limit. We nev­
ertheless find that high productivity firms choose to take the maximum permitted 
leverage despite the risks to net worth this involves. The intuition for this is simple. 
High productivity entrepreneurs earn such a good return on their productive assets 
that insuring their net worth by leaving themselves with spare debt capacity is too 
costly. Because the owners of these fast growing firms have very good future con­
sumption opportunities, saving at prevailing market prices is a very bad proposition
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for them. So they rationally choose to leverage up to the debt limit, accepting the 
ex post volatility in the rate of return on their portfolios.
The main result of the paper is the following. When we allow a benevolent 
government to choose state contingent capital requirements to maximise ex ante 
social welfare, we find that the government makes identical choices to the market 
for reasonable parameter values. In other words, the government chooses capital 
requirements which are equal to the incentive compatible debt limits. We find that 
this surprising result arises from the balance of the costs and benefits of regula­
tion around the private optimum. Tightening capital requirements relative to the 
market-imposed borrowing limits has the benefit of dampening the collateral ampli­
fication mechanism and reducing the volatility of asset prices and consumption over 
the economic cycle. This cyclical volatility is ‘excessive’ from a social point of view 
because leveraged borrowers do not take into account the effect of their own forced 
asset sales on other leveraged borrowers. But the government considers the costs 
of regulation too. In our model, the flow of finance from low to high productivity 
entrepreneurs increases the economy’s TFP by putting more of the economy’s pro­
ductive resources into the hands of those best able to make use of them. When the 
government regulates leverage, more production has to be undertaken by inefficient 
firms and this depresses average TFP and consumption over time.
How the government locates itself on this trade off between increasing the econ­
omy’s average productivity and consumption and increasing its consumption volatil­
ity is a function of the costs of business cycles in the model. We find that, quanti­
tatively, these costs are small. Because the government acts in the social interest, it 
allows private agents to borrow as much as can be credibly repaid without imposing 
tighter capital requirements than the market.
Interestingly, we find that the ‘no overborrowing’ result does not arise because 
amplification in the model is small. Contrary to the results of Cordoba and Ripoll 
(2004) we find that it is large, increasing the standard deviation of output by 40% 
higher than the first best without making any non-standard assumptions about 
preferences or the productive technology. The difference between our results and
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those of Cordoba and Ripoll (2004) arise out of our assumption of constant returns 
to scale to all factors, which helps to maintain productivity differences between firms 
even in the face of large shocks to their relative outputs. This result shows that the 
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) framework is capable of generating quantitatively large 
amplification for reasonable calibrations. Nevertheless, despite generating a lot of 
amplification, the framework does not generate strong incentives to regulate financial 
transactions. This is because consumers care more about having a high rate of return 
on wealth and this dominates the welfare costs due to business cycle fluctuations.
Finally, we need to stress that the pecuniary externality our paper discusses is 
only one of the many reasons for capital regulation. Our framework misses out one 
very important reason for capital regulation - the risk shifting behaviour caused by 
the possibility of bankruptcy or a government bail-out. There is a large literature 
which has studied the incentives for banks and other private borrowers to take 
excessive risks when they know that losses in the worst case scenarios will be borne 
by lenders or the government. While such factors axe undoubtedly an important 
cause of financial crises, we abstract from them in this paper in order to keep our 
framework tractable1.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2.2 discusses the related 
literature in a little more detail. Section 2.3 outlines the model environment. Section 
2.4 outlines the competitive equilibrium for our model economy. Section 2.6 outlines 
the government’s objective function and policy instrument. Section 2.5 compares 
private and government leverage choices and uses numerical simulation of the econ­
omy to illustrate the costs and benefits of tighter collateral requirements. Finally, 
Section 2.8 concludes.
1 We study borrowing contracts which feature no bankruptcy in equilibrium. Also we assume that 
the government cannot make transfers. This rules out two of the most widely studied mechanism  
which generate overborrowing by private agents.
52
2.2 R elated  Literature
2 .2 .1  T h e co llateral am plification  m echan ism
This model is related to a large and rapidly growing literature on the credit amplifi­
cation mechanism and on the pecuniary externalities this generates. The collateral 
amplification transmission channel was first popularised by the work of Bernanke and 
Gertler (1989), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Kiyotaki (1998) Carlstrom and Fuerst 
(1997) and Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999). All these models examine the ef­
fect of financing frictions on aggregate allocations. In them, the net worth of agents 
who have productive opportunities is key in determining the cost and availability 
of external finance. Adrian and Shin (2009) have explored this mechanism in the 
context of multiple leveraged traders in financial markets.
2 .2 .2  P ecun iary  ex tern a litie s  and th e  efficiency o f  private leverage
The central question of this paper is related to an older literature which has exam­
ined the constrained efficiency of the competitive equilibrium in an economy with 
moral hazard and adverse selection. Arnott and Stiglitz (1986) showed using a sim­
ple insurance moral hazard example that the competitive equilibrium is constrained 
inefficient when prices affect insurees’ incentives to take care. Kehoe and Levine 
(1993) show that the competitive equilibrium in their ‘debt constrained’ economy 
is only efficient in a single good world. Multi-good economies are not necessarily 
constrained efficient because relative prices affect the value of default and this intro­
duces a market price externality which is not taken into account by atomistic private 
agents. What these papers show is that when relative prices determine the tightness 
of incentive compatibility constraints, this drives a wedge between the decisions of 
private agents and the decisions of the social planner. Private individuals take prices 
as given while the social planner recognises that manipulating prices can relax some 
of the constraints it is facing.2
2 Prescott and Townsend (1984) showed that introducing man-made lotteries into the economy 
can remove the externality in question and restore the constrained efficiency of the competitive 
equilibrium.
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Even more closely related to the topic of this paper, work by Lorenzoni (2008), 
Korinek (2009) and Gromb and Vayanos (2002) have shown rigorously that the pres­
ence of asset prices in the collateral constraint can generate a pecuniary asset price 
externality between leveraged borrowers. Distressed sales by one set of borrowers 
can push down asset prices, damaging the net worth and credit access of other bor­
rowers. Private agents ignore this externality, generating incentives for government 
intervention in order to bring the social costs and benefits of leverage into line with 
one another. These papers provide the theoretical motivation in a simple three pe­
riod framework for the quantitative investigation we undertake here in an infinite 
horizon macro model.
Korinek (2008) and Bianchi (2009) have also examined the possibility of exces­
sive external debt in the an emerging market context. In Korinek (2008), borrowing 
in foreign currency is cheaper for individual firms because of the risk premium on 
domestic currency debt. However, foreign currency debt leaves domestic entrepre­
neurs vulnerable to a sharp appreciation of the domestic real exchange rate. In 
Bianchi (2009), fluctuations in the price of non-traded goods work in the same way 
to introduce sudden sharp changes in real debt values. In both of these models, just 
like in the model of this paper, the externality works through pecuniary externalities 
that affect the tightness of borrowing constraints.
2 .2 .3  T h e w elfare costs  o f  business cycles
How the government trades off average consumption against the volatility of con­
sumption is an important reason behind the results of this paper. This issue connects 
with the literature on the welfare costs of business cycles, which was started by Lu­
cas (1987)’s seminal contribution. Lucas (1987) found that the cost of aggregate 
consumption volatility was of the order of 0.08% of annual consumption, implying 
that business cycle volatility is not an important determinant of social welfare. Lu­
cas (1987), of course, recognised that imperfections in risk sharing had the potential 
of increasing the cost of business cycles at least for some groups in society.
This finding spurred a lot of research on the effect of risk sharing and consumer
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S heterogeneity on the welfare costs of business cycles. Krussell and Smith (1998) 
examine this question in an infinitely lived economy with aggregate uncertainty 
in which individuals are subject to unsinsurable idiosyncratic shocks. Storsletten 
et al. (2001) extended Krussell and Smith’s analysis to an economy with finitely 
lived overlapping generations. They found that the welfare costs of the business 
cycle vary substantially across different groups in society and are larger than Lucas’ 
orginal numbers but still far from enormous. We find that the small costs of business 
cycles play a substantial role in determining the costs and benefits of regulation in 
our framework too.
2.3 T he M odel
2.3 .1  T h e E conom ic E nvironm ent 
Population and Production Technology
The economy is populated with a continuum of infinitely lived entrepreneurs and 
a continuum of infinitely lived workers - both of measure 1. Each entrepreneur is 
endowed with a constant returns to scale production function which uses capital k , 
labour h and intermediate inputs x to produce gross output y.
where a is the idiosyncratic component of productivity which is revealed to the 
entrepreneur one period in advance and can be high aH or low aL. The idiosyncratic 
state evolves according to a Markov process. Following Kiyotaki (1998) let n8 be 
the probability that a currently unproductive firm becomes productive and let be 
the probability that a currently productive firm becomes unproductive. This implies 
that the steady state ratio of productive to unproductive firms is n. The aggregate 
state also evolves according to a persistent Markov process.
At  is the aggregate component of productivity which also evolves according to a 
Markov process and alternates between high and low values. The realisation of the
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aggregate state At occurs at the beginning of time t.
Intermediate inputs x are produced one for one from consumption goods and 
fully depreciate between periods. Capital is in fixed aggregate supply and does not 
depreciate. The only financial asset is simple debt.
Com m itm ent technology and private information
Agents suffer from limited commitment. They cannot make binding promises unless 
it is in their interests to do so. In addition, idiosyncratic productivity realisations 
and individual asset holdings are private information.
2 .3 .2  E ntrepreneurs  
Preferences
Entrepreneurs are ex-ante identical and have logarithmic utility over consumption 
streams
oo
UE =  Eo ^ 2  f? lnc(
t = 0
Flow of Funds
Entrepreneurs purchase consumption (c), working intermediate inputs (x ), capital 
(k) at price q and labour (h) at wage w. All inputs are chosen a period in advance. 
Entrepreneurs borrow using debt securities bt at price 1/Rt-
ct +  wtht +  x t +  qtkt -  =  yt +  q t h - i  ~ h - i
Because we assume that idiosyncratic shocks and individual asset holdings are pri­
vate information, securities contingent on the realisation of the idiosyncratic state 
will not trade in equilibrium.
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Collateral constraints
Due to moral hazard in the credit market, agents will only honour their promises 
if it is in their interests to do so. We assume that only a fraction 9 of capital 
holdings can be seized by creditors. We also assume that entrepreneurs only have 
the opportunity to default before the aggregate shock has been realised. Hence 
the collateral constraint limits the entrepreneur’s debt to the expected value of 
collateralisable capital3:
Note that 6 here is assumed to be exogenously given by the underlying limited 
commitment problem in this economy. It therefore cannot be affected by the gov­
ernment. When we come to analyse the government’s choice of capital requirements, 
we will allow it to choose the capital requirement 9t ^  9. This will then place a limit 
on private leverage over and above the limit imposed by the incentive compatibility 
constraint (2 .1 ).
2 .3 .3  W orkers 
Preferences
Workers have the following preferences:
of the land price in the worst case scenario. In our case there are only two aggregate productivity 
states so lenders look at the value of collateral in the low aggregate state.
Such a collateral constraint would obtain if borrowers were allowed to default after the realisation 
of the aggregate productivity shock. Lenders would then want to insure themselves against losses 
by only lending up to the value at which entrepreneurs would never default.
We found that using such a form of the collateral constraint did not significantly affect the results 
we get.
bt ^  9Etqt+\kt (2 .1)




Workers do not have the opportunity to produce. They purchase consumption (c) 
and save using debt securities bt at price 1/Rt- Their net worth consists of labour 
income (Wtht) and bonds bt- \ .
ct +  tt  =  wtht +  bt - 1
Collateral constraints
Due to moral hazard in the credit market, workers cannot borrow:
bt ^ 0 (2 .2)
2.4 C om petitive Equilibrium
2 .4 .1  E ntrepreneurial behaviour
Entrepreneurs make decisions based on three key margins. First of all they decide 
how much to consume today and how much to save for future consumption. Sec­
ondly, they need to decide how to divide their savings between safe bonds and risky 
production - the portfolio problem. Thirdly, within the amount they invest in pro­
duction, they need to decide on the input mix between capital, intermediate inputs 
and labour - the production problem.
Let V  (zt , at, Xt)  denote the value of an entrepreneur with wealth zt, idiosyncratic 
productivity level at (determined and revealed to the entrepreneur at time t  — 1 ) 
when the aggregate state is X t =  [.At ,Z t ,dt\ . For now we simply assume that the 
aggregate state consists of the aggregate technology realisation At, total wealth in 
the economy Zt as well as the share of wealth held by high productivity entrepreneurs 
dt. We will prove subsequently that this is the case.
The value function is defined recursively as follows:
V ( z t , a t , X t) =  max {lnct +  (3EtV (zt+ i ,a t+ i ,X t+ i ) }  (2.3)
jO f  ,C f
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where the maximisation is performed subject to the current resource constraint,
ct +  wtht +  xt +  qtkt ~  t t  ^  z t 
xit
the transition law for individual wealth, 
the collateral constraint
bt ^  OEtqt+ih
the Markov process for the idiosyncratic productivity shock and the transition law 
for the aggregate state. The aggregate technology shock evolves according to a 
Markov process. The share of wealth held by high productivity entrepreneurs is an 
endogenous variable and we will describe its evolution as part of our characterisation 
of the competitive equilibrium of our model economy.
O ptim al consum ption
In Appendix 4.B.1 we prove that the log utility assumption ensures that consumption 
is always a fixed fraction of wealth that depends upon the discount factor.
ct =  (1  -  p) zt
O ptim al production
When borrowing constraints bind, high and low productivity entrepreneurs will make 
different production decisions. This is why we examine the optimal production 
decisions of the two groups separately.
H igh productiv ity  entrepreneurs In equilibrium, the high productivity en­
trepreneurs will turn out to be the borrowers in this economy. Optimal production 
implies that the input mix between capital, labour and intermediate inputs is given
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by the following expressions:
xt =  rju^kt/a  (2.4)
and
fc =  i (2. 5)
a wt
where u^  is the user cost of capital faced by high productivity entrepreneurs.
When the borrowing constraint is binding, this means that the entrepreneur 
derives additional value from purchasing capital because this relaxes the collateral 
constraint. This value (in terms of goods) can be easily derived from the first order 
condition with respect to borrowing:
a  =  i - W - * - )
Rt \ c t + i j
=  ^ - - e J  1 ^
Rt \R ? +1 J
where R^+i is the rate of return on wealth for high productivity entrepreneurs (to 
be pinned down later in the paper) and nt and At are the Lagrange multipliers 
on the borrowing and resource constraints. The value of relaxing the borrowing 
constraint by a unit is equal to the difference between the market price of future 
consumption (the price of debt) and the private valuation of future consumption. 
Credit constrained borrowers are those who value future consumption less than the 
market because their wealth and consumption are growing fast. They would like to 
borrow unlimited amounts at prevailing market prices but are prevented from doing 
so by binding collateral constraints.
In general the user cost expression is given by:
u ? =  q t - E t \ J ^ J - e E tqt+1^
When credit constraints bind, the user cost expression is give by:
7iH -  n - W  I qt+1
U t ~ qt M a g . ,
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while when they do not bind, the shadow price on the borrowing constraint fit =  0  
and the user cost is given by:
„.h  _  j? ( Qt+i
Low productiv ity  entrepreneurs In equilibrium, low productivity entrepre­
neurs axe always unconstrained savers. When borrowing constraints bind sufficiently 
tightly, they also end up producing using their inefficient technology. Suppose that 
we are in such an environment where efficient and inefficient technologies are both 
used due to the borrowing constraint. Then the first order condition for optimal 
capital input by the low productivity producers is as follows:
uf=9t-Et{w,:)
where Rf+i =  is the rate of return on wealth for a low productivity entrepreneur 
(to be specified later on in the paper). This is a standard user cost expression. 
Because our economy has two aggregate states and two assets (debt and productive 
projects), markets for aggregate risk are complete and 7r (s) /Rt+i  (s ) is the price 
of an Arrow security that pays a unit of consumption if state s is realised in the 
next period. The Et term is the present value of the capital unit tomorrow
evaluated at Arrow security prices.
Conditional upon the user cost of capital, low productivity entrepreneurs have 
the same input mix as high productivity types. However, high productivity entre­
preneurs will use less capital intensive production strategies because they face a 
higher cost of capital compared to low productivity ones. We will return to the link 
between downpayment requirements and the user cost of capital later because it is 
key to the policy conclusions of the paper.
T he portfolio  problem
In the previous two subsections we characterised the solution of two of the consumer’s 
three decision margins: the consumption function and the optimal input mix into
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production. Now what remains is to solve for the optimal mix between productive 
projects and loans to other entrepreneurs. For the high productivity entrepreneurs 
who are the borrowers in our economy this problem boils down to choosing optimal 
leverage. For the low productivity savers, it will be a choice of whether to produce 
or lend at the margin.
H igh  prod u ctiv ity  entrepreneurs In equilibrium, high productivity entrepre­
neurs have investment opportunities in excess of the rates of return available on 
market securities (in this model, simple debt). Consequently they will want to 
leverage up in order to take advantage of this (temporary) investment opportunity. 
Let It =  bt/Etqt+ikt denote the fraction of the entrepreneur’s capital purchase which 
is financed by debt. This fraction is bounded from above by the collateral constraint, 
which states that, in the laissez faire economy, at most 9 fraction can be borrowed. 
In the regulated economy It will be bounded by the capital requirement chosen by 
the government, 0f
In Appendix 4.B.2 we show that a high productivity entrepreneur who borrows 
a fraction It ^  9 to fund his capital purchases will earn the following rate of return:
pH =  (At+iaH/a )  w t +v “ +  qt+i -  hEtqt+i . .
^ +1 qt +  ( l - a ) u " / a - ( l t / R t ) E tqt+1 1 ' '
The numerator of the above expression denotes project revenues consisting of out­
put per unit of capital ((At+\aH/a )  w£+T]~l (u^)1 a) and the value of capital (qt+i) 
net of debt repayments ItEtqt+i. The denominator denotes the total cost of under­
taking the project. It consists of the total cost of capital (qt) and other inputs 
( ( 1  — a) / a )  minus the amount of financing the entrepreneur chose to undertake 
via debt markets (lt/Rt) Etqt+i- So in other words, R^+i is the leveraged rate of 
return on production.
In Appendix 4.B.3 we show that the entrepreneur chooses It in order to maximise 
the expected log rate of return on wealth.
In Rh * =  max Et In
it
(At+iaH/ a )  Wt+T) 1 ( u f ) 1 a +  qt+i ~  kEtqt+ 1  
qt +  (1 -  a) u f  f a  -  (lt / R t) Etqt + 1
(2.7)
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subject to the constraint:
k ^ 0t (2 -8 )
To get a more intuitive understanding of the leverage decision, we can think of 
the entrepreneur’s leverage decision as a standard portfolio problem in which the 
entrepreneur chooses how much of his savings to put into a risky and a safe asset. 
We define the return on the risky asset as the return on a productive project together 
with the returns from the capital holding that goes with it:
k (At+ laH/ a ) w t +Tt 1 ( u ? ) 1 a +  qt+i
^ t+1 qt +  { 1 -  a ) v ? / a
Then we can write the rate of return on the entrepreneur’s total portfolio as the 
weighted average between the risky and the safe rate of return:
R t+1 =  ™ tl R t+1 +  C1 “  ) R t
where
y T v;-, —  >  i (2-9)
qt +  (1  -  a) u ? / a  
qt +  { 1 -  a) u f / a  -  (lt / R t) Etqt+1
is the share of the risky asset in the high productivity entrepreneur’s portfolio. 
Entrepreneurs are free to choose a value of It below 6 if they are unconstrained. 
However, the maximum share of the risky asset is determined by the borrowing 
constraint and is given by:4
H qt +  { l - a ) u ? / a
max — - / 1 \ H / (a / d \ t?qt +  { 1 -  a) uj* f a  -  {0/Rt ) Etqt + 1
4 The larger lt the higher the share of risky assets in the entrepreneur’s portfolio. As (2.9) shows, 
when lt >  0, the share of the risky asset w f  is greater than unity. But even when the entrepreneur 
borrows the full value of her capital purchases, this does not mean that she is unconstrained in her 
borrowing. As long as the expected return on the risky asset Rt+i  is sufficiently greater than the 
interest rate on safe debt Rt  to compensate for risk, the entrepreneur will remain credit constrained 
and would like to borrow against the value of her future output as well.
Reducing the value of It below the market determined 0 is tantamount to the entrepreneur 
choosing to reduce his holdings of the risky asset. As the entrepreneur borrows less and less, It falls 
and with it w f  falls too. If the entrepreneur decides to become a net saver, It falls below zero. In 
the limit, as It becomes large and negative, w ?  tends to zero and the portfolio of the entrepreneur 
consists of only the safe asset.
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In Appendix 4.B.5 we show that we can take a second order approximation to 
the portfolio problem as follows:
In R h * «  max In Rt +  (EtPt+i -  !) -
where the expected excess return on production for high productivity agents is de­
fined as follows:
EtP?+ l =  /R t  ( 2 n )
Rt y  qt +  ( l - a ) u F / a  J
The conditional variance of the log rate of return of the risky asset cr^ + 1  is dom­
inated by the variance of the capital price as well as the covariance of the capital 
price with the technology shock (for more details see Appendix 4.B.5). Both of these 
terms increase strongly as the collateral amplification mechanism becomes stronger. 
The first order condition is:
d  In R h * _  H h  2 ^ n (r> 1 0\
~  EtPt+1 1 <JR t+ 1 ^ 0 (^*12)





where S 1 is the conditional Sharpe ratio on the risky asset for the high 
productivity entrepreneur. <7Rt+i is determined by the volatility of the technology 
shock a \  as well as the volatility of the capital price The higher these are,
the smaller the share of the risky asset chosen by the entrepreneur. Equally a higher 
premium Etp^+i — 1 leads to a larger share invested in the risky asset.
This means that, in general, the share of the risky asset in the high productivity 
entrepreneur’s portfolio is given by:
vj¥  ~  min Etpj*+ 1 -  1 qt +  (1  -  a) uf*/a
a R t+ 1 ’ % +  ( ! - <*)  u f / a  -  (O/Rt) Etqt+ 1
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where — /a ------  is the share of the risky asset when the constraint
q t + ( l - a ) u ”  / a - { 0 / R t ) E t q t + \  J
is binding.
Low prod u ctiv ity  entrepreneurs Low productivity entrepreneurs may or may 
not produce in equilibrium, depending on the tightness of the collateral constraint. 
When the constraint binds very tightly, high productivity firms will be constrained 
in their ability to purchase the productive assets in the economy and some of them 
will have to be bought by low productivity firms. Consistent with the large variance 
of plant level productivity, we focus on a level of 6 such that low productivity firms 
do end up producing in equilibrium, financing themselves using their own net worth. 
In Appendix 4.B.4 we show that the rate of return on their net worth is given by:
(At+i/a)  w“ + ’1 1 (uf-)1 “ +  <7t+i kt +  bt
[qt +  (1 -  a) uf'/a] kt +  bt/ R t 
where the numerator consists of the revenues from production as well as debt re­
payments received from other entrepreneurs, while the denominator is the cost of 
purchasing the portfolio. Unlike, high productivity entrepreneurs who leverage up 
in order to invest in production, low productivity entrepreneurs have more bal­
anced portfolios, consisting of loans to other entrepreneurs as well as own productive 
projects.
The portfolios of high and low productivity entrepreneurs are linked by the 
market clearing conditions in the capital and debt markets. This means that once 
we have solved for the optimal portfolio of the high productivity entrepreneurs, this 
also gives us the investment choices of low productivity ones. In Appendix 4.B.4 we 
show that the equilibrium rate of return on wealth for the low types is given below:
R t + 1  =  w t
(.At+1/ a ) w ? +v 1 (u f ) 1 a +  qt+i
qt +  ( 1 -  a) uf'/a +  (i -  ™i) R t
where
jL _  [qt +  { l - a ) u t ' / a \  (1 - K t)
* [Qt +  (1 -  oi) u f /a ]  (1  -  K t) +  ltEtqt+i /R t
is the share of the risky asset in the low productivity entrepreneur’s portfolio. Note
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that this is always less than one because this entrepreneur invests part of his savings 
into risk free loans to other entrepreneurs. The risky asset available to the low 
productivity entrepreneur earns a lower rate of return compared to the one held by 
high productivity ones. The excess return for the ’low’ type is given by:
T ( {At+\/a)  u;?+77_1 (u t ) 1 a +  <ft+i\
Etft+i =  Et K-  *+--/-  ; ( -----\ - 4 - ------------- Rt 2.13y qt +  (1 -  a) u f / a  J
The conditions for the optimal portfolio composition of the low productivity type
are similar to those in the previous subsection:
L _  S t+1« -------
& r t + l
where S^ +1 =  ^alt+i 1 *s conditional Sharpe ratio on the risky asset for the low 
productivity entrepreneur and c r r t + i  is the standard deviation of the log return on 
the risky asset. Analogously with c r m + i , c rr t + 1 is determined by the volatility of the 
technology shock a \  as well as the volatility of the capital price & q t + i .
2 .4 .2  B eh aviou r o f  W orkers
Let Vw  Xt)  denote the value function of a worker with individual financial 
wealth bt when the aggregate state is Xt.  The value function is given by:
Vw (bt- i ,Xt) =  max h n f c t - x ^ - )  +  0EtVw (bt , X t+l) \
c t , h t , b t+1   ^ \  1  +  U  J  J
subject to the flow of funds constraint and the borrowing constraint. The first order 
conditions are given by:
wt =  xh% (2.14)
=  PRtEt
I h ] + ?
W i  -
In equilibrium, workers will not save as long as the volatility of the aggregate wage 
is not too great. This is because the risk free interest rate is below the workers’ rate 
of time preference. This means that workers will consume their entire wage income
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in equilibrium and their welfare will be dominated by the stochastic process for the 
aggregate wage rate5.
The result that workers consume their entire labour income allows us to drop the 
financial wealth state variable and simplify their value function considerably. Using 
the optimal labour supply condition (2.14) we get to the following simple expression:
V w (Xt) =  e  +  In wt +  0 B tV w  ( * 1+1)
1 +  U)
where 0  is a constant that depends on parameter values.
2 .4 .3  A ggregation  and M arket C learing
We complete the characterisation of the competitive equilibrium of our model econ­
omy by specifying the evolution equations for the endogenous state variables well as 
the market clearing conditions.
There are three market clearing conditions. The bond,
J b t + 1 ( i ) d i  =  0  (2.15)
capital
and goods markets
J k t + i ( i ) d i  =  l  (2.16)
C f  +  C ?  +  C f  +  X g j  +  X tL+ 1  =  Y tH  +  Y t L  (2.17)
all clear.
Finally the economy’s endogenous state variables evolve according to the follow­
In solving the model we verify at each point in time that the condition for no saving holds
1 > pRtEt 1ht1+“ I hjtj'
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ing transition law.
Zm  =  R?+1PZtH +  I$ +10Z jt (2.18)
= [dtfl£i + (l-d<)fl£n]0Zt
dt+i =  (2.19)
At+1
_  (1 -  S) dtRj*+1 +  nd (1  -  dt) R^+1 
dtRt+i + (1 — dt) Rt+1
2 .4 .4  E quilibrium  D efin ition
Recursive competitive equilibrium of our model economy is a price system Wt, uE , 
uE, qt, R t , value functions V E and , entrepreneur decision rules kt, xt, bf, hf 
and cf, worker decision rules bf+1, hf+1 and cf ,  and equilibrium laws of motion for 
the endogenous state variables (2.18) and (2.19) such that
(i) The value function VtE and the decision rules kt, xt, h\, b% and cf solve the 
entrepreneur’s decision problem conditional upon the price system wt, uE , uE, qt, 
Rt, the value function and the decision rules bf, h f  and c f  solve the worker’s 
decision problem conditional upon the price system wt, uE , uE, qt, R t .
(ii) The process governing the transition of the aggregate productivity and the 
household decision rules kt, xt, bf, hf, cf, bf,  h f  and c f  induce a transition process 
for the aggregate state given by (2.18) and (2.19).
(iii) All markets clear
2.5 T he Econom ic Im pact o f C apital R equirem ents
Capital requirements are the main policy instrument for the government in our 
framework. In this section we examine using numerical solutions of our model econ­
omy what their effect is on economic outcomes. We focus on the ways in which 
tighter borrowing limits affects the different distortions in the credit constrained 
economy in order to see how the government trades them off against one another.
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Section 2.6 will derive the optimal capital requirement.
2 .5 .1  B aselin e  C alibration
In this section we outline the basic features of the baseline calibration. More details 
can be found in Appendix 4.B.7.
We calibrate 77, the share of intermediate inputs in gross output to 0.45 using 
data from the 2007 BEA Industrial Accounts. Using the Cooley and Prescott (1995) 
methodology we calibrate a  (the share of capital in gross output) to 0 . 2  which gives a 
share of 0.36 in value added. We set 6 (the share of capital which can be collateralised 
for loans) to 1.0 in line with the value used in Kiyotaki (1998) and Aoki et al (2009). 
However, since there is very little information on the collateralisability of capital 
goods we conduct extensive sensitivity analysis due to the highly uncertain value of 
this parameter.
The technology process at the firm level consists of an aggregate and an idiosyn­
cratic component. Because TFP is endogenous in the Kiyotaki-Moore framework we 
pick the process for the aggregate exogenous technology shock to match the standard 
deviation of HP-filtered real GDP. The high (low) realisations of the aggregate TFP 
shock are 0.6% above (below) the steady state TFP level. The probability that the 
economy remains in the same aggregate state it is today is equal to 0 .8 .
Calibrating the cross-sectional dispersion of TFP is important because the quan­
titative importance of the pecuniary externality studied in our paper is related to 
the productivity gap between high and low productivity firms. Bernard et al. (2003) 
report an enormous cross-sectional variance of plant level value added per worker 
using data from the 1992 US Census of Manufactures. The standard deviation of the 
log of value added per worker is 0.75 in the data while their model is able to account 
for only around half this number. The authors argue that imperfect competition 
and data measurement issues can account for much of this discrepancy between 
model and data. In addition, the study assumes fixed labour share across plants so 
any departures from this assumption would lead to more variations in the measured 
dispersion of labour productivity.
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In a comprehensive review article on the literature on cross-sectional productivity 
differences, Syverson (2009) documents that the top decile of firms has a level of 
TFP which is almost twice as high as the bottom decile. He finds that unobserved 
inputs such as the human capital of the labour force, the quality of management and 
plant level ‘learning by doing’ can account for much of the observed cross-sectional 
variation in TFP.
This model does not have intangible assets of the sort discussed in Syverson 
(2009) and consequently calibrating the model using the enormous productivity dif­
ferentials identified in the productivity literature would overestimate the true degree 
of TFP differences. In addition, the Kiyotaki-Moore model would need very tight 
borrowing constraints or a very small number of high productivity entrepreneurs in 
order for credit constraints to be binding if some firms are so much more productive 
than others. And within the framework we have, binding credit constraints axe the 
only mechanism for generating cross-sectional differences in productivity. Aoki et al. 
(2009) also consider these issues in their calibration of a small open economy version 
of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). They argue that a ratio of the productivities of the 
two groups of 1.15 is broadly consistent with the empirical evidence and I choose 
this number for the baseline case. However I conduct extensive sensitivity analysis 
on this hard to pin down parameter because there is very little strong evidence for 
how to calibrate the productivity dispersion across firms.
Moving on to the parameters governing labour supply we set a; - 1  (the Frisch 
elasticity of labour supply) to 3. This is higher than micro-data estimates (refer­
ences) but is consistent with choices made in the macro literature. We then pick x , 
a parameter governing the disutility of labour to get a value of labour supply as a 
fraction of workers’ time endowment which is equal to 0.33.
The discount factor /3, the probability that a highly productive entrepreneur 
switches to low productivity 6, and the ratio of high to low productivity entrepre­
neurs n are parameters I pick in order to match three calibration targets - the ratio 
of tangible assets to GDP, aggregate leverage and the leverage of the most indebted 
decile of firms.
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I use data on tangible assets and GDP from the BEA National Accounts in the 
1952-2008 period. The concept of tangible assets includes Business and Household 
Equipment and Software, Inventories, Business and Household Structures and Con­
sumer Durables. GDP excludes government value added so it is a private sector 
output measure.
Aggregate leverage is defined as the average ratio of the value of the debt lia­
bilities of the non-financial corporate sector to the total value of assets. Leverage 
measures can be obtained from a number of sources. In the US Flow of Funds, 
aggregate leverage is approximately equal to 0.5 for the 1948-2008 period. This is 
broadly consistent with the findings of den Hsian and Covas (2007) who calculate 
an average leverage ratio of 0.587 in Compustat data from 1971 to 2004. Den Haan 
and Covas (2007a) also examine the leverage of large firms and find that it is slightly 
higher than the average in the Compustat data set. Firms in the top 5% in terms of 
size have leverage of around 0.6. Den Haan and Covas (2007b) have similar findings 
in a panel of Canadian firms. There the top 5% of firms have leverage of 0.7-0.75 
compared to an average of 0.66 for the whole sample. High productivity entrepre­
neurs in our economy run larger firms so differences in productivity and therefore 
leverage could be one reason for the findings of Den Haan and Covas (2007a and 
2007b). But the perfect correlation of firm size and leverage that holds in our model 
will not hold in the data. So if we are interested in the distribution of firm leverage, 
the numbers in Den Haan and Covas will be an underestimate. This is why we pick 
a target for the average leverage of the top 1 0 % most indebted firms to be equal to 
0.75. This number is broadly consistent with the findings in Den Haan and Covas.
Table 2.1 below summarises the calibration targets we match while Table 2.2 
summarises the baseline parameter values used in the paper.
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Target Value Source
Tangible Assets to GDP =  q/  (Y h  +  Y l -  X H -  X L) 3.49 BEA National Accounts
Aggregate Leverage = L A =  B /  (g +  Y H +  Y L) 0.50 Flow of Funds
Leverage of indebted firms = L H — B /  (q K  +  Y H) 0.75 Den Haan-Covas (2007a)
Share of intermediate inputs in gross output =  77 0.45 BEA National Accounts
Share of capital in GDP =  a /  (1 — 77) 0.36 BEA National Accounts
Cross sectional productivity dispersion =  aH/ a L 1.15 Aoki et al. (2009)
Collateralisability of capital =  0 1 .0 0 Aoki et al. (2009)
Standard deviation of annual real GDP 2 .0 1 BEA National Accounts
Table 2.1: Calibration targets












aH/ a L 1.15
e 1 .0 0
Table 2 .2 : Summary of baseline model calibration
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2 .5 .2  M od el evaluation
Having chosen parameter values to match the first moments of the model to those 
in the data and to match the volatility of real GDP, in this section we evaluate the 
model by analysing how key moments of the model compare to those in the data. 
All variables have been detrended using the HP filter (for more details see Appendix 
4.B.7) Table 2.3 below compares the second moments of the model relative to the 
data6. The numbers we focus on is the standard deviation of annual aggregate 
non-durable consumption, aggregate labour hours and the stock market
Data Model
°C 1.55 2 .0 1
Oh 1.32 1.25
(Jy 6.06 2.55
Note: < JC is the standard deviation of the logarithm of aggregate consumption, <Th is the standard 
deviation of the logarithm of aggregate labour hours, a v is the standard deviation of the
logarithm of stock prices
Table 2.3: Model second moments
The standard deviation of aggregate labour hours in the model are broadly in 
line with those in the data. The model does less well in the other two key dimensions 
we use in our evaluation. Aggregate consumption is too volatile relative to the data. 
This is a feature of the model that can be improved upon in future work by adding a 
better means of aggregate saving. Capital is fixed and the only means of aggregate 
saving for agents in the model is to purchase intermediate inputs. In addition, due 
to the low risk free interest rate, workers do not save and their consumption is as 
volatile as labour income. In future work I intend to extend the model by adding 
capital which does not depreciate fully and which can, therefore, be accumulated 
in the aggregate, allowing households to smooth consumption better. The volatility
6More details on how the data moments were computed are in Appendix 4.B.7.
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of the real value of the S&P 500 in the data is also considerably higher than the 
volatility of asset prices in the model.
2 .5 .3  B orrow ing C onstra in ts and  S tead y  S ta te  P ro d u ctiv e  E fficiency
In this subsection we consider what would happen in the steady state (i.e. in the 
absence of aggregate shocks) if the government chooses to impose tighter capital 
requirements (a lower value of 6). Perhaps the biggest welfare cost of tighter bor­
rowing constraints arises because borrowing constraints reduce the efficiency of the 
economy. This happens for two reasons. Firstly, the downpayment requirements on 
capital acts as a tax on the capital purchases of high productivity entrepreneurs and 
distorts their production mix relative to the first best. Secondly, borrowing con­
straints increase the share of low productivity firms in economic activity, reducing 
aggregate TFP. Below we explain both of these sources of inefficiency.
Capital requirements and the ‘downpayment tax’ on high productivity  
entrepreneurs
In Appendix 4.B.8 we show that we can write the steady state user cost of capital for 
high productivity entrepreneurs in the tax wedge form popularised by Chari, Kehoe 
and McGrattan (2007):
-  n Lt ~  Qt
(h 1 -  9t
Rt R?+1 
=  u f f i  +  Tj (e
Qt+i
where the tax is given by the following expression
- ‘ ( ^ )  =  ( 1 - ^ )  ( 5 - 1)  l 1 - ^ )  (220)
The collateral requirement acts like a tax on the capital purchases of constrained 
producers. The size of the tax is determined by the following factors. First of all, the 
tax is increasing in the required downpayment on capital goods 1 — $t- This fraction
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determines how much of the capital purchase needs to be financed by expensive own 
savings as opposed to cheap external funds. The difference between the valuation of 
internal funds and the market price of loans is given by the 1 — -Mf— term in (2 .2 0 ).
Kt+1
It arises when the borrowing constraint leads to a deterioration in consumption 
smoothing. High productivity entrepreneurs experience faster consumption growth 
making them less willing to save. And because the collateral constraint forces them 
to save, this acts to increase their user cost relative to unconstrained low produc­
tivity agents. Secondly, the tax is increasing in the price to rent ratio of capital. 
This is because a high price to rent ratio increases the internal funds required by a 
constrained borrower (who needs to have a fraction of the cost of capital as down­
payment) relative to an unconstrained borrower (who effectively faces only the user 
cost). The first row in Table 2.4 below shows how the ‘downpayment tax’ varies 
with the value of downpayment requirement. As Qt - the collateralisability of capital 
- declines from 1 and 0 .8 , the ‘tax’ increases from 0  to more than 2 0 %.
Interestingly the impact of capital requirements on the real wage and non­
monotonic. At high levels of Q, the wage is increasing in the downpayment of capital 
goods, while at low levels of 0, it is decreasing. Capital requirements have two op­
posing effects on the real wage. Lower Qt allows high productivity entrepreneurs 
to expand production which boosts TFP and increases wages. But there is an­
other effect. Lower Qt increases the user cost of capital and skews the input mix by 
high productivity entrepreneurs towards intermediate inputs and labour. The higher 
labour demand increases the wage. At high levels of Qt, the share of production done 





bas 0 =  0.9
oT—1II 1 st best
r 0 .2 1 0 . 1 2 0 .0 0 0 .0 0
w 1.590 1.592 1.586 1.788
K h 0.30 0.42 0.69 1 .0 0
T F P 1.050 1.066 1.104 1.15
Notes: T  is the ’downpayment tax’ rate, W  is the wage rate, K ^  is the share of the capital stock 
held by high productivity entrepreneurs, T F P  is aggregate total factor productivity.
Table 2.4: Selected first moments under different capital requirements
Capital requirements and the level of T FP
The aggregate level of TFP in this economy is given by the ratio of aggregate output 
in the economy to the inputs that are used in production.
T r r , A aH (K)a {X H)" “ " +  ( l - K ) a ( X Ly ( H L) 1- a ”
( X H +  X Lf  (H H +  IIL)1 — a — Tj
In Appendix 4.B.9 we show that aggregate TFP in the economy is given by the 
following expression:
1 +  K t 
TFPt = ---------
1 +  T ( $ ) K t
The downpayment tax and the existence of inefficient production under binding 
borrowing constraints endogenously reduces the economy’s level of TFP. This can be 
seen in the last row of Table 3.4 above. As 0 declines from unity to 0.8, the share of 
capital held by high productivity entrepreneurs declines from 0.69 to 0.30, bringing 
about a decline in aggregate TFP of more than 5%. This is a crucial feature of the 
Kiyotaki (1998) framework. When borrowing constraints bind tightly, not enough 
funds get into the hands of the high productivity firms. As a result, the economy 
operates within the production possibility frontier because some of the scarce capital
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input is held by low productivity firms.
2 .5 .4  B orrow ing C onstraints and A gg reg a te  V o la tility  in  th e  S to­
chastic  E conom y
In this subsection we consider how the imposition of capital requirements affect the 
equilibrium of the economy with aggregate uncertainty. Here we focus on the ways 
in which capital requirements affect the volatility of aggregate consumption as well 
as the consumption of different groups and link it to the endogenous fluctuations in 
TFP which arise due to the amplification mechanism.
Leverage leads to a reallocation of capital between high and low productivity 
entrepreneurs over the business cycle. This happens through the standard collateral 
amplification mechanism of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), which can cause substantial 
endogenous fluctuations in TFP amplifying the normal shocks to technology over the 
business cycle. The mechanism which generates this amplification is the following. 
When the aggregate productivity state At changes (say, it falls), this reduces the 
capital price in both the borrowing constrained and in the ‘first best’ economy. 
But whereas in the ‘first best’ world, there is very little additional propagation, in 
the credit constrained (leverage financed) economy, the fall in asset prices impacts 
the wealth of high productivity and low productivity agents differently. Because 
they are leveraged, high productivity entrepreneurs are badly affected and have to 
scale down their capital investments because they can no longer afford the required 
downpayment as well as the cost of the capital input needed to operate productive 
projects with a large capital input. The purchasers of capital are the low productivity 
entrepreneurs and consequently the economy’s aggregate TFP declines as inefficient 
production expands. The additional fall in TFP puts further downward pressure 
on capital prices and on the wealth and borrowing capacity of high productivity 
entrepreneurs. This is the amplification channel of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997): small 
declines in the economy’s aggregate technology can set off a self-reinforcing spiral of 
falling TFP and asset prices, magnifying the effect of the original technology shock. 
The amplification mechanism is very important because its quantitative strength will
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be a crucial determinant of whether capital requirements can be welfare improving 
or not.
Capital Requirements 0 =  0.80 0 =  0.90 0 =  1 .0 0 1st best
Gy 1.48 1.57 2 .0 1 1.39
Gq 1.52 1 .6 8 2.55 1.39
° c 1.48 1.57 2 .0 1 1.39
Gyj 0.57 0.59 0.65 0.34
gtfp 0.53 0 .6 6 0.85 0.61
Note: Gy is the standard deviation of the log of output, Gq is the standard deviation of the log of 
the capital price, Gc is the standard deviation of the log of aggregate consumption, GTFP is the 
standard deviation of the log of aggregate total factor productivity, Gw is th e  standard  
deviation  o f th e  log o f th e  real w age rate.
Table 2.5: Selected second moments under different capital requirements
Cordoba and Ripoll (2004) have argued that the amount of amplification in 
the Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) framework is very small when one assumes con­
cave utility and decreasing returns to scale in production. They show that large 
amplification needs a large productivity gap, a large share of constrained agents in 
production and substantial reallocation of collateral in response to shocks. Cordoba 
and Ripoll (2004) find that, in particular, there is a trade off between having a 
large productivity gap and having a lot of production in the hands of constrained 
entrepreneurs. This is because they assume decreasing returns to scale at the plant 
level. When constrained firms are very small and their output is low they are much 
more productive than the larger unconstrained firms. But the downside is that their 
share in total output is low. At the other extreme, when constrained firms are large, 
their productivity advantage relative to unconstrained ones is small. In both cases, 
at least one condition for large amplification is not satisfied and so the additional 
volatility from the model is negligible.
As Table 2.5 shows, the amplification we obtain from out calibrated version of
78
the Kiyotaki (1998) model is very substantial. In the baseline case, the standard 
deviations of TFP and output are, respectively, 38% and 45% higher compared to the 
first best while the standard deviation of the capital price is 84% higher. So contrary 
to the results in Cordoba and Ripoll (2004) we get quantitatively large amplification 
from the framework. Our differences from Cordoba and Ripoll (2004) arise from one 
main source - our assumption of constant returns to scale to all factors at the plant 
level. Even though we have decreasing returns to the collateral factor (capital), the 
production function is constant returns in all the three factors. This means that in 
our calibration we do not face the trade off between the size of the productivity gap 
and the share of constrained producers in economic activity. The productivity gap 
is largely driven by the value of aH as well as the ‘downpayment tax’ r  (6). It is 
independent of the level of output at any individual firm. When we add the effects 
of leverage (again realistically calibrated to match US data), we get substantial re­
allocation of collateral between high and low productivity entrepreneurs as asset 
prices fluctuate. So Cordoba and Ripoll’s conditions for amplification are satisfied 
and this explains why our constrained economy is so much more volatile relative 
to the ‘first best’. Our results are similar to those in Vlieghe (2005) who found 
something very similar in a version of Kiyotaki (1998) with nominal rigidities. In 
his model (which also featured constant returns to all factors) amplification was very 
substantial showing the potential of the framework to propagate shocks.
In addition to the amplification of aggregate fluctuations, leverage concentrates 
the aggregate risk in the hands of only a small subset of agents in the economy. When 
capital is largely held by high productivity entrepreneurs who finance their capital 
holdings using simple debt, risk sharing between the two groups deteriorates. We can 
see this in Table 2.6 below which shows the variance of the aggregate consumption 
of the two groups. This difference grows as credit constraints are relaxed due to the 
increasing collateralisability of capital.
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Capital Requirements 0 =  0.80 0 =  0.90 0  =  1 .0 0 FB
& c H 2.48 3.12 5.57 1.39
& c L 1.33 1.34 1.52 1.39
° c W 1.45 1.50 1.65 1.39
Note: (Jch  is the unconditional standard deviation of the log of the consumption of high 
productivity entrepreneurs, ( J c l  is the unconditional standard deviation of the log of the 
consumption of low productivity entrepreneurs, <7cl  is the unconditional standard deviation of
the log of the consumption of workers.
Table 2.6: Consumption volatility for the two groups
This result is not surprising. The low productivity entrepreneurs hold largely 
riskless debt and small positions in risky capital. In contrast, high productivity 
entrepreneurs hold leveraged positions in risky capital. This asymmetry in the asset 
holdings of the two groups leads to a concentration of the aggregate risk in the econ­
omy into the hands of very few (high productivity) individuals whose consumption 
fluctuates very substantially. Our results are in line with the findings of Vissing- 
Jorgensen and Parker (2009) who find that the aggregate risk is borne by a small 
fraction of high consumption/high income households. Tightening firms’ access to 
borrowing reduces this asymmetry in the riskiness of different individuals’ portfolios 
and consequently reduces the volatility in their relative consumption levels over the 
business cycle.7
2 .5 .5  D iscu ssion
In this section we examined the quantitative significance of four ways in which the 
credit constrained economy is distorted relative to the first best. These distortions, 
however, do not necessarily imply that the economy is constrained inefficient. As 
long as the government cannot do anything directly about borrowing constraints, 
many of these distortions will be an unavoidable consequence of credit market im­
7In the limit, when no borrowing is allowed and all production is entirely net worth financed, 
both types of agents hold identical portfolios (only productive projects) and risk sharing is perfect.
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perfections.
For example, any deviations of the economy’s steady state from first best would 
be constrained efficient. The trade off between productive efficiency and consump­
tion smoothing is identical for private individuals and for the government. Private 
borrowers with good productive opportunities choose to borrow up to the limit and 
experience a steeply sloped consumption path because the rates of return they can 
earn on productive projects are much better compared to the cost of debt. The 
government will make an identical decision because it can redistribute capital hold­
ings between the two groups and compensate the low productivity firms for their 
lost output while still making the high productivity borrowers better off. The only 
constraint on this redistribution is the collateral constraint, which binds for the 
government in the same way as it binds for the laissez faire economy.
In a stochastic environment, the efficiency properties of the competitive equilib­
rium change. The collateral amplification mechanism of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) 
introduces feedback effects between asset prices, the net worth of leveraged bor­
rowers and the tightness of borrowing constraints. When aggregate productivity 
switches from high to low, asset prices fall and this has a disproportionately nega­
tive effect on the net worth of leveraged high productivity borrowers. Because part 
of the capital purchase and the whole of the intermediate input purchase is non- 
collateralisable, borrowers need their own net worth in order to produce on a large 
scale. Therefore the fall in the net worth of high productivity borrowers reduces 
the amount of capital they can invest in production and forces them to scale down 
their capital holdings. The low productivity agents absorb the capital sold by the 
high productivity ones but only at lower prices. But this fall in the price of capital 
further damages the net worth of leveraged firms and forces them to cut their capital 
holdings even further. This completes the ‘credit cycle’, amplifying and propagating 
small shocks into larger fluctuations in output, TFP and asset prices.
Where does the inefficiency of private leverage come from? As identified in 
Lorenzoni (2008) and Korinek (2009), when collateral constraints bind, the pecu­
niary externalities we usually consider harmless from an economic efficiency point
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of view, begin to interfere with the allocative efficiency of the economy. The forced 
sales of leveraged borrowers depress asset prices and tighten the credit constraints 
of all other constrained borrowers, forcing them to sell assets themselves8.
2.6 T he M odel Econom y under C apital R equirem ents
In this section we turn to the main question of this research: are private leverage 
decisions optimal from a social point of view? From the work of Lorenzoni (2008) 
and Korinek (2009) we know that, qualitatively, the answer is ‘no’. Here we examine 
whether, quantitatively, the inefficiency is large or small.
We assume that capital requirements are chosen by a benevolent government 
who maximises a social welfare function which weights the values of all agents in the 
economy. The government is subject to the same collateral and budget constraints 
facing private agents. So any differences in private and social leverage choices are 
due to the market price externality discussed above.
2.6 .1  T h e G overn m ent’s P rob lem
The government optimises the coefficient on a simple state contingent capital re­
quirement rule
9t =  min [exp (xb +  X i ln dt +  X2 ln z t) , 0\ (2.21)
in order to maximise the following social welfare function
\ 1 + C J
fin “  max Eo 
{xT lnc*. i t= 0 t= 0
8But although such pecuniary externalities exist they are not always quantitatively significant. 
For example, Guerrieri (2007) examines the constrained efficiency of a competitive labour market 
search model with private information and limited commitment. In her model, workers take the 
value of the outside unemployment option as given while the planner recognises that it is endoge­
nous because the expected value of job matches affects the continuation value of the unemployed. 
Although Guerrieri (2007) identifies this very interesting source of inefficiency of the competitive 
equilibrium, she finds that, quantitatively, the externality in question is very small.
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where qlE is the Pareto-Negishi weight on entrepreneur i while <;w is the Pareto- 
Negishi weight on the workers. We do not consider any other policy instruments.9 
Note that the capital requirements Ot is constrained by the exogenously given limit
o.
ot ^ o
In other words the government has no advantage in enforcing debt repayment over 
the private sector and therefore it cannot choose looser capital requirements than 
the market. The policy rule (2.21) allows the capital requirement to undergo mean 
shifts as the aggregate productivity state changes. Capital requirements also can 
respond to changes in the other aggregate state variables - total wealth wt and the 
share of wealth held by high productivity people dt. Once the government has chosen 
capital requirements, the collateral constraint in the regulated economy becomes:
bt ^ OtEtqt+ikt (2.23)
Private agents then perform exactly the same maximisation problem as in the un­
regulated economy, but the collateral constraint they now face may be tighter if 
Ot < 0 in some states of the world.
In Appendix 4.B.3 we showed that the value function of entrepreneurs depend 
on the net present value of future expected log rates of return on wealth as well 
as the logarithm of current financial wealth. We assume a particular initial wealth 
distribution in which all high and all low productivity entrepreneurs have an initial 
level of wealth equal to the group average in the ‘no regulation’ steady state. This
9 We do not solve a social planning problem because the collateral constraints in our economy 
depend on prices and these do not admit to a simple closed form solution in the same way as in 
Lorenzoni (2008) and Korinek (2009).
In future work, we intend to solve for the full Ramsay problem. We do not do this here because 
it complicates the solution of the model. At the same time the policy we consider does capture a 
lot of intuitive features about the way capital requirement policy may be implemented. It is fully 
state contingent and it is conducted under commitment because the government chooses the x* 
coefficients at the beginning of time and sticks to them for ever.
Our policy rule is, therefore, similar to the ‘Optimal non-inertial plan’ popularised by Woodford 
(2003) because it is conducted under commitment (the central bank opimises its coefficients in a 
once and for all fashion) but without responding to lagged variables (which is what the optimal 
Ramsay commitment policy does).
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allows us to consider the following social welfare function which weights the utilities 
of the three groups by the inverse of their marginal utility of consumption evaluated 
at the initial wealth distribution (more details in Appendix 4.B.11):
(2.24)
where Zq and Zq are the initial wealth levels of the high and low productivity 
entrepreneurs. Of course future switches in the idiosyncratic as well as aggregate 
state will cause ex post wealth heterogeneity, which the government cares about, the 
welfare costs of this ex post wealth heterogeneity is fully captured by the <pH (Xo|xz) 
and ifL (Ao|x1) terms and the government fully takes these welfare costs into account 
when setting Ot-
2.6 .2  W h en  is private leverage excessive?
The benevolent government chooses and commits to a time invariant capital require­
ment function Ot which maximises social welfare (2.24). The government cares about 
three things in (2.24). It wants to maximise the Pareto weighted average of the net 
present expected value of log returns on wealth for the two types of entrepreneurs. 
These are the the and <£>g terms in the social welfare function. But it also wants 
to maximise the welfare of workers which depends on the average level and volatil­
ity of real wages. Finally, the government cares about the current financial wealth 
of entrepreneurs too. It knows that any policy announcement will immediately be 
reflected in the capital price, impacting on the wealth of the two groups and it 
takes this into account when designing the optimal policy. In the next section we 
will compute numerically how these determinants of the welfare of the three groups 
change as we vary capital requirements. Then we will see whether the government 
can increase welfare relative to the market.
Here however we try to add a little more intuition by considering how the capital 
requirement choices of the government differ from those of private individuals in 
more detail. We do this by looking at what choices the government would make if
Qq =  max Eq 
OcT
. H In Z0" ( x ’) 
1 - / 3
+ <r ( - W )
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allowed to choose Ot in order to maximise the log expected portfolio return of the 
two groups of entrepreneurs as well as the log wage rate of workers. We compute the 
government’s first order condition for each group’s portfolio problem and evaluating 
them at private leverage choices Z™. This exercise will be useful for two reasons.
First of all it identifies any sources of re-distribution between the two groups as 
capital requirements are tightened. But secondly, it pinpoints where the externalities 
discussed by Lorenzoni (2008) and Korinek (2009) might occur in our framework.
High productivity entrepreneurs
Starting with the portfolio problem of high productivity entrepreneurs we find how 
Rt+i  is affected by tightening collateral requirements around the private optimum
im
l t
dEtpH+1 Q ln Rt
ddt ddt 
(2.25)
Here p^ +l is the excess return on leveraged production for high productivity entre­
preneurs, which was defined in equation (2.11). The value of (2.25) depends strongly 
on whether borrowing constraints bind or not in the current period. When borrow­
ing constraints bind, the entrepreneur’s portfolio hits the constraint and the private 
first order condition with respect to the share of the risky asset (equation (2 .1 2 )) 
holds with inequality:
EtPt+i ~  1 -  w t v 2m +1 >  0
But the government takes an additional amplification effect into account. This is the 
(^t ) d{aRt+i) term in equation (2.25). It takes into account the endogeneity of the 
variance of the portfolio rate of return for high productivity entrepreneurs. The more 
they borrow to invest into risky assets, the larger the impact of capital price shocks 
on their rates of return on wealth. And this is where the amplification mechanism 
generates the externality identified in Lorenzoni (2008) and Korinek (2009). When 
capital prices fall, leveraged entrepreneurs make low returns on wealth and this
-  h -  -  x _  r o M ( + l ) _  +
ddt d0t 2 dOt
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forces them to sell capital because they no longer have the net worth to purchase 
the non-collateralised inputs needed to support a large capital input into production.
The capital sales can only be absorbed by low productivity firms at lower prices, 
leading to another round of forced capital sales by credit constrained entrepreneurs.
But the government also recognises the fact that its policy instrument has 
its costs. Raising the downpayment requirement on capital acts like a tax on 
high productivity entrepreneurs, which reduces their excess return on production: 
dEQP£ +1 >  0. So when capital requirements axe tightened, the excess return on high 
productivity projects is reduced due to their distorted input mix. Partially offset­
ting that, the risk free rate increases when the government tightens credit limits:
<  0. But overall, tighter capital requirements leads to a lower rate of return 
on wealth for high productivity entrepreneurs. Finally, high productivity entrepre­
neurs have substantial capital positions which depreciate in value when regulation 
is introduced. This has a negative effect on their welfare.
Low productivity entrepreneurs
Moving on to the portfolio of low productivity entrepreneurs we have the following 
first order condition, which determine the way the capital requirements for high 
productivity entrepreneurs impact on the log rate of return on wealth for the low 
types:
) | 9 E t p t + 1  | d in R t
dQt d0t 
(2.26)
Capital requirements will affect low productivity types indirectly because they will 
reduce the available supply of the risk free asset and force them to invest more of 
their net worth in production. This is the first term in (2.26). But in addition, the 
volatility of the aggregate economy will decline and this will reduce the variance 
of the returns on the risky asset ( (ro*) ). The excess return on the risky
asset for low productivity types will also change (^ ! ~ +1) depending on whether the
out
overall portfolio has become riskier or safer as a result of the policy change. Finally
0 1 n =  d w L
ddt 90t
{ ™ i f  & ((?%+! 
2  80t
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risk free rates will change as the economy becomes more regulated.
For unconstrained low productivity entrepreneurs most of the terms in (2.26) 
are zero. Etpf+i — 1 — wfa^.t+1 =  0 from optimal portfolio choice. Because the low 
productivity type prices assets in our economy, any change in the volatility of returns 
will be reflected in the excess returns demanded in equilibrium. This means that 
_ (CTt) d{art+i) _|_ dPtj-i _  q. more voiatile returns will be accompanied by a higher 
excess return leaving the welfare of low productivity entrepreneurs unaffected.
There is an interesting difference between the way the government treats the 
portfolios problems of the two groups. In the case of the high productivity agents, 
the government was concerned with the welfare consequences of the market price 
externality which increased the value of (r2m+1- the variance of the log rate of return 
on the risky asset for high productivity entrepreneurs. But in this case changes in 
°rt+i ' the variability of the log excess return on the risky asset for the low types - 
did not represent any allocative inefficiency.
This difference arises because low productivity entrepreneurs are always uncon­
strained in their portfolio choice so, on the margin, any increase in the volatility of 
capital prices due to the excessive leverage of other entrepreneurs is compensated in 
equilibrium by higher excess returns. For the low productivity types the behaviour 
of the productive types represents a pure pecuniary externality with no consequences 
for allocative efficiency. In contrast, high productivity entrepreneurs are borrowing 
constrained (at least in some states of the world) and the tightness of the borrow­
ing constraint depends on the level of asset prices. So the pecuniary externalities 
caused by the forced capital sales by leveraged entrepreneurs in downturns do have 
consequences for the allocative efficiency of the economy. By tightening borrow­
ing constraints for everyone else, forced sales exert an externality the benevolent 
government should be concerned with correcting.
Because most of the terms in (2.26) drop out, the expected net present value of 
future returns for low productivity types is driven largely by what is happening to
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the log of risk free rates.
a  in R ^ ( 0 t  =  iT )  _ a in a ,
00* ~ dOt
Because tightening collateral requirements in the Kiyotaki (1998) model reduces 
aggregate TFP and pushes down on capital prices, the lower user cost of capital 
increases the rate of return on production for low productivity types and, by arbi­
trage, increases the risk free rate. This effect raises the welfare of low productivity 
entrepreneurs.
But there are other factors which reduce the welfare of low productivity entre­
preneurs. First of all, the continuation value of low productivity agents (pf partly 
depends on the value of a possible future high productivity opportunity f  and as 
we have seen in the previous subsection, this can be reduced by regulation. But sec­
ondly, as capital regulation is tightened, this depresses capital prices which form a 
part of all entrepreneurs’ portfolios. So the wealth terms of (2.24) will fall. Overall, 
the welfare of the unproductive will rise if they do not hold much capital (hence the 
loss of wealth from lower prices is small) and if they are not very likely to transit to 
the high productivity state (hence the fall in the value of productive opportunities 
does not affect them much).
Workers
Workers’ period welfare is determined by the log of the real wage.
^ In wt (&t =  ip'j
Wt
As the results in Table 3.5 above showed, tightening capital requirements in rela­
tively well developed financial systems (with a high value of 0t) resulted in slightly 
higher real wages and higher welfare for workers. However, tightening collateral 
requirements in a less well developed financial system resulted in lower wages for 
workers.
To summarise. We can see that introducing capital requirements may improve 
the welfare entrepreneurs and workers although this is by no means guaranteed. 
When collateral requirements are already binding at the time of capital require­
ment reform, such a reform may not be welfare increasing despite the existence of 
externalities. This is because the binding collateral constraint makes the policy in­
strument (tightening collateral constraints even further in some states of the world) 
a very distortionary one. In order for the government to distort an already distorted 
economy even further, two things have to be true: the collateral amplification mech­
anism must be very powerful and/or private individuals must care very much about 
consumption volatility. We now proceed to check whether numerically this is is the 
case or not in our economy.
2.7 O ptim al Collateral R equirem ents and W elfare
2.7 .1  N um erica l R esu lts
In this section we use numerical simulations to compare the market and the govern­
ment’s choices of the collateral requirements on capital. We do this under different 
states of the financial system as measured by 9 - the fraction of capital which is col- 
lateralisable10. This is done in Table 2.7 below. The first row of the table shows that 
firms always choose to invest up to the debt limit in the competitive equilibrium. 
The second row shows the government’s choice of capital requirement as it tries to 
maximise the social welfare function (2.24). The capital requirement turns out to be 
invariably equal to the privately permissible maximum leverage and, unsurprisingly, 
private agents borrow the same amount as they do in the unregulated economy 
(shown in the third row of the table). This is the main result of this paper - when 
credit constraints bind tightly due to a substantial productivity differential between 
the two types of entrepreneurs in our economy, the government wants to encourage 
investment all the way to the incentive-compatibility determined borrowing limit 6.
10 In each we recalibrated the model to match the target discussed in the calibration section. 
These are (1) aggregate leverage, (2) leverage of the most indebted decile of firms, (3) the ratio of 
tangible assets to GDP, (4) the fraction of time spent working and (5) the standard deviation of 
real GDP.
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0 =  0.80 0 =  0.90 0 =  1 .0 0
E(!T) 0.80 0.90 1 .0 0
E (0t ) 0.80 0.90 1 .0 0
E(l f) 0.80 0.90 1 .0 0
Note: E (I™) is the average private choice of debt as a fraction of tangible assets in the Laissez 
Faire economy, E  is the average capital requirement in the regulated economy and E [If) is 
the average private choice of debt as a fraction of tangible assets in the regulated economy.
Table 2.7: The government’s collateral requirement choices
Table 2.8 below tries to delve a little deeper into the determinants of welfare 
for individual groups as well as the aggregate economy in order to see how they 
they are affected by changes in capital requirements. The table looks at the change 
in a number of measures of welfare from the imposition of a capital requirement 
0t =  0 — 0.01 in all states of the world. Because we are interested in how the initial 
state of the financial system affects the incentives of the government to regulate 
leverage, we repeat our exercise for several financial systems, represented by different 
values of the maximum collateral limit 0.
So for example, the first column of the table takes an economy where the state 
of the financial system can collateralise up to a 0.8 fraction of capital values. To see 
the local incentives for the government to regulate we consider the welfare effects of 
the imposition of a capital requirement 0t =  0.79.
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0 =  0.80 0 =  0.90 0 =  1 .0 0
Welfare of high productivity entrepreneurs
100 A  In <£q -0.33 -0.32 -0.23
100A In Zq -1.06 -1.91 -4.15
1 0 0 A In Vq* -0.33 -0.58 -1.15
Welfare of high productivity entrepreneurs
1 0 0  A  In <£>o 0.37 0.58 1 .1 1
1 0 0  A In Zq -0.14 -0.32 -0.71
1 0 0  A  In Vq 0.05 0.03 0.04
Workers’ welfare
1 0 0  A  In Vq^ -0.09 -0 . 0 2 0.14
Aggregate welfare
lOOAlnVb -0.18 -0.23 -0.33
Note: All variables in the table measure the percentage change in the relevant component of 
welfare from a tightening of collateral requirements by 0.01 (or 1% of the value of tangible assets). 
A In tpg is the change in the net present value of future expected log rates of return on wealth 
for high productivity entrepreneurs, A In (£>q is the change in the net present value of future 
expected log rates of return on wealth for low productivity entrepreneurs, A In Wq is the wealth 
change for high productivity entrepreneurs, A  In Wq is the wealth change for low productivity 
entrepreneurs, A In Vq  ^ is the welfare change for high productivity entrepreneurs, A In Vq 1 is 
the welfare change for low productivity entrepreneurs, A  In Vo is the aggregate welfare change.
Table 2.8: Capital requirements and welfare
Starting with the baseline case of 0 =  1 we can see that changing capital require­
ments a little in the neighbourhood of the competitive equilibrium reduces aggregate 
welfare by 0.3%. But this masks a number of different competing effects on welfare. 
Starting with the high productivity entrepreneurs, the second row of the table shows 
that the expected net present value of future log returns on wealth decreases by just 
under 0.2%. There is also a 4% decline in wealth (second row) and causes a 1% drop 
in the welfare of high productivity entrepreneurs. Further down the 0 =  1 column we
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have the components of welfare for low productivity entrepreneurs. The expected 
net present value of future rates of return increases by around 1 % driven by the 
higher safe rate of return. Lower asset prices depress the wealth of this group which 
falls by 0.7%. The effect of higher rates of return on wealth dominates, leading to a 
0.04% increase in welfare. Workers’ welfare also rises by a small amount driven by 
a small rise in the real wage and a decline in the volatility of real wages.
The cases of 6 =  0.9 and 9 =  0.8 (the first and second column of the Table) are 
qualitatively similar to the baseline case though all the magnitudes get progressively 
smaller in absolute value as the economy gets more and more distorted at lower levels 
of financial development. Appendix 4.B.12 contains a number of other sensitivity 
checks we performed in order to be sure of the robustness of the ’no regulation’ 
result. We found that our results were robust to different values of the productivity 
differential aH as well as to the form of the borrowing constraint.
2 .7 .2  D iscu ssion
Our numerical results show that the capital requirement is a very blunt instrument, 
which is best left unused in the context of our model and calibration. The main losers 
from tighter regulation of private leverage axe the high productivity entrepreneurs 
who find that their access to borrowing is reduced with detrimental effects on their 
steady state consumption and welfare. On the positive side, the volatility in their 
consumption declines very sharply. This is because reduced leverage improves both 
consumption smoothing over the idiosyncratic productivity cycle as well as risk 
sharing over the business cycle. But the beneficial impact of greater consumption 
stability are insufficient to generate a welfare improvement.
Low productivity entrepreneurs also lose out though by a smaller margin. For 
them, capital regulation represents a finer balance. On the one hand they gain be­
cause the reduced access to credit reduces capital prices and boosts the rate of return 
they earn on their own production. The consumption is also smoother due to the 
reduced volatility of consumption over the productivity cycle as well as the business 
cycle. But these gains are relatively small because low productivity entrepreneurs
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are not leveraged and their consumption is already smooth. On the other hand, 
lower wealth due to poorer borrowing opportunities and lower asset prices affects 
them too.
Taken as a whole, the economy is made worse off by capital requirements. This 
is because the productivity reducing effect of regulation turns out to have a larger 
impact on welfare compared to its impact in terms of greater macro-economic sta­
bility. This suggests that one reason for the surprising result of this paper is that 
private agents value average consumption a lot more than they value consumption 
stability. One simple way to test this hypothesis is to examine the premium on risky 
assets in our economy. This is done in Table 2.9 below, which shows the difference 
between the expected return on the risky asset for low productivity entrepreneurs 
and the risk free rate. We focus on low productivity entrepreneurs because they are 
unconstrained and therefore they price assets in our economy.
e =  0 .8 0 e =  o.9o 9 =  1.00
100 (Etr}+1 -  Rt) 0.0010 0.0015 0.0020
Note: 0.01 denotes 1 basis point.
Table 2.9: The risk premium under different financial systems
The table shows that the risk premium is very small - less than lbp for the 
calibration we consider. Put another way, low productivity entrepreneurs strongly 
prefer excess returns to smooth returns. It is therefore clear why the government 
finds that it cannot improve on the competitive allocation. The pecuniary external­
ity results in excessive volatility of consumption and asset prices while the policy 
response we consider has its own costs in terms of the level of output and consump­
tion. Consumers in this model do not find such a trade off advantageous.
Again, note that an absence of amplification in the Kiyotaki (1998) model is not 
the reason for this result. Contrary to the findings of Cordoba and Ripoll (2004) 
we find that there is substantial amplification with the standard deviation of output 
and TFP around 40% higher than the ‘first best’ and the standard deviation of
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consumption and asset prices more than 80% higher than the ‘first best’. This 
shows that the model can magnify the effects of shocks but consumers do not care 
sufficient about this to be willing to pay the costs of the regulation.
There are at least three reasons for this. First of all, the assumption of log utility 
limits entrepreneurs’ risk aversion and the amount of steady state consumption they 
are willing to give up in order to have a smooth consumption profile over time. 
This reduces the costs of weak risk sharing and consumption smoothing in our 
economy and therefore makes regulation (which improves both risk sharing and 
consumption smoothing) less desirable. Secondly, aggregate shocks are small. The 
high productivity state alternates between values 0 .6 % above or below steady state. 
This is consistent with aggregate fluctuations in developed economies during the 
recent ‘Great Moderation’ period. It remains to be seen whether the volatility of 
technology shocks picks up following the 2008 Lehmans Crisis.
Thirdly, the nature of borrowing in this model is entirely constrained efficient. 
The flow of funds between borrowers and lenders serves to boost productivity and 
benefit everyone. There is no misalocation of resources such as might arise if lenders 
or borrowers make mistakes in allocating credit; there are no defaults and no bank­
ruptcy costs associated with default. So perhaps it is unsurprising that regulation 
cannot help in this environment: we have made its task relatively difficult.
These considerations introduce many possible avenues for future work. Examin­
ing the robustness of the ‘no regulation’ result to different preferences is one obvious 
extension I am already working on. But examining other economic environments 
is also a promising avenue in studying the question of whether and how capital 
requirements can improve social welfare.
2.8 C onclusions
This paper aims to assess quantitatively the extent to which private leverage choices 
are inefficient from a social point of view. We found that, to a very close approxima­
tion, these choices are efficient. In the Kiyotaki-Moore framework credit constraints
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bind because limited commitment makes the financing of productive opportuni­
ties more difficult. Thus although leverage introduces a certain degree of financial 
fragility into the economy, it also allows the funding of high value added activities 
which, on average, allow society to enjoy a higher level of output and consumption.
So we find that regulation has a number of costs and benefits for economic agents. 
The main benefits involve reducing the inefficient volatility of output and consump­
tion which arises from the workings of the collateral amplification mechanism. In 
the laissez faire equilibrium individual borrowers decide to borrow up to the debt 
limit in order to take advantage of attractive productive opportunities. They know 
that when aggregate shocks hit, leverage will magnify the effect of asset prices on 
balance sheets and force them to sell productive assets at a time when the price is 
already low. But atomistic agents take the low price in downturns as given even 
though the amount of asset sales and the size of the price fall are closely linked. The 
more assets are sold by leveraged high productivity entrepreneurs the more the price 
falls because the only buyers are the unleveraged low productivity types. This exerts 
downward pressure on the aggregate efficiency of the economy and depresses asset 
prices even further tightening credit constraints even more. It is binding borrowing 
constraints that make the usually harmless pecuniary externalities between different 
agents important for allocative efficiency.
But regulation has substantial costs too. When borrowing constraints bind, not 
enough funds flow from low to high productivity entrepreneurs and this reduces 
average TFP and consumption over time. Imposing tighter collateral requirements 
further squeezes the flow of credit and further reduces its average productive effi­
ciency even though it makes it more stable as a result.
The social choice between the level and the volatility of consumption is largely 
driven by the preferences of economic agents as well as the marginal rate of trans­
formation between the level and volatility of consumption. In our calibration we 
find that economic agents do not care about volatility as much as they care about 
the level of consumption. This is clearly demonstrated by the low premium on risky 
assets (below lbp). In addition, capital requirements reduce volatility at too high a
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cost in terms of average efficiency. Consequently, the benevolent government chooses 
not to regulate finance in our model economy.
In future research I want to explore the robustness of this result. One obvious 
extension is to change the structure of the model in order to generate a more realistic 
equity risk premium, for example by incorporating the Epstein-Zin-Weil preferences 
and an environment of long run consumption risk. A high equity premium indicates 
that private investors are very concerned about risk. So an environment with a 
high equity premium is more likely to be one in which the imposition of capital 
requirements is optimal.
Chapter 3
Borrower R eputation  as 
Intangible C ollateral
3.1 Introduction
The financial boom and bust cycle of 2005-2009 was characterised by a substantial 
increase and subsequent fall in the permissible leverage for all sectors of the economy. 
Downpayment requirements on housing, capital and financial asset purchases fell 
during the boom and then increased sharply as the financial crisis unfolded during 
2008. At the same time, asset prices and output fell sharply across the world, 
raising questions about the linkages between financial conditions, asset prices and 
real quantities during the financial crisis. And while we have a good theoretical 
understanding of how credit constraints affect the interaction between output and 
asset prices, there has been comparatively less work on downpayment requirements 
and other aspects of the financial conditions facing private borrowers.
In this paper, we build a framework which can generate fluctuations in downpay­
ment requirements by appealing to changes in the value of borrower’s reputation for 
repayment. We extend the framework of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Kiyotaki 
(1998) by considering an environment, in which savers can keep their anonymity but 
borrowers cannot. This allows lenders to punish defaulting borrowers by excluding 
them from future borrowing. They cannot however stop them from saving in the
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anonymous financial market or from engaging in self-financed production. We show 
how the possibility of such market exclusion can lead to the emergence of intangible 
collateral in equilibrium alongside the tangible collateral which is usually studied in 
the literature.
The intangible collateral is essentially the value of a borrower’s reputation for 
debt repayment. We find that this collateral form can back a very significant part of 
the liabilities of the private sector. One of the key contributions of this paper is to 
show how the financial contract in a model with tangible and intangible collateral 
can still be represented as a linear borrowing constraint, where a fall in the value of 
intangible collateral manifests itself in a higher ’haircut’ (or downpayment) while a 
rise in the value of intangible collateral can manifest itself as a lower haircut.
In our numerical experiments we find that intangible collateral is large (and hair­
cuts are low) when the cost to an entrepreneur of being excluded from borrowing 
is substantial. Intangible (or reputational) collateral has a non-linear relationship 
with the more conventional tangible collateral. While inefficient production remains, 
higher tangible collateral boosts the excess return of high productivity entrepreneurs 
and therefore increases the value of intangible collateral. This is because increas­
ing the borrowing capacity of high productivity entrepreneurs increases the price 
of capital and reduces the real rate of interest (equal to the rate of return on the 
production of low productivity entrepreneurs). Once, the availability of tangible col­
lateral becomes high enough, inefficient production disappears and further increases 
in tangible collateral starts to push up real interest rates, depressing the excess rate 
of return for high productivity entrepreneurs. Once the excess return starts to fall 
so does the value of intangible collateral.
Finally we solve our model economy with aggregate uncertainty in order to study 
how intangible collateral interacts with the business cycle. Assuming that entre­
preneurs borrow using empirically realistic simple debt contracts, the model does 
generate some endogenous fluctuations in ’haircuts’. For conventional technology 
shocks, these fluctuations are small and pro-cyclical. In other words, the model 
generates low haircuts in recessions and high haircuts in booms. The reason for this
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counterintuitive finding is the following. In recessions, asset prices are low, finan­
cial constraints bind strongly and the excess return for leveraged high-productivity 
firms over the unleveraged low-productivity firms increases. Since recessions are 
expected to be persistent, this increase in excess returns leads to a rise in the value 
of debt repayment, reducing lenders’ required haircuts. In contrast, in booms, asset 
prices are high, financial frictions axe reduced and the leveraged high productivity 
entrepreneurs enjoy a smaller excess return relative to unleveraged low productivity 
firms. Hence the value of intangible assets declines, increasing lenders’ required hair­
cuts. In order to replicate the counter-cyclical behaviour of downpayment require­
ments in the data, we augment the model by allowing pro-cyclical fluctuations in the 
technological gap between ’high’ and ’low’ productivity firms and also by allowing 
counter-cyclical fluctuations in the degree of uninsurable idiosyncratic production 
risk. This introduces a pro-cyclical component in the value of being a leveraged high 
productivity producer, helping to motivate counter-cyclical haircut movements.
3.2 R elated  Literature
This paper studies the nature of dynamic borrowing contracts in an environment 
with permanent exclusion from credit markets. There is a large literature on dynamic 
optimal contracts starting with the seminal contributions of Kehoe and Levine (1993) 
and Kocherlakota (1996) who developed the first general equilibrium models with 
endogenous borrowing constraints. Subsequently, work by Alvarez and and Jermann 
(2001) showed how the allocation of Kehoe and Levine (1993) can be decentralised 
by a set of state contingent borrowing limits in a general economy with permanent 
exclusion from risk sharing arrangements.
Our paper is also related to the literature on the collateral amplification literature 
started by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Kiyotaki (1998). These papers have 
shown that when debts are collateralised, leverage magnifies the impact of small 
shocks on the net worth of producers, thus amplifying and propagating impulses 
over time. This mechanism is central in our paper too. In the standard Kiyotaki
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and Moore (1997) set up, borrowers can commit to repay an exogenous fraction of 
project revenues or tangible asset values. In contrast, this paper explicitly models 
the fluctuations in such ’haircuts’ as a function of the value to a borrower of being 
able to access credit markets in future. We find that the value of credit access is 
counter-cyclical. It is low in booms because entrepreneurial net worth is already 
high and excess returns from production are relatively low. It is high in recessions 
because entrepreneurial net worth is low and excess returns are high. So the value 
of intangible collateral acts as a dampening mechanism in our model.
There has been relatively little work on the importance of intangible collateral. 
Hellwig and Lorenzoni (2007) is a notable exception. They study an endowment 
economy with limited commitment in which there is no collateral to secure bor­
rowing. Because the autrarkic equilibrium is dynamically inefficient and stationary 
bubbles on intrinsically useless assets can exist as in the classic Samuelson (1958) 
model. Hellwig and Lorenzoni show that when private borrowers can be permanently 
excluded from future credit market access, an equilibrium with bubbles on inside 
liquidity (private debt) can achieve an identical allocation as the equilibrium with 
bubbles on outside liquidity. Here private agents capture the seigniorage benefits of 
debt issue and these seigniorage benefits serve as the intangible collateral needed to 
back borrowing.
Gertler and Karadi (2009) is closer to this paper in the sense that they motivate 
intangible collateral by appealing to the value of excess returns in an equilibrium 
with no bubbles. They develop a model of a bank which can pledge the net present 
value (NPV) of future profits as collateral. Their mechanism is very similar to 
the intangible collateral studied in this paper. In Gertler and Karadi (2009) the 
entrepreneur is threatened with the loss of the NPV of future profits (which come 
from excess returns). Here the entrepreneur is threatened with the loss of the NPV 
of future utility flows from excess productive returns. Because of risk aversion, the 
value of intangible collateral is lower in this paper but not significantly so because 
log utility does not lead to high risk aversion.
We find that counter-cyclical variation in idiosyncratic production risk is one
100
mechanism that is capable of causing counter-cyclical movements in haircuts in a 
way that amplifies the business cycle. Angeletos and Calvet (2006) and Perez (2006) 
are two papers that examine the importance of idiosyncratic production risk for 
the business cycle. They both show that the presence of uninsurable idiosyncratic 
production risk can have a profound impact on risk-taking and capital accumulation. 
And if the degree of idiosyncratic production risk varies in a counter-cyclical fashion 
(i.e. it is higher in recessions), Angeletos and Calvet (2006) show that this can 
amplify the business cycle by affecting entrepreneurs’ investment into risky but high 
yielding projects. In this paper, our focus is mainly on the impact of idiosyncratic 
production uncertainty on haircuts. High ex post productivity variability causes the 
expected return from production (in utility terms) to decline and this reduces the 
value of borrowing. So to the extent that production uncertainty is high in recessions, 
this channel is capable of producing counter-cyclical downpayment requirements.
3.3 M otivating O bservations
There is a lot of evidence that permissible leverage fluctuates very substantially for 
many private borrowers. Figure 3.1 below (reprinted from Geannakoplos (2009)) 
shows how the haircuts on securities purchases have fluctuated for a hedge fund 
named Ellington. The chart clearly shows that haircuts average around 20% of the 
purchase price although they rose to 40% during the Russian default in 1998 and 
during the 2008-2009 financial crisis. During the 2006-2007 credit boom haircuts 
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Figure 3.1: CMO margins at Ellington (reprinted from Geannakoplos (2009))
In housing markets, leverage fluctuations have also received a lot of recent atten­
tion. Figure 3.2 below shows the movement of the monthly LTV ratio for new home 
buyers. The chart shows that the ratio varies in a pro-cyclical fashion, with local 
peaks in booms (1984, 1988, 1995-1999 and 2007) and troughs in recessions (1975, 
1982, 1991, 2003 and 2008). The contemporaneous correlation between HP-filtered 
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Figure 3.2: Loan to Value Ratios in the US: 1973-2008 (Source: FHFA)
These data show that downpayments in financial markets move in a counter­
cyclical fashion and the leverage used in security or housing purchase varies in a 
pro-cyclical fashion. This is the feature of the data our model aims to explain.
3.4.1 T h e  E conom ic E n v iro n m e n t
Production Technology
- Population and productive technology
The economy is populated with a continuum of infinitely lived entrepreneurs of 
measure 1. Each entrepreneur is endowed with a constant returns to scale production 
function which uses land and capital to produce gross output y.
3.4 The M odel
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k is fixed capital (which does not depreciate), x is working capital (which fully 
depreciates) and a is the idiosyncratic component of productivity (which can be 
high or low) and A is the aggregate component of productivity (which also can 
be high or low). The idiosyncratic state evolves according to a Markov process. 
Following Kiyotaki (1998) let nS be the probability that a currently unproductive 
firm becomes productive and let be the probability that a currently productive firm 
becomes unproductive. This implies that the steady state ratio of productive to 
unproductive firms is n. The aggregate state also evolves according to a persistent 
Markov process.
Finally we assume that agents suffer from limited commitment. They cannot 
make binding promises to repay their debts unless it is in their interests to do so.
3 .4 .2  E ntrepreneurs  
Preferences
Entrepreneurs are ex-ante identical and have logarithmic utility over consumption 
streams
OO
i / e =  X > ‘
t=o
Flow of Funds
Agents purchase consumption (c), investment goods (x), capital (k) at price qt and 
borrow using debt securities bt+i at price R^1 where Xt  =  (At,Tt)  is a vector 
describing the aggregate state of the economy. At is aggregate TFP and Tt denotes 
the wealth distribution.
ct +  qth+i  ~ =  yt +  Qth ~ bt
Because the idiosyncratic shocks and individual asset holdings are private informa­
tion, this implies that Arrow securities contingent on the idiosyncratic state will 
not trade in equilibrium. Hence, we have an asset market which is complete over
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aggregate but not idiosyncratic states.
Collateral constraints
Due to moral hazard in the credit market, agents will only honour their promises if 
it is in their interests to do so. This is why we need to carefully describe the precise 
nature of contract enforcement in the event of default. We assume that entrepreneurs 
have the ability to ’run away’ with a (possibly state contingent) fraction 1 — </)t of the 
firm’s revenues - yt+i- However we assume that lenders can seize the firm’s capital 
qt+ikt+i- Upon default, entrepreneurs can anonymously lend to other entrepreneurs 
or produce without any leverage.
The collateral constraint then takes the form of a value function comparison at 
each value of the aggregate and individual state. Let V  (s t ,X t ) denote the value of 
an entrepreneur who has never defaulted and let V d (s*, Xt)  denote the value of an 
entrepreneur who has defaulted in the past, s* =  (wt ,a t ) is the idiosyncratic state 
where wt is individual wealth and at  is the idiosyncratic level of TFP. When an 
entrepreneur borrows using state contingent debt, her lender would have to assess 
whether such an entrepreneur would find it optimal to repay the promised amount 
in each state of the world. This is tantamount to knowing that the value of repaying 
is larger than the value of defaulting in each state of the world next period.
V ( s t+u X t+1\st ,Xt) >  Vd (st + u X t+1\st , X t)
For the time being we will conjecture that this value function comparison can be 
reduced to a state contingent collateral constraint of the following form.
bt+i ^  Et [Otyt+i +  qt+ikt+i]
We verify subsequently that this is indeed the case.
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3 .4 .3  E ntrepreneurial behaviour
The entrepreneurs in our economy have to make two types of decisions. They have 
to choose consumption over time optimally (the consumption problem) and they 
have to choose the assets they invest in (the portfolio problem). Fortunately, the 
budget constraint is linear in all the assets at the entrepreneur’s disposal and as a 
result we can utilise the result due to Samuelson (1968), which states that we can 
solve separate the consumption and portfolio decisions.
The consumption problem
Due to logarithmic utility, consumption is a fixed fraction of wealth at each point in 
time for all entrepreneurs regardless of their level of idiosyncratic productivity. This 
general result is proved in Appendix 4.B.1 and it greatly simplifies the aggregation 
of consumption decisions.
The portfolio problem
The portfolio problem is more complex because we have three assets and a collateral 
constraint. The first order condition for capital use is:
where A* =  1/c* is the shadow price on the flow of funds constraint while [it is 
the shadow price the collateral constraint. The first order condition for capital 
investment is:
ct =  (1 -  p) wt





+  Qt+i —0 (3-1)
—A t +  Et (3.2)
Finally the first order condition for the bond holdings is:
— +  (3Et\ t+ i  +  y>t — 0
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3 .4 .4  B orrow ing lim it d eterm in ation
Our economy is a limited commitment one. Borrowers repay their debts only if it 
is in their interests to do so. Upon default, a borrower loses his tangible assets but 
also he loses his reputation for repayment and therefore the ability to borrow in the 
future. As we now show, entrepreneurs will be allowed to borrow up to the value of 
the tangible and intangible assets they can lose when they default.
The value of a non-defaulting entrepreneur
We now combine the optimal consumption and portfolio choices of entrepreneurs 
to derive the value function that characterises their maximum lifetime utility. Let 
V  (s t ,X t ) be the value of a non-defaulting entrepreneur with idiosyncratic state St 
when the aggregate state is X*.
V ( s t , X t) =  max {\nct + P E tV (st+ i , X t+i)}
ct,kt+i,xt+i,bt+i
In Appendix 4.C.1 we show that the value function takes the following form
V{8UX t) = ' p { 8 t , X t) +
In wt
where the intercept ip (s t ,Xt ) satisfies a functional equation:
(p(st ,Xt )  =  ln (l  -  p)  +  max /3Et
kt+i,xt+i,bt+i
In (3 In r\+i+l - ( 3  l - ( 3 +  V7 (st+i, At-i-i) (3.3)
Intuitively, the value of an entrepreneur depends on his current wealth (this is the 
term in In at) as well as the rate of return the entrepreneur can earn on his wealth 
(this is the intercept term). Looking at (3.3) we can see that, if the rate of return on 
wealth is equal to the inverse of the rate of time preference at all times (rl =  1//3), 
the intercept ip (st, Xt)  will be equal to zero and the value of an entrepreneur will be 
solely determined by his current wealth. In contrast, values of r% above 1/(3 would 
generate a positive value of <p reflecting the net present value of ’excess returns’ to 
the entrepreneur.
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The value o f a defaulting entrepreneur
An entrepreneur who defaults makes a very high return on her investments for one 
period because she avoids paying some of her debt. The cost of this is that she then 
loses her right to borrow in future and she loses her right to use the high productivity 
technology. We guess that the value of an entrepreneur who has defaulted in the 
past is given as follows:
V d (st , X t) =  <pd (st , X t ) +  ^ |
where the intercept of the value function satisfies the now familiar functional equa­
tion:
(pd (st, X t) =  In (1 -  /3) +  max (3Et
k t + i , x t + i , b t + i
In (3 +  In r f^
1 - / 3
This guess is verified in Appendix 4.C.I. Intuitively, once the entrepreneur defaults 
he can only lend to others or produce without leverage. This is reflected in the 
above value function which depends on r f ^  - the rate of return on the portfolio of 
entrepreneur who have defaulted in the past.
The value of an entrepreneur defaulting in state Xt+i  next period is higher 
than this, however, because of the large one-off return due to the avoidance of debt 
repayment:
In wf+i
V d (st+1, X t+1) =  < / ( St+1,X m ) +  T - ^
=  tpd (st+i, X t+1) +  max
k t + i , x t + i , b t + i
( l -<f>)Et ]n [yt+i] 
1 - / 3
Solving for the borrowing lim its
Alvarez and Jermann (2001) solve for borrowing limits which are ’not too tight’ as 
the highest possible borrowing limit consistent with repayment. In our setting this 
is given by the Incentive Compatibility Constraint which equates the expected value
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of repayment with the expected value of defaulting.
EtV (st+ i , X t+i\9) =  EtV d (s t+i> x ,+ i )
This implies that the loss of reputation due to default (LHS of the expression below) 
exactly offsets the one-off gain from having one’s debt written off (the RHS of the 
expression below).
^ 2  n ( s t+i \s t ) (p (s t+i ,Xt+ i \0)  -< p d 0 * t+ i)
«t+i
^ Et In [(1 -  4>) yt+1] -  Et In [yt+1 +  qt+ih+i  -  bt+ 1]
Using the approximation:
E  In x «  In Ex — - v a r  (In x )
we get:
( 1 - / 3 )  Et y. IT (st+i|st) <p (S(+1, x t+1\0) -  <pd ( x t+i)
< * t+ l
— fit
^ In Et  [(1 -  <f>) yt+i] ~  In Et [yt+i  +  qt+ih+i  ~  h+i]
where
=  g {ww*t(ln [yt+1 +  qt+ikt+1 -  bt+1]) -  vart(In [(1 -  <f>) j/t+i])}
is an approximate risk premium term which reflects the greater ex post wealth 
variability for repaying entrepreneurs. Re-arranging we have:
(1 - (p )  yt+i
yt+i  +  Qt+ih+i — h + i
<  exp { (1 -  p)  ^
at+i
= A (st+uXt+i\<f>)
^ 2  *  (st+i\st ) <p (st+1 , X t+i\4>) -  tpd (Xt+i)
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So the borrowing constraint is:
. ^ f  A {st+1, X f+i|0 ) +  0  — 1 )
*+1 "  i  A (sm , X t+110) /  Vt+1 +  9t+1 t+1
Solving for the borrowing constraints requires us to solve for the value function and 
for the borrowing constraints until both have converged.
Discussion
The entrepreneur’s borrowing limit is determined by the trade off between the bene­
fits of gaining some current wealth by defaulting against the costs of permanently los­
ing the ability to borrow. The benefit from defaulting is determined by the size of un­
secured borrowing - (0* — 4>t) yt- The costs are dominated by the gap between the ex­
pected value of being a non-defaulting entrepreneur ($^at+i 77 (s*+ils*) (s*+i> Xt+i\<f>))
and the value of defaulting (ipd (A^+i)). This gap is driven by the utility value of 
the entrepreneur’s stream of excess returns relative to current financial wealth.
Because most of these excess returns are in the future, the discount factor is 
one of the main determinants of the value of repayment. A discount factor of 0.95 
implies that the entrepreneur is indifferent between a lpp increase in his rate of 
return on wealth in perpetuity and a 19% increase in his current financial wealth. 
With a discount factor of 0.9, the consumer is only willing to accept a 9.5% increase 
in current wealth in exchange for a lpp increase in returns. Furthermore, since 
a defaulting entrepreneur only suffers a rate of return disadvantage during high 
productivity spells, the value of her reputation for repayment is largely determined 
by the frequency of high productivity spells
3 .4 .5  M ark et c lea r in g
There are four market clearing conditions in our model economy - two Arrow security 
markets (one for each aggregate state), the land market and the goods market.
f  bl+1di =  0 (3.4)
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(3.5)
The total quantity of land in the economy is normalised to unity.
J  4di +  j  x\+1di =  j  y\di (3.6)
3 .4 .6  B ehaviour o f  th e  aggregate  econom y
Due to the presence of binding borrowing constraints, high and low productivity 
entrepreneurs have different demands for assets at a given level of wealth. High 
productivity agents prefer to invest in production in order to take advantage of high 
productivity. Low productivity agents have a more balanced portfolio - they invest 
in production too but also lend funds to the high productivity entrepreneurs through 
the Arrow security market. This implies that the wealth distribution does matter 
for equilibrium. But even though the individual decision rules differ according to 
idiosyncratic productivity, these decision rules remain linear in wealth which means 
that a within-groups aggregation result obtains. The economy behaves as if it is 
populated by two agents (a high productivity and a low productivity one). In 
determining the equilibrium of our model economy we can concentrate on just two 
moments of the wealth distribution - the mean of the wealth distribution Wt and 
the share of wealth owned by high-productivity agents dt .
At any given date, the state of the aggregate economy can be summarised by 
the state vector
consisting of the level of aggregate productivity, the level of aggregate wealth and 
the share of aggregate wealth held by productive agents. At evolves according to an 
exogenous two state Markov process while the evolution of the two state variables 
Wt and dt is governed by the following relations.
X t =  {At,Wt,dt}
W t+ i  =  0 [dtRg.i +  (1  -  dt) iJ f + J  Wt (3.7)
I l l
d =  (1 - S ) d tRf+1^ n S ( l - d t )R^+1 
t+1 d t R ^  +  i l - d ^ R ^  [ ' }
where Rt+i  and rt+\ are the rates of return on wealth of, respectively, high produc­
tivity and low productivity agents.
In equilibrium, productive agents’ wealth grows at state contingent rate which 
depends on their leverage choices
_  [at+iAt+i -  6 t a H EtAt+1] (uf^)1 a +  qt + 1 -  Etgt+ 1 _
+1 ~  Qt +  -  E t  (« (+1 +  6ta.HAt+1 ( y » )  l ~a )  / R t
where u^  is the user cost of capital for high productivity agents.
Aggregating the individual capital demands yields an expression for the aggre­
gate land investment by productive entrepreneurs as a function of the state of the 
economy:
jy- _  ______________ fidtWt______________  , v
‘+ qt +  ^ u f - E t (q t + 1 + etY ^ ) / R t 
Unproductive agents are unconstrained and invest in their own projects as well 
as in the loans they make to the productive agents. This means that the wealth of 
low-productivity entrepreneurs grows at the following rate:
* £ »  = (311)
_  Y t + i  +  Q t + i  (1 — K t + 1) +  B t + i  
Q t  (1 — K t + 1) +  B t +1
where and YtL, and 1 — K t axe, respectively, the aggregate wealth, output,
and capital investments of low productivity workers. Also since we know that high
productivity entrepreneurs axe constxained, we know that
B t+i =  Et (OtY/h +  qt+1K t+1) (3.12)
Substituting (3.10) and (3.12) into (3.11) we get an expression for the growth rate 
of the wealth of low productivity workers as a function of expected land prices and
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land investments by the productive entrepreneurs:
l — OL
at+iAt+i-^-z  1- Qt+i
[qt+1 + "4f ut ] ( i — Kt+ i)  + B t+ i /R t
(1 — K t+ i)  +  B t+1
(3.13)
Due to log utility, individual and aggregate consumption are linear in individual 
and aggregate wealth. Hence goods market clearing implies:
(1 - P ) W t  +  X «+1 +  X tL+1 =  Y «  +  YtL
3 .4 .7  C o m p etitiv e  equ ilibrium
Recursive competitive equilibrium of our model economy is a price system , uf,  
qt, Rt, household decision rules k\+1, xt+i, b\+1 and c\, i =  H ,L  and equilibrium 
laws of motion for the endogenous state variables (3.7) and (3.7) such that
(i) The decision rules k\+1, oc\+1, blt+1 and c\ , i =  H ,L  solve the household 
decision problem conditional upon the price system , u f , qt, Rt .
(ii) The process governing the transition of the aggregate productivity and the 
household decision rules k\+1, x\+1 and c\, i =  H ,L  induce a transition process for 
the aggregate state s given by (3.7) and (3.8).
(iii) All markets clear
3.5 C alibration
We calibrate our model economy as follows. We set a, the share of fixed capital in 
output, equal to 0.2 in line with the calibration in Davis and Heathcote (2004) of 
the share of land in GDP. For the baseline calibration, I set <f>, the percentage of 
output that can be seized in the event of default, to zero. So any collateralisability 
of output in the steady state is due to the value of intangible collateral. I also set 
A 1, the standard deviation of ’ex post’ idiosyncratic productivity shocks, equal to 
zero in the baseline calibration. Following the arguments in Chapter 2 I set the ratio 
of the productivities of the two groups to 1.15.
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The discount factor /3, the probability that a highly productive entrepreneur 
switches to low productivity S, and the ratio of high to low productivity entrepre­
neurs n are parameters I pick in order to match three calibration targets - the ratio 
of tangible assets to GDP, aggregate leverage and the leverage of the most indebted 
decile of firms. The data is constructed in the same way as in Chapter 2 and the 
data sources are discussed in more detail in Appendix 4.B.7.
Finally, the high (low) realisations of the aggregate TFP shock are 0.5% above 
(below) the steady state TFP level. The probability that the economy remains in 
the same aggregate state it is today is equal to 0.8. Table 3.1 below displays a 
summary of the baseline calibration.











Table 3.1: Baseline calibration
3.6 N um erical R esu lts for th e  B aseline Econom y
3.6 .1  S tead y  s ta te  com p arative sta tic s
In this section we consider how the steady state collateralisability of output 9 varies 
with different features of the economy’s production technology and nature of contract 
enforcement. Figure 3.3 shows the value of intangible collateral as a percentage of
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output. We compute the value of intangible collateral as the difference between the 
amount the market would lend against the firm’s future output and the fraction 
of the firm’s output which can be seized from defaulting entrepreneurs. The three 
lines on the chart correspond to three different values of aH/a L - the productivity 
differential between high and low productivity entrepreneurs. In the absence of any 
long term punishments for defaulters, all three lines on the figure should be zero - 
the downpayment should be exactly pinned down by the collateralisability of the 
firm’s capital and output. But in our framework borrowing capacity is determined 
by the values of a borrower’s reputation for repayment as well as by the value of 
tangible assets. We can see from the figure that intangible collateral first increases 
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Figure 3.3: Collateralisability of output
Figure 3.4 below examines the determinants of the value of a borrower’s reputa­
tion. The evolution of reputational collateral in response to changes in <fr is governed
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by the interplay of the impact of rising capital prices and falling real interest rates on 
the excess return for high productivity entrepreneurs. While the economy is produc­
tively inefficient (K  < 1), rising (j> reduces real interest rates by depressing the rate 
of return to the production of low productivity entrepreneurs. Rising capital prices 
and falling real interest rates increase the leverage available to high productivity en­
trepreneurs, boosting the excess rate of return during high productivity spells. This 
in turn makes access to borrowing more attractive, driving up intangible collateral 
values higher and helping to increase leverage and capital prices even more. Once 
the economy achieves productive efficiency, productive entrepreneurs start to bid up 
the real interest rate, collectively reducing their excess return in the process. Lower 






 ah = 1.14




Figure 3.4: Excess return for high productivity entrepreneurs
Unsurprisingly, Figures 3.3 and 3.4 show, the value of repayment also increases 
as the productivity differential aH rises. The bigger the productivity advantage the
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greater the benefit of leverage and therefore the greater the leverage a borrower can 
obtain by mortgaging his tangible assets and reputation for repayment.
3.6 .2  N um erica l resu lts for th e  sto ch a stic  econom y
Table 3.2 below shows how debt limits evolve over the cycle for different parameter- 
isations of the economy. In the baseline case (the first column of the table) we can 
see that debt limits are slightly counter-cyclical. They tend to be lower in booms 
than in recessions though the difference is very small. The reason for this is that 
the net worth of high productivity entrepreneurs is low in recessions and this lowers 
asset prices. Low current asset prices implies higher rates of return on investment, 
and this is magnified by the availability of leverage. Access to debt markets is more 
beneficial in recessions in our economy because asset prices are low and the potential 
profits from leveraged investments is high.
In columns 2 and 3 we consider a situation in which firms face a high degree 
of idiosyncratic investment risk in recessions but not in booms. Counter-cyclical 
idiosyncratic production risk is capable of rationalising the pro-cyclical borrowing 
limits faced by firms. This is because uninsurable idiosyncratic risk reduces the 
value of leveraged investments in productive projects. As the value of an entrepre­
neur’s reputation for repayment falls, this makes entrepreneurs less able to pledge 
it as collateral and borrow against its value in the capital market. As idiosyncratic 
uncertainty in the recession increases, the average value of reputational collateral 
falls and the gap between haircuts in the boom and the recession increases.
Baseline A7=  0.10 A7=  0.20 A e =  0.0025 Aa =  0.01
6 (h ) 0.267 0.262 0.243 0.265 0.257
6(1) 0.268 0.259 0.230 0.264 0.260
Note: 6 (i) is the average downpayment from a 2000 periods long simulation 
Table 3.2: Borrowing limits over the economic cycle in the Debt Economy
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3.7  C onclusions
This paper extends the collateral amplification framework of Kiyotaki and Moore 
(1997) and Kiyotaki (1998) by adding intangible collateral. Intangible collateral 
arises due an assumption that although lending can be done anonymously in this 
economy, borrowing cannot. Consequently, a defaulting entrepreneur not only loses a 
fraction of her tangible assets but also permanently loses her ability to borrow. When 
credit constraints bind, leveraged high productivity entrepreneurs have a rate of 
return on investments which exceeds the market interest rate. Leveraged production 
can boost low productivity firms’ rate of return on wealth and consequently exclusion 
from debt markets is costly to borrowers. This generates a value for intangible 
collateral - in our model this is a borrower’s reputation for repayment.
We study the way such intangible collateral varies with the nature of technology 
and contract enforcement in the economy both in steady state and over the business 
cycle. Steady state intangible collateral is higher the larger the excess return of 
leveraged production relative to saving. This is the case when the productivity 
differential between the high and low efficiency technology is large and when the 
collateralisability of tangible assets is high.
When we introduce aggregate uncertainty we found that the baseline model pre­
dicted, counterfactually, that downpayment requirements are mildly pro-cyclical. 
This is because credit constraints are tighter in recessions and the excess return of 
leveraged high productivity entrepreneurs is higher, increasing the value of intangible 
collateral. However, introducing counter-cyclical variability of idiosyncratic produc­




4. A  C hapter 1
4 .A .1  S o lv in g  th e  m od el
Solving the household’s decision problem
We discretize net worth (x \ ) using 400 grid points, with denser grids closer to zero to 
take into account the higher curvature of the value function in this region. The grid 
range for the continuous state variable is verified ex-post by comparing it with the 
values obtained in the simulations. For points which do not lie on the state space 
grid, we evaluate the value function using cubic spline interpolation along net worth. 
We simulate the idiosyncratic exogenous productivity shock from its three-point 
distribution. The realizations of these exogenous random variables are held constant 
when searching for the market clearing prices (p and r ). We use the policy functions 
to simulate the behavior of 10000 agents over 600 (the exact number depends on the 
probability of exiting working life and the survival probability) periods and aggregate 
the individual housing and equity demands to determine the market clearing rental 
and housing price and the equilibrium household allocations.
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Solving the perfect foresight model
We guess a sequence of tangible asset rental rates {rt}J=1 such that the rental rate 
has converged to the new steady state. For an exogenous real interest rate R  in the 
small open economy, use (1.22) to calculate a sequence of capital stocks {Kt} t=i  and 
then use (1.2) to compute the sequence of {Zt} . Then we get tangible asset prices 
{qt,Pt}lLi from (1.25) and VtF =  qtZt-i  =  ptZt — It (which follows from the firm 
flow-of-funds and the zero profit condition). Given these guessed prices, we solve 
the household’s problem backwards from period T when the economy is assumed 
to have converged to the new steady state. Households are assumed to know the 
realization of the entire path of tangible asset prices and rental rates. The value 
function in period T is the value function for the new steady state. Then the value 
function in period T -l is computed as follows:
Vr- i  (x t - \ \ tt- i ,Pt - i ) — max [u (ct- i , h r - i )  +  &Vt  {x t Vt P^t )]CT,h,T
We simulate the model forward, starting from the capital stock and the joint 
distribution of labor productivity and equity of the original steady state. In each 
period, we simulate a cross-section of 10000 agents over 600 periods and aggregate 
their individual housing choices, computing the excess demand for tangible assets 
in each period. We increase the rental rate in periods with an excess demand in 
the market for tangible assets use, and decrease the rental rate in periods with an 
excess supply, generating a new path {rt}J=1 of the rental rate. We repeat this until 
successive paths of the rental rate are less than 0.0001% from each other.
4 .A .2 S ta tion ary  R ep resen ta tion  o f  V alue F unctions
The stationary representation o f the household’s problem
Using the property of the steady state equilibrium of Section 2.4, we normalize the 
quantities and prices using the power function of labor in efficiency units Mt  =  AtNt 
and population Nf. Both variables are exogenous state variables, and there can be 
a jump or a kink in the trend if labor productivity experiences a once-for-all change
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in its level or growth rate. Let us denote the normalized variable Xt  as Xt- Then 
we have:
K t =  K t/M t S* =  S*/Mt
(wt ,x t) =  (wt ,x t) / ( M t ^ / N t )  
(ht ,st) =  (ht , s t) / ( M t 7^ % / N t)
(n ,P t , q t ) =  (n ,p t ,q t )  /M t
Mt l~^ /N t
vtl =  vt*/
M t
1  -p
We also define the normalized discount factor as:
0  =
L r r
1  - p
Let us assume population grows along the steady state path. Let At be deviation 
of labor productivity from the trend. Then the vector of normalized state variables 
adjusted by the productivity change are:
Using these normalized variables, we can define the normalized value function. 
For an example, the stationary representation of the retiree’s problem is (noting 
that prices and quantities grow at different rates, explaining the use of (1.28) in the 
normalizations:
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1 f  X t - ( p t - r t ) s t
1 - p  [[rt/(l-i/')]1_“
1  - p
+(3aVr (bt + 1 +
I a 1 l—p




a [ 1—a / ( i  -  #»)
max
+0<rVr ( b t+1 +  ^ % ;, A t+1)
1 \  x t - ( j p t - r t ) S t  1 1 -/3
1—p [ n 1-Q
_ + ^ ( 6 (+1 +  % i ^ , I (+1)
)
4 .A .3  D a ta  sources and defin itions
To compute the share of income of productive tangible assets (rj), we use quarterly 
data from the US Flow of Funds accounts and from the NIPA for the period of 1952 
Q1 - 2005Q4. We follow Cooley and Prescott (1995). We define unambiguous capital 
income as the sum of corporate profits (7r), net interest (z), non-housing rental income 
(r) from the NIPA (table 1.12)1. We also measure the depreciation of capital (DEP) 
by the consumption of fixed capital (NIPA, table 1.14). We allocate 77 fraction of 
proprietors’ income (Yp, NIPA, Table 1.12) to the income from productive tangible 
assets. Then, the income from productive tangible assets, Y z p , can be computed as 
the sum of unambiguous capital income, depreciation, and 77 fraction of proprietors’ 
income:
Yzp  =  7T +  i +  r  +  D E P  +  rjYp =  r]Y
where Y  is GDP excluding explicit and implicit rents from housing. Solving this for 
77, we have
7r +  i +  r -f D E P
1 We use the average share of residential to total structures to compute non-housing rental income 
from the total rental payments of all persons reported in NIPA table 1.12.
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This is a similar expression for the share of capital in output found in Cooley and 
Prescott (1995, p. 19).
Averaging the quarterly data for the U.S. from 1952 to 2005, we obtain a value of 
r) equal to 0.26. This is lower than the share of capital in output in the real business 
cycle literature (estimates there range between 0.3 and 0.4) because our 77 excludes 
the capital intensive production of housing services. We can decompose economy- 
wide tangible assets between the household and the firm. The exact definitions in 




F low  o f Funds concept
PZy
Non-farm, non-financial tangible assets 
(Non-residential tangible assets+Equipment+software+Inventories) 
Flow of funds, Tables B.102 and B.103 
FL102010005.Q+FL112010005.Q-FL115035023.Q
p f  h(i)di =  pH
Household tangible assets 
(Residential tangible assets+Equipment-|-software+Consumer durables) 
Flow of funds, Table B.100 
FL152010005.Q+FL115035023.Q
Non-corporate tangible assets include residential properties occupied by renters. 
Therefore, this series (FL115035023.Q) is subtracted from pZy and added to house­
hold tangible assets. Using these definitions, we compute the average numbers of 
Zy j  (Zy  +  H ) =  0.59 between 1952:Q1 and 2005:Q4. The ratio of total tangible 
assets to GDP (p (Zy +  H) / Y )  is 3.3, giving an average value of residential tangible 
assets to GDP of around 1.94. If farm corporate and non-corporate tangible assets 
(FL132010005.Q in the Flow of Funds) 2 are added to the non-farm tangible assets, 
then the ratio of household tangible assets to total tangible assets falls from 0.59 to
0.55, while the ratio of total tangible assets to GDP rises from 3.3 to 3.6.
2 Thanks to Michael Palumbo (Board of Governors) of kindly sending us this series in private 
correspondence.
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4 .A .4  Survey  o f  C onsum er F inances
We use primarily the 1992 SCF to calibrate our parameters. The labor income 
process is intended to use entrepreneurial income on top of wages and salaries. 
Following Castaneda et. al. (2003) we add to wages and salaries and proportion of 
proprietors’ income that can be attributed to self-employment. Thus, total labor 
income is wages and salaries plus 0.93 of business income where the 0.93 comes from 
the average ratio of (wages_ sa l/(wages_sal+bus_inc)). Net worth is total assets 
minus total debt for each household, corresponding to variable s in the model. The 
house value is the self-reported value of the primary residence conditional on owning 
a house. The SCF homeownership rate matches the Census one in 1992 exactly 
(64%).
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4.B  C hapter 2
4 .B .1  S o lv in g  for th e  con su m p tion  fu n ction
Suppose the entrepreneur has optimally chosen her capital, labour and intermediate 
inputs and purchases/short sales of the risk free security. This means that she can 
earn a state contingent rate of return on invested wealth of Rt+i- The first order 
condition for optimal consumption then becomes:
— =  (3Et ( R t+ v
ct \  <h+1.
We guess that the entrepreneur consumes a fixed fraction of her available resources:
ct =  (1 -  P) z t 
where zt is the entrepreneur’s wealth. This means that
zt+i =  pRt+iZt 
Substituting into the consumption Euler equation we have:
1 =  m ( R t + v  1
(1 ~ P ) Z t  V ( X ~ P ) z t+l
=  p E A R t+ i  1
v (1 -  P) PRt+iZt 
1
(1 -  P) zt
This confirms our initial guessed consumption function.
4 .B .2  S o lv in g  for th e  ra te  o f  retu rn  on  w ea lth  o f  a  h igh  p ro d u ctiv ity  
en trepreneur
We start with the flow of funds constraint of the agent.
ct +  w tht +  x t +  qtkt -  = y t  +  qtkt -i  ~  h - i  
Mt
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From the conditions for optimal production (2.4) and (2.5) we know that
xt =  (1 -  a ) u ^ k t/ a
and
wtht =  (1 - a - r j )  u f k t / a
Then if entrepreneurs borrow It ^ 6 of the expected value of collateral, this allows 
us to solve for their debt choice:
bt ^  ItEtqt+ih
The entrepreneur’s total saving is given by:
wtht +  xt +  qth -  +  (1 -  a) uf*/a -  ^ kt
This will deliver the following level of wealth in the following period:
w t+1 =  Vt+i +  Qt+ih -  bt 
=  [(At+iaH/ a ) w"+r7_1 (u ? ) 1 a +  qt+i -  ltEtqt+1] h
The entrepreneur’s rate of return on total wealth invested is given by:
t>h _  Vt+i +  Qt+ih — h  
t+1 xt+i +  qth  -  
_  (At+1aH/a )  w^+r>~1 ( u f  ) 1-a +  qt+1 -  ltEtqt+ 1  
qt +  { I -  a) u f  / a  -  (lt / R t ) Etqt+i
4 .B .3  S o lv in g  for th e  value fu n ction
The value function of an entrepreneur is:
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V ( z t ,at , X t) =  max {In ct +  /3EtV  (zt+ i ,a t+ i , X t+i)}  (4.1)
x t , k t , h t , b t , c t
=  max {ln (l  - /3) +  lnw;t +  pE tV (zt+i , a t+i , X t+1)} (4.2)
x t , k t , h t , b t
Guess that the solution is of the form
This implies that:
In zt
< p  ( a t ,  X t )  +
1 - / 3
=  max l ] n ( l - P ) + ] n z t  + P E t <p (at+i, X t+i) +  j
xtMMM f [ 1 ~  P J J
=  max < I n  ( 1  -  ( 3 ) +  \ n z t  + z r ^ — ; E t [ ( p ( a t + i , X t + i )  +  I n  ( / 3 R t + i Z t ) ] \
x t , k t , h t , b t  ^ 1  — p  J
=  { l n ( l  -  0) +  +  J L ^ E t m ^ [ l n ( i ? t+1)] +  V (ae+1, X i+1)] + ^ }
Equating coefficients we get the expression for the intercept of the value function:
<p(at,Xt) = l n ( l  - £ ) +  7 — ^ +  7 - ^  max Et [[In (flf+i)]+</> (at+i, X t+i)]
1  —  p  I  — p  x t , k t , h t , b t
The above expression shows that the agent has to choose productive inputs and 
borrowing so as to maximise the expected log rate of return on wealth in each 
period.
So the value of an entrepreneur in our economy depends on the net present value 
of expected log returns on the optimal portfolio as well as the log of current financial 
wealth.
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4 .B .4  So lv in g  for th e  ra te  o f  return  on  w ea lth  o f  a  low  p rod u ctiv ity  
en trepreneur
We start with the flow of funds constraint of the agent.
ct +  wtkt +  xt +  qth  +  —  =  yt +  qth - 1  +  h - i
K-t
From the condition for optimal production (2.4) and (2.5) we know that
and
xt =  (1  -  a) Uth/oL
wtht =  (1  -  a  -  77) Ut h/ at
The entrepreneur’s total saving is given by:
wtht +  xt +  qth  +  =  {qt +  (1 -  a) v i / a )  h  +
■itt Kt
This will deliver the following level of wealth in the following period:
vit+ 1 — Vt+i +  q t+ ih  +  h
=  \[At+i /a )  w“+T,_1 { y i )  1-“ +  qt+ 1 h  +  bt
The entrepreneur’s rate of return on total wealth invested is given by:
R _  Vt+i +  qt+ih  +  h  
t+1 Wtht +  xt +  qth  +
[(At+1/a ) w t +r) 1 ( v i ) 1 a +  qt+ 1
(qt +  (1 -  a) v i / a )  kt +  bt
Imposing market clearing in the capital and debt markets and recognising that 
all low productivity entrepreneurs chose the same portfolio, we get the following
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equilibrium rate of return on wealth for the low type:
[(At+i /a )  w f +’,“ 1 (u f)1-“ +  ®+i] (1 -  K t) +  ltEtqt+1K t
R?+l = (qt +  (1 -  a) v i / a )  (1 -  K t ) +  ltEtqt+i K t / R t 
where Kt  is the aggregate capital-holding of the high productivity entrepreneurs.
4 .B .5  A pp rox im atin g  th e  op tim al p ortfo lio  prob lem  as a  m ean  vari­
ance u tility  prob lem
The entrepreneur’s portfolio problem involves maximising the log return on his port­
folio of assets. The portfolio can be written as the weighted sum of the return on 
the risky asset and the rate of return on the safe asset
*2+i =
(At+iaZ/a) w?+T} 1 (uf)1 a +  qt+1
qt +  ( 1 -  a) u \ /a
+  (1 -  v j \ )  Rt (4.3)
Let
Rl* =m axEt ln i2 j+1
denote the maximum value of the expected log portfolio return. Using the approxi­
mation
Et In re «  In Etx — - v a r  (In x) (4-4)
we can write the portfolio problem as a mean-variance utility maximisation problem.
129
H igh P rod u ctiv ity  Entrepreneurs
For high productivity entrepreneurs the (4.3) expression above can be written as 
follows:
w H
(At+1aH/a )  w?+v 1 ( u f ) 1 a +  qt+1
=  Rt +  w tH
qt +  ( 1 -  a) u f  j  a
(.At+1aH/ a ) w * ^ 1 ( u f  ) 1~a +  qt+1 
qt +  (1 -  a) u f  / a
+  (1 -  ™f) Rt
- R t
=  Rt < 1 +  w H
(At+iaH/ a ) w f +r) 1 ( u f ) 1 a +  qt+1
qt +  ( 1 -  a) u f  / a / R t ~  1
=  Rt { l + w f  [pf+ 1 - l ] }
where
H _  (At+1aH/a )  Wt+V 1 ( u f ) 1 a +  qt+i . 
Pt+l _ , ft /R tqt +  (1 -  a) u f  / a
Taking logs and using the approximation In (1 +  x) «  x for small x we have
InRt+i «  lni?t +  w f  [pf+1 -  1]
Applying the approximation (4.4) we have:




In EtRt+1 -  i var  (in Rf+1)
In Rt +  In (1 +  w f  (Etpf+i -  l ) )  -  ^ v a r  ( i n  Rt +  In ( l  +  w f  (pf+1 -  l ) ) )  
In R t +  w f  (Etpf+1 -  1) -  ^var  (in Rt +  w f  (pf+1 -  l) )
In Rt +  w f  (Etpf+1 -  1) -  ■ VRt+i
Define
as output per efficiency unit of capital at time t  +  1 for high productivity entrepre­
neurs. Then the variance of the risky asset’s rate of return is given by:
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a R t+ 1 —
^t+1 a \  + tft+i &Aqt+ 1qt +  (1 -  a) u f  / a j  \ q t +  (1 -  a) u f  / a
+  ( f t  +  (1 -  a) u ? / a )  a q t+ 1  
W + i ) 2 <?a +  $ t + i  f a  +  ( ! - « )  u f / a )  V A q t+ l  +  < 7 ^ + 1  
{qt +  (1 - a )  u ?  /  ct)2
where a \  is the variance of the technology shock, CTAqt+i is the conditional covariance 
of the technology shock and the capital price and cr^ t+\ is the conditional variance 
of the capital price.
Low Productivity Entrepreneurs
Analogously with the previous subsection we learn that the log rate of return on 
wealth for low productivity agents can be approximated by:
In Rt+i «  In R t +  w t [pt+1 -  l]
where
L _  {At+i /a) ( v f ) 1 “ +  qt+i , n 
Pt+ 1 ~  i /i _ \ _.L /_ / R tqt +  { 1 -  a)  u f / a
Then we can approximate the expected log rate of return on wealth of low produc­
tivity agents by the following expression:
R L* max
max
InEtRt+i -  - v a r  (in Rf+1)
In Rt +  (Etpf+1 -  1) -
L \ 2
( w t ) _2
a r t+ 1
Define
as output per efficiency unit of capital at time t  +  1 for low productivity entrepre­
neurs. Then the variance of the risky asset’s rate of return is given by:
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2 =  f ^ + 1  ) t 2 | I tt+1 \ T l
r t + l  + (1 -  a )  U t / a  J  A  +  (1 - a )  u f ' / a  J  qt+1 
1 N 2
+  \ q t +  ( l - a ) u f / a j  
j^t+i )2 ° a +  ^t+1 fa  +  U ~  oQ ut / a ) °Agt+1 +  <r2t+i
(5« +  ( 1 - q) w f / a ) 2
Again, just like in the previous subsection, the variance of the risky rate of return for 
the low productivity is driven by a \  - the variance of the technology shock, (JAqt+i
- the conditional covariance of the technology shock and the capital price and o^t+\
- the conditional variance of the capital price.
4 .B .6  T h e F riction less B enchm ark  
The Problem  of Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs solve the following problem
maxEt Y V  In cf+s
C t , X t  ^ '  t=0
subject to the resource constraint:
e i.d ST' bst a H A t ( x t - i \ v f  ht - i  \ 1_a_T?ct + X t + U t + W t h t + Y ^ —  =  —  iy— j
Here we have already taken into account the fact that only high productivity en­
trepreneurs will produce in equilibrium and the entire capital supply will be used 
in production. are the entrepreneurs’ net purchases (or sales) of Arrow
securities at price 1/Rf+1 from workers. The first order conditions are as follows:
(1) Investment
Vxt =  —ut a
(2) Labour demand
ud 1 - a - r jwtht = ------------- uta
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(3) Arbitrage between production and Arrow securities
*?+! =
aHA st+1 ( x t- i x 71
Ol
h t- i
1 — a  — 77
1—a—17
(4) Entrepreneurs’ consumption function
ct =  ( I - / ? )
aHAt ( x t- iV *  (  ht - 1 \  1 a ^
of V 1 — a  — rj
+  bt-
The Problem  of Workers
Workers have the following preferences
i$ftE‘I2Ptln[ct -
c* At s=0 V 1




s  U t + 1
=  bt - 1 +  wtht
First order conditions are given by:







wt =  xh% (4.5)
We can derive the consumption function of the workers as follows. Define:
ct CT — X
=  cT — x
1 + a ;  
(wt/ x )  * 




wt =  wtht -  x ___1+ a;
i. , ^  {wt/x)  ‘wt (wt/ x )« -   —--
1+ a;
Then redefine the inter-temporal budget constraint using q  and wt’.
~ , — 
c< +  2 ^  '55— =  6f“ 1 +
s -^i+l
and the Euler equation:
Ct Ct+l
This problem now looks like the standard consumption-savings problem with log 
utility. The consumption function is:
5  =  ( 1 - 0 )  (Ht +  bt - i )
where
is the human wealth of the worker. The workers’ aggregate consumption function is 
therefore given by:
c f  =  (1 -  P )  ( H t  +  b t - i )  +  + + +  - -
1 +  U)
Aggregate consumption in the economy is given by:
c f  +  4  =  (1 -  P) (Ht +  qt +  Yt) +  J Wt/^  “
1 +  u
The full set of aggregate equilibrium conditions
Aggregate output
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a Sit i_a a+rj—1Yt =   ut Wt 1
a  1 1
Market clearing
M q\ ( zj , , v \  , ( w t / x ) ^  7] a 11 A t ! _ a  Q-4-7J—1(1 -  P) (Ht +  qt +  Yt) +  *rv /  / ------+  - u t  =  ui awt ^
1+ a; a  a
Human wealth
TJ ( / a  (wt / x ) ~  ( Ht + i \Ht =  wt (w t/x )*  -  >c— —---------b Et ——
1+ a; \ K t + i )
Price of capital 
Arrow security price
R t + 1 =  a H A tU t a W t +71~ l
Labour demand
( . i 1 - a - r jwt ('wtj>c)<*» = -------------ut
a
4.B .T  D a ta  D efin itions and Sources
Com puting the share o f capital in private value added
We compute the share of capital in private value
~ aa  =  -------
1 - 7 ]
added following the method in Cooley and Prescott (1995). We define unambiguous 
capital income (Y u ) as the sum of [] and ambiguous capital income (Y^ 4) as Propri­
etors income. We assume that the share of capital in ambiguous capital income is 
equal to its share in total national income. All series are obtained from the BEA na­
tional accounts. Then the share of capital in total income (Y) is defined as the sum
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of unambiguous capital income and the capital share of ambiguous capital income:
olY  =  Y u +  olY a
Hence
Y u 
a  ~  Y  -  Y a
C om puting 77 the share of interm ediate inputs in gross output
We use the BEA Industrial Accounts to compute this parameter. The Industrial 
Accounts produces sector by sector input output tables, showing the value added 
and gross output of each sector. This allows us to compute the share of intermediate 
inputs for each sector. The aggregate share of intermediate inputs can be obtained 
by averaging across all the sectors. Weighting different sectors by their weight in 
aggregate gross output gave almost identical results.
Com puting the ratio o f tangible assets to  GDP
We compute the economy’s stock of tangible assets by adding the nominal value 
of tangible assets of the Household (Table B.100, FL152010005), Corporate Non- 
Financial sector (Table B.102, FL102010005) and Non-corporate Non-Financial sec­
tor (Table B.103, FL U 2010005) from the September 2009 release of the US Flow 
of Funds. GDP is nominal GDP excluding the value added of the Government sec­
tor (Table 1.1.5, Line 1-Line 21). Data is for the period 1952-2008. The model 
counterparts to the ratio of tangible assets to GDP is defined as follows:
_________ Q_________
Y H +  Y L -  X H -  X L
Com puting aggregate corporate leverage
We use corporate (Table B.102, FL102000005) and non-corporate (Table B.103, 
FL112000005) total assets. This includes both tangible and financial assets on firms’ 
books. For corporate net worth we use the market value of corporate equity (Table
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B.102, FL103164003). For non-corporate net worth we use the net worth data in 
Table B.103, FL112090205. Leverage is computed as (Assets-Net Worth)/Assets. 
The model counterpart to aggregate corporate leverage is defined as follows:
L A =  8q K
q + ( Y H +  Y L) / R  
Com puting the second moments in the data
Our measure of GDP is private sector value added (Table 1.1.5, Line 1-Line 21). Con­
sumption is the sum of non-durable goods and services consumption. The value of 
the firm is proxied by the S&;P 500. All series have been deflated by the non-durable 
goods deflator to convert them them into real terms (non-durables consumption 
goods). All data is annual and the data sample is 1929-2008. Total employment in 
hours is obtained from the Bureau of Labour Statistics. The sample is 1964 - 2008. 
We convert the monthly data into annual averages. All data is detrended using the 
HP filter. Following Uhlig and Ravn (2001) we use a smoothing parameter of 2.06 
for annual data
4 .B .8  D eriv in g  th e  ta x  w edge form ulation  for s tea d y  sta te
The user cost of capital for low productivity entrepreneurs is
L Qt+i
u< = q t ~ i k
while that for high productivity entrepreneurs is








Qt+i . n  m I 1 1
It ^  +( r h
t+l




is the excess return. We can use the user cost expression to substitute out the 
expected future price in terms of ‘ex-dividend’ value of capital:
v ?  =  ui  +  ( i -  0) {ot -  u t )
=  uf Qt
ui. - MPt+lJ
=  u f [  1 +  Tt\
This completes our derivation of the downpayment ‘tax wedge’:
Pt+1
4 .B .9  D eriv in g  th e  level o f  T F P  in  s tea d y  s ta te
The level of TFP is given by the following expression:
TFP* =
YtH +  YtL
(H «  (X]L
\ a )   ^ r) J y  1—a —T) J
We know that:
v H  _  a a+r]—l (n H A1-"  tY 
*t ~  Wt-1 \Ut- l j  K t - 1a
_ (1 + T (fl))1 °  ^  a+T)-l ( L A1—aW
a
2771 ( l 7^
:-i K-i) K t-1
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where we have used the fact that =  (1 +  r  (9)) u \ . Aggregate intermediate input
investment in given by:
X ^ + X t i  = V _i(l-tf<-i + (l + T(0))tf<-i)a
=  L l (i +  T ( e )K t- i )  a
H ^  +  H h  =  1 a V “t - 1 (1 -  g t_! +  (1 +  r (9))
a  w t- i
L
' (1 +  r ( 0 ) K t- i )
1 - a - r j  ut_ x
Aggregate TFP for our economy is therefore given by:
1 +  t f t - i  
TF Pt = ------
i  +  T ( e )K t- i  
4.B.10 Deriving the aggregate state
In setting up the individual maximisation problem, we had assumed that aggregate 
wealth Zt and the share of wealth that belongs to productive individuals dt are 
the key endogenous state variables. Following the derivation of the conditions for 
optimal consumption and investment by entrepreneurs, we can see why this is indeed 
the case. We do this by showing that our market clearing conditions are functions of 
current and expected future market prices as well as the state variables in question.
Starting with the bond market clearing condition (2.15) we can see straight away 
from the collateral constraint that the gross amount of debt in any given period is 
given by the condition:
Bt =  6Etqt+iKt
The aggregate capital holding of high productivity entrepreneurs is given by:
K  = o____________ dtZt____________
1 qt +  (1 -  a)  t i f  / a  -  0Etqt+ i/R t  
which implies that debt is a function of market prices and Wt and dt.
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Moving on to the capital market clearing condition (2.16) we already know that 
capital demand by high productivity agents is recursive in the aggregate state. The 
capital demand of low productivity entrepreneurs is:
n K \ P 0 - -  dt) Zt -  B tfR t
( 1  0  =  ' ( «  +  ¥ « * )
_  P (1 — dt) Zt — 6Etqt+\Kt/Rt
(» +
This implies that the capital market clearing condition is a function of market prices 
as well as Wt and dt.
Finally looking at the goods market clearing condition (2.17) we can see that 
because of log utility, consumption is proportional to individual wealth and, con­
sequently, aggregate consumption by entrepreneurs is proportional to aggregate 
wealth:
c F  =  c ?  +  c ?  =  ( i - p ) z t
The consumption of workers is very simple because they do not save in equilibrium:
C™ =  wtHt =  wt
Due to the Cobb-Douglas production function, the aggregate expenditure on inter­
mediate input in the economy is given by the following expression:
X tH +  XF =  —  (u ? K t +  u f  (1 -  K t))
a
where we already know that the capital demands of the two groups are recursive in 
the state. The definition of total wealth implies that:
YtH +  YtL =  Wt - q t
So goods market clearing depends on market prices as well as Wt and dt .
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4 .B .1 1  D eriv in g  th e  Socia l W elfare F unction
The government solves the following policy problem.
Qo =  max En 
(xT lnct. i t—0
0 0  /  ( TT \ 1 + W
^ ^ I n  C r - x L ' )
t—0 \ +  u
(4.6)
We can represent the net present value of period utilities of the two groups as the 
sum of Pareto weighted value functions:
f2o =  max Eq 
{xT
=  max E q 
(xT
( 4 , 4 . * 0\xi ) + < ; w v w  (Xolx*)
x y  L  ( 4 , x 0|x‘) +  + < w v w  (Xolx*)
(4.7)
(4.8)
Under the assumption that all entrepreneurs hold their group average level of initial 
wealth and all workers hold zero wealth allows us to re-write the value function (4.8) 
as follows:
doZo (<pP (X0|x‘) +  1° t y ) )  +
(1 -  do) Z 0 L *  (Xolx*) +  +  ( * ¥ « * )  V w  (Xolx*)
Q q — maxFn 
(xU
4 .B .1 2  S en sitiv ity  A nalysis  
Sensitivity to aH
We performed extensive sensitivity analysis to check whether the value of aH affected 
the results. We found that it did not and the result from the exercise are shown 
in Table 4.1 below. Again, at each value of aH, the model is recalibrated for each 
parameter value in order to match our five targets from the data).
The value of aH has two offsetting effects on the incentives to regulate. A higher 
value of aH increases amplification because fluctuations in the share of wealth of 
high productivity entrepreneurs leads to bigger endogenous fluctuations in TFP and 
land prices. This would increase the incentive of the government to impose capital 
requirements in order to dampen the amplification mechanism. But a higher value 
of aH also increases the benefits of getting more funds into productive hands so
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the welfare costs of capital requirements in terms of lower average productivity and 
consumption also increase. We examined a number of different values of aH and 
found that at all of them, the government chose not to regulate.
aH =  1.05 Baseline aH =  1.25
100 A  In <pg -0.25 -0.23 0.02
100A In Z g -1.07 -4.15 -7.60
100 A In Vq1 -0.44 -1.15 -2.01
100A In ifQ 0.26 1.11 1.97
100 A In Zq -0.16 -0.71 -1.55
100 A  In Vq 0.03 0.04 -0.11
100A In Vq^ 0.06 0.14 0.17
100 A In Vo -0.10 -0.33 -0.66
100A <jc -0.02 -0.12 -0.21
lOOAcr cw -0.01 -0.03 -0.08
100Acrc# -0.22 -0.60 -0.75
100A (TCL 0.02 -0.06 -0.18
Table 4.1: Capital requirements and welfare under different values of ah 
Sen sitiv ity  to  th e  form o f th e  borrow ing constraint
’W orst case’ borrow ing lim it We also experimented with an alternative bor­
rowing constraint of the form:
bt ^  6qlt+1 kt
Such a constraint focuses on the value of collateral in the low aggregate productivity 
state. So it would be equivalent to a ‘worst case’ scenario value of collateral. Such 
a borrowing constraint also introduces two opposing incentives for the government. 
The case for higher regulation arises because the externality is much more severe 
under this constraint. This is because volatility of asset prices now has a first
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order effect on borrowing constraints. The more volatile land prices are, the more 
constrained entrepreneurs become because lenders become worried by large falls in 
the land price. This externality means that capital requirements might be beneficial 
because they reduce volatility and may even relax borrowing constraints.
But there is another offsetting effect. Suppose entrepreneurs attempt to leverage 
up and this leads to an increase in land price volatility. This would lead to tighter 
borrowing limits, stopping the rise in leverage in the first place. So the ‘worst case’ 
borrowing constraints exhibit a lot self-regulation which is missing in the standard 
‘expected value’ borrowing constraints we consider in the main paper. This self­
regulation effect makes government regulation unnecessary in equilibrium.
e =  0.80 e -  o.9o e =  i.oo
100 A In <Pq -0.33 -0.31 -0.25
100 A  In Z g -1.06 -1.79 -3.68
100A In Vq1 -0.33 -0.55 -1.04
100 A In <£q 0.37 0.54 0.96
lOOAln Zfr -0.14 -0.30 -0.61
100 A  In Vq 0.05 0.04 0.05
100 A In V™ -0.09 -0.02 0.11
100 A  In Vo -0.18 -0.34 -0.29
100Acrc -0.02 -0.03 -0.04
100Acrcw -0.01 -0.02 -0.01
100Acrctf -0.08 -0.13 -0.20
100A (TCL 0.00 0.01 -0.01
Table 4.2: Capital requirements and welfare under ’worst case’ borrowing contracts
C ollateralisable ou tp u t In this case the borrowing constraint is of the form:
^ Et +  QyVt+l)
143
Entrepreneurs can now borrow up to the full value of their capital holdings and also 
up to a fraction 6y of their future output. The results are shown in Table 4.3 below. 
Again, looking at the effects of this parameter did not change the basic result that 
aggregate welfare declined as the result of the imposing tighter capital requirements.
Baseline Qy =  0.1
oIIa
100 A  In ip” -0.23 -0.34 -0.39
100A In Z g -4.15 -1.27 -1.78
100 A In Vq1 -1.15 -0.44 -0.55
100 A In (fQ 1.11 0.25 0.35
100 A Iu Zq -0.71 -0.21 -0.28
100A In 0.04 -0.01 -0.01
100A  In Vq^ 0.14 -0.05 -0.07
100 A  In Vo -0.33 -0.13 -0.14
100Acrc -0.12 -0.06 -0.10
100A(jcw -0.03 -0.03 -0.04
100Acrc# -0.60 -0.26 -0.42
100A<7cL -0.06 -0.04 -0.07
Table 4.3: Capital requirements and welfare under collateralisable output
4 .B .1 3  S o lu t io n  m e th o d  
T he Laissez Faire econom y
We use the following ‘parameterised expectations’ algorithm in order to solve for 
the recursive competitive equilibrium of our model economy.
1. Start by guessing parameter values for current and future expected price 
functions. All equilibrium pricing functions are log linear in the state variables dt 
and Zt.
In q (X t+1 \Xt) =  wc (X t+i\X t) +  u d (Xt+1 \Xt) In d, +  u w (X t+x\Xt) In Z( (4.9)
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In q (Xt) =  <pc (X t) +  <pd (Xt) In dt +  <pw (Xt) In Zt (4.10)
lnr (Xt+1|Xt) =  «c (Xt+1\Xt) +  Kd (Xt+1\Xt) Indt +  kw (Xt+1\Xt) In Zt (4.11)
where Xt  is the aggregate state of the economy.
2. Static portfolio maximisation
Next we find optimal leverage levels. Due to the non-convex choice set we need 
to compute and compare the value function when the constraint is binding and when 
it is non-binding. We pick the leverage choices associated with the largest of the 
two value functions.
(a) The value of the constraint binding is
R h ' (;,+! =  6) =  Et \nR?+1
(At+iaH/a )  w “+T,~l (u f  ) 1_“ +  qt+i -  9Etqt+i
=  E* In
qt +  { I -  a) u ? / a  -  (0/Rt) Etqt+ 1
where
=  ft -  Et j -  0Etqt+1Et (4.12)
is the user cost of capital under the binding constraint.
(b) The value of the constraint not binding
R h * (lt + 1  < 6) =  max Et In R^+i
0 < Z t + i  <6
=  max Et In 
0 < Z t + i  <0
(At+ia11/a )  Wt+r) 1 (u p )1 a +  qt+i -  ltEtqt+ 1
qt +  (1 -  a) u ? / a  -  (lt /R t) Etqt + 1
where
u f = q t - E t { w J
is the user cost when the constraint does not bind. We solve this maximisation 
problem using the inbuilt Matlab function fmincon.m
3. Compute the equilibrium at time t:
We use the latest guess of the qt+i pricing function, the portfolio policy function
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lt+i as well as the current realisations of the state variables Af, dt and Wt-
( l - K t) +  l t+ iq (X t+1) K tA t+ i  £  h qt+i
\qt +  ^ r ut ]  (1 — Kt)  +  (h+i/R t)  Etqt-\-\Kt 
where 
Ut =  Qt ~  Et
(4.13)
# + 1
High productivity entrepreneurs invest the following fraction of their wealth in cap 
ital.
PdtWt
qt +  — ( k + i / R t )  Etqt+i
Their rate of return is given by:
K t =  . , (4-14)
> H = (At+iaH/<x) 1 (^f)1 a +  Qt+i -  hEtqt+1 lg v
+1 qt +  (1 -  a ) V?/at -  (l t /R t ) Etqt+1
when the collateral constraint is slack and
H  T7* I Q .t+ 1  \  t \  T7» _ / !  7^  / 1Ut =  qt -  E t \ -r-jf- -  8Etqt+i —  -  E t
\R?+ i j  \ R t \ R ? + l J )
Finally, goods market clearing is:
(1 - P ) W t  +  WtHt +  (1  -  Kt) +  t t fK t]  = W t - q t
OL L J
Using the inbuilt Matlab zero-finding routine fsolve.m, solve for the values of
{Rt, Rt+i, Kt, qt, R ^ i j u f  ,U t}  at which these conditions are satisfied up to an 
error tolerance level.
4. Use the state evolution equations to compute next period’s state vector:
Wt+1 =  [dtR?+1 +  (1 -  dt) I$+ J  0W t (4.16)
_  (1 -  S)dtR +^ 1 +  n<5(l -  dt) R^+1 
dt+1 ~  dtR?+1 +  ( l - d t ) R t +1 (4'17)
5. Repeat steps (l)-(4) for 2000 periods. Using the simulated data (minus a 200
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period ’burn in’ period), update the price and forecasting function coefficients using 
linear regression.
6. Re-compute a simulated time series of the endogenous variables in our model 
economy under the new forecasting rule. Repeat steps (l)-(5) until the coefficients 
on the forecasting rule have converged up to an error tolerance level.
The economy with capital requirements
In our government economy, the government chooses state contingent leverage func­
tions dt in order to maximise social welfare
SI =  m axk^nW * ( z f  / n ,X 0) + i LV L (z&,X0) + S WV W (X0)l (4.18)
{x1}
=  max 
{>}
U  (X„) +  + 1* ( >  (Xo) +  (X0)
(1.) Pose a candidate leverage function and make a starting guess on its para­
meters. In this paper we guess a first order log-linear formulation for each aggregate 
state i =  h, I.
\n0t =  xo +  x\  ln dt +  X2 lnZt
(2.) Compute the equilibrium quantities of our model economy using steps (1)-
(6) in the previous subsection
(3.) Compute the entrepreneurs’ value function
<p (at, dt , Zt , At ) =  In ( 1 - 0 )  +  +  ) + p Et<p (at+i, dt+u Zt+1, At+1)
and the workers’ value function
V w  (dt, Zt, At) =  e  +  InWt +  0 BtV w  (dt+i. Zt+ i ,A t+1)i UJ
(3.1.) Discretise the space of the continuous state variables dt and Zt. We use 10 
grid points on each state variable. The value function is almost linear in the direction
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of both state variables so using more grid points makes very little difference to the 
results while slowing down the computations considerably.
(3.2.) Use value function iterations to compute the value function at each grid 
point. When state variables fall in between grid points, we use bi-linear interpolation 
to approximate the value function.
(4.) Compute social welfare for the candidate leverage function 0*. This consists 
of two steps:
(4.1.) Compute the realisation of the capital price in the initial period when 
the private sector is surprised by the policy change. This allows us to compute 
the realisations of the aggregate state variables (the vector Xo) when the policy is 
announced. It also allows us to compute the realisations of the wealth of each group 
when the policy is announced.
(4.2) Evaluate the the social welfare function (4.18) at the post regulation reform 
aggregate state Xo and individual wealth positions - Zq and Zq .
(5.) Place steps (l)-(4) above in a function which outputs the value of social wel­
fare for a candidate leverage function and maximise it with respect to the parameters 
of the leverage function. Because function evaluations are very time consuming we 
use the inbuilt Matlab routine fminsearch.m which uses a Nelder-Meade algorithm.
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4.C  C hapter 3
4 .C .1  T h e value fu n ction  o f  a  n on -defau ltin g  entrepreneur
We now combine the optimal consumption and portfolio choices of entrepreneurs 
to derive the value function that characterises their maximum lifetime utility. Let 
V  (s t ,X t ) be the value of a non-defaulting entrepreneur with idiosyncratic state s* 
when the aggregate state is X t .
V ( s t , X t) =  max { ln c f +  /? y ^  it (Xt+ i\X t) it (st+i^t) V  («t+i, X t+i)
ct,kt+i,xt+ ib t+i  I —X t +1 St+1
We guess a solution of the form:
V (st, X t) =  <f(st , X t) +  (st , X t) In wt
Hence the value function equals:
max
k t + i , x t + i , b t + i
ip(st , X t) +  <; (su X t) In wt (4.21)
In (1 -  /3) 4- In wt+
P Ext+1 E at+1 *  (Xt+i \X t) 7T (st+i\st ) (4.22)
\ip {st+i, X t+i) +   ^(st+i, X t+i) lniyt+i]
In (1 -  {3) +  lnwf+
P E x t+ 1 T.st+1 n (X t+l\X t) * (st+l\st)
\<p (st+1 , X t+1) +  C {st+1 , X t + 1) (In P +  In R (Xt+i \ st , X t ) +  In wt)]
max
kt+i,xt+i,bt+i
Equating coefficients we have:
(s<5 Xt) — 1 +  (3 E E  7T (Xt+l \Xt) 7T ( s £ + i | s * )  ( s t + l , X f + i )




+  max j 3 V ] y 2 T r ( X t+1\Xt )7r(st+i\st) 
kt+i,xt+i,bt+i r.—Xt+i st+ 1
tp(8t iX t) =  ] n ( l - 0 )  (4.24)
£ (st+i ,X t+i) (ln/3 4- ln i2(X f+i|si,X f))
+V7 ist+ i,X t+ i)
(4.25)
Equation (4.23) implies that
c(8t i X t) =
1 - 0
Plugging this into (4.24) we have
+ t max/, A E E ^ 1 ^ 1 \x t ) v ( s t+i\st)Kt + l ,Xt + l , b t + l  1 — p  Tr —
Xt+1  S t + 1
v ( s t , X t) =  In (1 - /3 )  (4.26)
]n0 +  ]n R (X t+1\8UX t)
+  (1 ~  P )  <P ( S f + l , ^ t + l )
(4.27)
Solving for the optimal portfolio allocation of the high productivity en­
trepreneurs (a) The value of the constraint binding
where
< 1  =
(At+i — OtEtA t+i) — +  qt+i — E tqt+i




(b) The value of the constraint not binding
Q, (It < 0t) =  max E t ln R ^ i
where 1—a
{At+\ — h E tA t+ i)   ----- +  qt+i — Etqt+ 1
t+1 +  - E t (qt+1-\-ltyt+i/k t+ i)
and
(4.29)
v ?  =  qt -  Et
qt+i
V alue function  iterations Let Rt+i (Xt+i |s /l, X*) denote the rate of return on 
entrepreneurial wealth under optimal leverage. We are now ready to compute the 
value functions by iterating on the functional equation below.
9  ( A X t )  =  In (1 -  0 ) + _ £ _  (Xt+1 \Xt) ,r (s t+1\sh)
P
ipd (Xt) =  In (1 -  0) +  J E  7r (Xt+1 \Xt)
inP +  l n R ( X t+1\sh, X t)
+ (1 — P)*P (st+ii^)+i)
(4.30)
+ (1 — P)v(s t+ii- t^+i)
(4.31) '
ln,3 +  ln I(A :(+1|s!,X f)
+  (1 - 0 )ipd {Xt+1)
(4.32)
C om puting  aggregate equilibrium  Armed with the optimal leverage functions 
It obtained in the solution of the maximisation step above, we are ready to compute 
equilibrium for a simulated time series of shocks.
From market clearing in the capital and the debt markets we can pin down the 
state contingent growth rate of the low productivity household without solving an 
explicit portfolio problem:
# + 1
At+i +  Qt+1 (1 — K t+1) + Et [Zt^ t+i + qt+iKt+i]




u f  =  qt -  Et
Rt+1
High productivity entrepreneurs invest the following fraction of their wealth in land.
K   ________________PdjWt________________ (4 34,
qt +  -  Et [ItYt+i/Kt+i +  q (Xm )]
Their rate of return is given by:
a H ( u H \  1 - a
r>H (At+i ~  ltEtAt+1 )  — +  qt+i -  Etqt+i 
^  =  q t+ ^ u ? - E t [ l tY t+ lI K M + qt+t] (4'35)
where the user cost of land is given by
=  qt -  Et
1
The real interest rate on debt securities is given by the consumption euler equation:
Finally, goods market clearing implies that:
(1 - P ) W t  +  —  [uf (1 -  K t+1) +  u ? K t+1] = W t - q t
OL
Using a zero-finding routine, solve for the values of {Rt ,  Kt+i ,q t ,  -Rf+i> R t + \ i u? •> ut-> Kt+1 } 
at which these conditions are satisfied up to an error tolerance level. I use Matlab’s 
own fsolve.m routine.
3. Use the state evolution equations to compute next period’s state vector:
Wt+1 =  [dtfig.! +  (1 -  dt) rtf+1] PWt (4.36)
. (1 — &)dtRt+1 4 " ( 1  — dt) Rf+1 ,,
rfi+1 -  d t R ^  +  d - d t ) ^  (4-37)
4. Repeat steps (l)-(3) for a large number of periods. Using the simulated data,
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update the price and forecasting function coefficients using linear regression.
5. Re-compute a simulated time series of the endogenous variables in our model 
economy under the new forecasting rule. Repeat steps (l)-(4) until the coefficients 
on the forecasting rule have converged up to an error tolerance level.
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